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Summary:
This thesis examines the relationship between J. Edgar Hoover and North Carolina 
State Bureau of Investigation directors and their career trajectories from 1937 to 1972 as 
a result of their public relations practices in high profile case investigations in the print 
media.
Although researchers argue that leadership characteristics impact law enforcement 
executives’ careers, an overlooked component is the relationship between directors’ career 
trajectories and print media when reporting on high profile cases. This thesis examines the 
consequences of high profile case investigations in the print media and directors’ career 
trajectories. Namely, J. Edgar Hoover and State Bureau of Investigation directors’ career 
trajectories are examined to demonstrate how directors used the print media to prolong 
their tenure. This thesis argues that State Bureau of Investigation directors modeled their 
public relations style in the print media and high profile investigations after Hoover’s in 
order to accomplish a positive career trajectory.
This thesis also argues that career trajectory outcomes of State Bureau of 
Investigation directors who emulated Hoover’s style of using the print media in high 
profile investigations were distinguished by prolonged career tenures. State Bureau of 
Investigation directors less efficacious in emulating Hoover’s style were characterized 
with negative career trajectories. In order to better understand this career advancement 
outcome, the research problem is examined on the basis of a triangular relationship 
between Hoover’s public relations practices, the State Bureau of Investigation’s public 
relations practices that were modeled after Hoover, and print media’s coverage of high 
profile case investigations from both agencies.
This thesis concludes that there is a direct correlation between law enforcement 
directors’ career advancements and their public relations practices related to print media 
coverage of high profile cases.
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Preface
This thesis examines the relationship between J. Edgar Hoover and North Carolina 
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) directors and their career trajectories from 1937 to 
1972 as a result of their public relations practices in high profile case investigations in the 
print media.
Although researchers argue that leadership characteristics impact law enforcement 
executives’ careers, an overlooked component is the relationship between directors’ career 
trajectories and print news media when reporting on high profile cases. This thesis 
examines the consequences of high profile case investigations in the print media and 
directors’ career trajectories. Namely, J. Edgar Hoover and SBI directors’ career 
trajectories are examined to demonstrate how directors used the print media to prolong 
their tenure. This thesis argues that SBI directors modeled their public relations style in 
the print media and high profile investigations after Hoover’s in order to accomplish a 
positive career trajectory. Furthermore, it argues that SBI directors who were less 
successful in using Hoover’s public relations style produced a negative career shift that 
resulted in a declining career trajectory. Although SBI directors modeled themselves after 
Hoover and his use of the print media, none of the SBI directors achieved a comparable 
prolonged tenure like Hoover.
This thesis argues that career trajectory outcomes of SBI directors who emulated 
Hoover’s style of using the print media in high profile investigations were distinguished by 
prolonged career tenures. SBI directors less efficacious in emulating Hoover’s style were 
characterized with negative career trajectories. While this research demonstrates that SBI 
directors experienced short-term career trajectory consequences compared to Hoover, 
both Hoover and SBI directors’ career advancements were directly impacted by print 
media coverage of high profile cases. In order to better understand this career 
advancement outcome, the research problem is examined on the basis of a triangular 
relationship between Hoover’s public relations practices, the SBI’s public relations 
practices that were modeled after Hoover, and print media’s coverage of high profile case 
investigations from both agencies.
This thesis concludes that there is a direct correlation between law enforcement 
directors’ career advancements and their public relations practices related to print media 
coverage of high profile cases. The consequence of SBI directors misunderstanding the 
significance of the media in high profile investigations limits the length of the director’s 
career tenure. Additionally, frequent changes in law enforcement administration as a 
result of diminished career tenures are likely to have administrative repercussions on 
impending law enforcement executive leadership.
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Introduction
This thesis examines the parallels that existed between the career trajectories of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director and North Carolina State Bureau of 
Investigation (SBI) Directors during the period 1937 to 1972. It shows how, with varying 
success, both J. Edgar Hoover and SBI directors utilized public relations practices, high 
profile case investigations, and the print media to promote positive career paths.
During this thirty-five year period, while these factors impacted directors’ career 
trajectories both the FBI and SBI experienced administrative changes that occurred in 
policing associated with three historical policing eras. The historical eras of policing 
according to George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore are compared to Soren Kierkegaard’s 
observation that life is lived forward, but understood backwards. Changing historical 
patterns in police directors’ selection and career tenure, like historical changes in general 
must be recognized and understood in order to appreciate and understand contemporary 
directors’ career trajectories that occur in police organizations.1 This premise is used to 
examine the positive and negative effects that print media coverage of high profile case 
investigations have on FBI and SBI directors’ career trajectories. When Hoover and SBI 
directors’ career trajectories are examined a correlation between print media coverage of 
high profile cases and the directors’ career trajectories is observable.
In research studies of law enforcement administrators’ careers in the United States, 
the correlation between print media, high profile cases and career trajectory has been 
overlooked. Therefore, the career trajectories of FBI and North Carolina SBI directors 
were selected for comparison in this research since the FBI directly impacted the 
formation of the SBI. This thesis also examines print media, high profile case 
investigations and their impact on J. Edgar Hoover and SBI directors’ professional 
success or failure, namely their career trajectories. Historically, the career trajectory 
experience or the director's professional accomplishments and failures, indicated a law 
enforcement agency's success or failure. Consequently recognizing these factors will 
benefit law enforcement agencies as well as directors.
1 Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofski, eds., Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality 
(New York: Praeger, 1988) p. 3.
1
The methodology for identifying high profile cases included interviewing the 
investigating agents with personal knowledge pertaining to high profile cases and 
directors’ careers. In order to assess the impact on public opinion, research also included 
locating articles in statewide and national newspapers that received substantial media 
coverage. Nevertheless, high profile cases are not necessarily cases that made substantial 
print media coverage, but are important to the agency. In these important investigations, 
one principal aspect of a high profile case often involved political interest. Frequently, the 
victim or suspect was a political figure, someone who had political connections, an 
important person in the community or a political constituent known personally by the 
director. The director, a supervisor, or someone of higher rank in the organization made a 
case important according to the degree of significance that they associated with the case. 
Although an examination of case investigation documents would have contributed in 
establishing high profile case investigations, actual SBI case investigation documents are 
unavailable.
Unlike Federal documents, SBI records in North Carolina are not applicable to the 
Federal Freedom of Information Act that provides public disclosure of federal government 
documents.2 SBI records are permanently sealed as mandated by North Carolina General 
Statutes; consequently, general access to SBI records and case files are prohibited.3 SBI 
records are only available with the director’s permission for legal inquiries into case 
investigations or by court order; otherwise, the research for this study would have 
included the actual case records.4 Therefore, since SBI records are not public documents, 
the method of selecting high profile cases for this research was from two primary sources
2 Guide to Research Materials in the North Carolina State Archives: State Agency Record 
(Raleigh, NC: Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Archives and 
Records Section, 1995) p. 439.
3 North Carolina Legislature, House of Representatives, House Bill 195, Chapter 280: An Act to 
Amend Section 114-15 o f the General Statutes o f North Carolina Relating to Records o f the State Bureau 
of Investigation (Raleigh, North Carolina: General Assembly, 1947).
4 James J. Coman, Personal Interview of Former Guilford County Assistant District Attorney, 
Former Chief of the Criminal Division of the N.C. Department of Justice, Former SBI Director and Senior 
Deputy Attorney General, 24 March 2000.
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as previously noted. They included the print media and interviews with agents and former 
directors who had primary knowledge of cases and print media that influenced the 
directorship during this thirty-five-year period of police history.
This thesis will also cover the historical development of the North Carolina SBI 
and its directors from Frederick Handy through Charles Dunn whose publicity styles and 
tenures paralleled J. Edgar Hoover’s. The SBI and its appointment policy for directors 
have not been previously researched. This is the first outside original examination of 
factors that influenced the appointment process for the SBI directors and their career 
trajectories.
Throughout the history of American police, the directorship in federal and state 
law enforcement agencies has undergone significant reform as a result of political and 
cultural changes to the organizations. Scholars of Harvard University's Kennedy School 
of Government divided American policing into three eras, political, reform, and 
community policing. Each has a unique administrative approach to law enforcement 
operations. Hoover and the SBI directors’ career trajectories and the influence of high 
profile investigations and the print media were examined in the context of these three 
policing eras.
The first era began in the 1840s and ended in 1929 and is described as the political 
era due to the relationship between the police and public officials. Communities benefited 
from police services; however, police directors’ allegiance was to the powerful influential 
politicians. The second period began in 1930 and extended until the 1970s. This period 
was referred to as the reform era, and is recognized as a period of professionalism. Law 
enforcement directors concentrated their efforts on investigating major crimes such as 
organized crime, narcotics, homicide, robberies, and arson. The final era began in the 
1970s. This era has been identified as community policing and the agency partners with 
the community. This era developed from a need to resolve community problems that 
emerged between the community and police.5
5 Frank Schmallenger, Criminal Justice Today: An Introductory Text fo r  the Twenty-First 
Century (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991) p. 180.
3
Since the origin of law enforcement agencies in America and throughout these eras 
in police history, law enforcement agencies have not traditionally practiced a standardized 
method for the selection and tenure of law enforcement directors.6 Although during these 
three eras, traditional promotional methods influenced directors’ career trajectories this 
research also indicated that Hoover and SBI directors’ public relations practices in print 
media coverage of high profile case investigations played a salient role in their career 
outcomes as well.
In 1908, nearly a quarter of a century before the political era in police history 
ended, the earliest federal law enforcement agency that lead to the creation of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation was established. By the 1930s many states soon followed suit by 
organizing state law enforcement agencies. North Carolina formed the State Bureau of 
Identification and Investigation in 1937 during the reform era; however, the turbulent 
political era influenced the director’s career trajectory.
When the gubernatorial candidate won the governor’s race, the first SBI director 
was appointed by the new governor as a political favor and worked at the pleasure of the 
governor. Even during this early period, police directors selected by politicians were 
aware of the consequences of the print media and avoided any negative print media 
publicity that may cause their political superiors to question their appointments.7
Although politics influenced the tenure of federal and state law enforcement 
directors, essential to both positions was the impact of high profile case investigations and 
the print media. Like other state law enforcement agencies throughout the United States, 
initially, Hoover observed strict hiring standards while the SBI directors determined the 
hiring criteria for agents. However, multiple internal and external factors influenced the
6 David R. Johnson, American Law Enforcement: A History (St. Louis, Missouri: Forum Press, 
1981) pp. 57-58. According to Johnson, early in law enforcement organizations like New York City, one 
of the first modem police agencies, personnel recruitment, hiring, and promotion were influenced by 
political favors since police administrations were elected or appointed by elected officials. Consequently, 
the first law enforcement officers and directors were often hired and promoted based on their friendship 
with politicians.
7 James Bradshaw, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Assistant Director, 27 
November 1995. Bradshaw recalled the consequences of negative publicity to Powell’s position as SBI 
Director.
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selection process for the director. This thesis argues that high profile cases and print 
media coverage affected directors by strengthening or weakening their career trajectories.
At the state level, particularly with the SBI during this period, two former agents 
who investigated high profile cases and received extensive positive print media coverage 
of case investigations advanced and became SBI directors.8 As directors, they continued 
their public relations practices that were modeled after Hoover’s publicity style and 
utilized the print media and high profile cases to propel their successful career trajectories. 
A review of Hoover’s publicity style using the print media and the SBI directors’ 
emulation of Hoover will demonstrate the effect of high profile cases and print media on 
their career trajectories. While political changes in the attorney general’s office frequently 
had an adverse affect on the directors’ career trajectories, high profile cases in the print 
media generally had a positive effect on their career advancement.9
Although career advancement in law enforcement has been studied, researchers 
have not examined print media and high profile cases as variables that impact chief 
executives’ career trajectories in law enforcement. Police executives’ career advancement 
research includes traditional aspects of the promotional process. Among the literature 
surveyed involving police promotions, none referenced the impact of the print media in 
high profile cases on police directors’ career trajectories. Following are some research 
studies that examine career advancement in law enforcement.
Police researcher David R. Young described the selection, career advancement, 
and promotional process by evaluating historical, organizational and philosophical aspects 
of law enforcement. Young determined that some of the first police agencies’ recruitment, 
hiring, and promotional practices were tainted by political corruption since elected officials 
appointed police administrators. Young’s research did not consider the effect of print
8 James R. Durham, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Documents Examiner, 
Supervisor, Assistant Director, and SBI Acting Director, 16 December 1997. Durham noted that 
Creekmore and Powell became directors prior to 1972.
9 Dan Gilbert, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Supervisor, 18 January 1998.
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media in high profile cases on police executives’ career trajectory during the political era. 
His research focused primarily on the political impact of police executives’ careers.10
Additionally, researchers, Karen Boehnke and Andrea DiStefano, compared 
traditional law enforcement organizations to military organizations. These two 
researchers determined that the leader’s role in the organization influences the promotional 
process. Their research also failed to consider the effect of the print media and high 
profile investigations on police leaders’ career trajectories.11
August Vollmer, Chief of Police, Berkeley, California; Professor of Police 
Administration, University of Chicago and the University of California, used research in 
order to establish appropriate police assignments based on officers’ potential. During the 
time he observed career trends in law enforcement, the Civil Service exam was a 
commonly used method to make career determinations; however, Vollmer concluded in 
his research that the Civil Service exam should not be used as a conclusive measure to 
determine law enforcement personnel’s capabilities. Although Vollmer did extensive 
research in the area of career advancement, there is no indication that he considered the 
impact of the print media and high profile cases on career advancement or the longevity of 
directors in positions of authority at the federal or state law enforcement level.12
Police management researchers William Melnicoe and Jan Menning incorporated a 
broad spectrum of instruments in their study that many police management studies include: 
written examination, oral interview, appraisal boards, social skills tests; service ratings, 
seniority, peer ratings, and assessment centers. They also discuss two traits that could be 
closely associated with career trajectories that are influenced by the print media in high 
profile case investigations. However, these two traits, extroversion and aggressiveness,
10 Johnson pp. 57-58.
11 Karen Boehnke and Andrea C. DiStefano, “Leadership for Extraordinary Performance,” 
Business Quarterly 61 (1997): pp. 54-56.
12 August Vollmer, The Police and Modem Society (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1971) pp.
225-230.
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are not associated in their study with print media in high profile cases on career 
trajectories of senior administrators.13
Dennis R. Baltzley concluded in his study that the Behavioral Assessment 
Dimension Guided Evaluation (BADGE) is the most effective method to evaluate 
leadership potential among law enforcement officers. BADGE is a revamp of the oral 
interview process. The candidate for promotion is required to describe on-the-job 
situations before an interview board. After interviewing applicants, the board makes a 
recommendation to the hiring official or the board will be empowered to employ the 
applicant. Although the oral interview that is a component of the BADGE method has 
been used to select SBI directors, this study also does not include the influence of print 
media in high profile case investigations in determining potential SBI director candidates 
and their influence on directors’ career trajectories.14
Many surveys conducted by researchers observe promotional practices within the 
lower ranks of law enforcement. Douglas Cederblom, an industrial psychologist, 
examined written exams and studied their effectiveness in determining career 
advancement. His findings indicated that written tests are not a conclusive measure of all 
qualifications needed for promotion. Cederblom, like other researchers who have studied 
promotional aspects in law enforcement, makes no mention of print media in high profile 
cases as a significant factor in career trajectory.15
Studies include research pertaining to career advancement ranging from education 
and training to police psychology and behavior. Researchers make valid recommendations 
for effective methods in determining police candidates for advancement in their careers. 
However, none of the research discussed the tenure of senior police executives and factors 
that heighten or diminish their career trajectories. Furthermore, print media in high profile
13 William B. Melnicoe and Jan C. Menning, Elements o f Supervision, 2nd ed. (Encino, 
California: Glencoe Publishing Co., Inc., 1978) p. 41.
14 Dennis R. Baltzley, “Filling the Gap Between Written Tests and Assessment Centers,” The 
Police Chief58 (1991): p. 47.
15 Douglas Cederblom, “Written Promotional Exams: How Good are They,” The Police Chief SI 
(1990): pp. 27-28.
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investigations is not examined as an aspect that decreases or increases directors’ career 
tenures.
Additionally, researchers have not conducted any comparative studies examining 
state law enforcement directors who emulated Hoover’s public relations methods and their 
consequential impact on career trajectories. Since SBI directors emulated Hoover’s public 
relations style in publicizing high profile cases that affected their career trajectories, the 
origin and development of the SBI as well as the directors who followed Hoover’s print 
media paradigm are examined.
Traditionally, numerous factors have influenced the promotional process of police 
leaders: organizational structure, politics, professional associations, unions, federal
legislation, training and standards. Law enforcement organizations were structured 
similarly to military organizations. Leaders of a bureaucratic hierarchy profoundly 
influenced an orgamzation depending on their philosophy or leadership roles.16 
Furthermore, the relationship between politicians and police administrators influenced the 
career trajectory of directors. Also, early in the history of police organizations, 
professional associations and unions formed that played an essential role in the career 
trajectories of police directors.17 Although early organizations were not associated with 
the labor movement, professional organizations and associations emerged that advocated 
fair standards and practices in the selection and promotional criteria for employees. 
Namely, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) supported the formation 
of civil service for police officers.18 It also advocated removal of political influence and
16 Boehnke pp. 56-64.
17 Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism: Power and Impact in Public-Sector 
Bargaining (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973) pp. 15-17. The first national organization affiliated 
with a labor union was the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). 
Another early union-like organization, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) formed in Pittsburgh in 1915.
18 Steffen W. Schmidt, Mack C. Shelley, II, and Barbara A. Bardes, American Government and 
Politics Today (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1985) pp. 454-455. The Pendleton Act, most 
commonly referred to as the civil service act, was the forerunner of other federal legislation that protects 
employees and guarantees a fair and nondiscriminatory work environment.
control from the agencies.19 However, the political process continued to pervade the 
director’s position and it remained a political appointment within the FBI as well as the 
SBI.20
In the early 20th century, police professionalism suffered in the United States. As 
evidence, there were several police scandals throughout the United States that brought 
national attention to the activities of law enforcement agencies. Consequently, President 
Herbert Hoover created the national Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement to 
examine these problems. Named after its chairman, George Wickersham, the Wickersham 
Commission focused on political corruption and police brutality. Three major 
recommendations of the commission were to strengthen personnel standards, centralize 
police administration, and implement the use of technology.21 Additional
recommendations of the Wickersham Commission that resulted in more professional 
police agencies were to change the police selection and promotional procedures. Also, the 
commission recognized that state police agencies could offer substantial assistance in the 
form of expertise and resources to local law enforcement in rural areas.22 The 
recommendations of the Wickersham Commission constituted a major reform policy in 
law enforcement and the reform reinforced positive career trajectory outcomes for law 
enforcement professionals.
While the Wickersham Commission was being established in Washington, D.C., on 
the west coast, Vollmer, the researcher previously discussed who did extensive research 
on law enforcement career advancement, was contributing significantly to the 
professionalism of law enforcement. According to Vollmer, if untrained and unfit
19 Joseph J. Senna and Larry J. Seigel, Introduction to Criminal Justice (St. Paul, Minnesota: 
West Publishing Company, 1993) p 217.
20 Bryan Beatty, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Attorney, Assistant Attorney 
General, Deputy Attorney General, SBI Director, and Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety, 16 
February 2000. Attorney General Michael Easley appointed Beatty as SBI Director. When Easley was 
elected Governor, he appointed Beatty to the position of Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety.
21 Larry K. Gaines, Michael Kaune, and Roger Leroy Miller, Criminal Justice (Belmont 
California: Wadsworth, 2000) pp. 119-120.
22 Richard N. Holden, Law Enforcement: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 
1992) p. 68 and p. 85.
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individuals were hired in law enforcement, disrespect and distrust by the general citizenry 
would eventually result in the demise of the law enforcement organization.23 Vollmer 
utilized postsecondary educational institutions for police training, was the first to 
incorporate vehicles for police patrol, and employed scientists to assist in evidence 
examination. Vollmer was instrumental in the development of the first criminal justice 
training program in the United States.24
Another contributor to police reform was O. W. Wilson. Wilson, a protege of 
Vollmer, developed a style of policing known as the professional model. This model 
advocated the use of a bureaucracy for efficiency in the police organization, the 
incorporation of new technology and the elimination of politics from police work.25
While police researchers like Vollmer, Wilson and officials of the Wickersham 
Commission made recommendations, a modernization process transpired across the 
United States in police agencies. Some of the first changes of this modernization process 
involved restructuring the department by promoting ethical supervisors and establishing 
selection standards for new recruits. The objective was to deter future internal corruption 
among law enforcement officers.26 Consequently, early hiring standards, even though 
rudimentary at best, were developed to hire qualified candidates to fill police positions and 
promote competent, ethical officers to supervisory and administrative ranks within police 
agencies. Professional developments at the entry level had the potential to impact the 
senior administrative and directorship positions when recruits who were hired based on the 
minimum training and standards criteria eventually advanced to the director’s position.
However, not only did traditional factors that influenced the overall selection and 
promotional process in police organizations potentially impact directors’ career 
trajectories, additional factors influenced the directors’ career trajectories who had direct
23 Vollmer p 216.
24 Gaines pp. 120-121.
25 Gaines pp. 120-121. Wilson’s professional model involved the creation of police units such as 
traffic squads, vice squads, and investigative units that had citywide jurisdiction.
26 Gaines p. 120.
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and indirect involvement in high profile case investigations that received print media 
coverage. Although many changes occurred in police organizations during Hoover’s 
tenure, he maintained his position as FBI director as a result of information he obtained as 
well as high profile investigations and his publicity style. In addition, the career 
trajectories of SBI directors’ who emulated Hoover’s publicity style were directly 
impacted by their actions while professional changes in policing occurred.
Modernization and professional developments continued and throughout the 
United States police organizations adopted minimum standards and training for police 
officers.27 North Carolina was consistent with other states across the nation. Initially, the 
SBI director selected, interviewed, hired, and promoted agents based on the director’s 
criteria. However, like other police agencies that were challenged to become more 
professional, the SBI adopted a standardized hiring and promotional process influenced by 
the state’s minimum training and standards council.28
As states adopted minimum standards guidelines, the professional environment in 
law enforcement agencies strengthened and as a result, the career trajectories of law 
enforcement directors were either reinforced or jeopardized. Not only was print media 
coverage of high profile cases important to the director’s career trajectory, but also as a 
result of the professional developments that came about as a result of minimum standards, 
the director’s professional involvement in high profile investigations were more closely 
scrutinized by the print media.
The primary purpose of the minimum standards and training council was to 
establish minimum training standards. However, three law enforcement associations, the 
IACP, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), and the 
National Sheriffs Association (NSA) promoted promotional procedures. Ultimately, 
accreditation was established to promote professionalism in the agencies.29 Each law
27 Charles R. Swanson, Leonard Territo and Robert W. Taylor, Police Administration: 
Structures, Processes, and Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1988) p. 30.
28 Albert Coates, The Beginning of Schools fo r Law Enforcing Officers in North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill, NC: Professor Emeritus Fund, 1983) p. 143.
29 Martin I. Kurke and Ellen M. Scrivner, eds., Police Psychology Into the 21st Century 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1995) p. 32-33.
11
enforcement agency could not decrease the minimum standards training topics or lecture 
times. The police selection process varied throughout the United States, and individual 
state training and standards councils generally determined the minimum standards for 
entry-level positions
Although FBI and SBI directors were both appointed through the political process, 
some directors advanced from within the ranks of the law enforcement agency. 
Historically, the law enforcement director’s selection and career trajectory was determined 
by political favoritism. However, additional factors increased agents’ career trajectories 
and influenced the attorney generals who appointed directors. Those factors included high 
profile cases reported in the print media. Agents who investigated high profile cases 
reported in the print media were perceived as leaders. Therefore, the perception of agents 
by political leaders and professional hiring criteria at the entry level influenced directors’ 
career trajectories. Even though SBI agents were initially hired based on the director’s 
judgment, eventually agents were required to have a college degree.30
Also, examined are the comparable characteristics between the FBI and the SBI, 
the use of high profile cases reported by the print media and the consequences they had on 
Hoover and SBI directors’ career trajectories. More specifically, it will be argued that 
high profile cases augment the length of career tenure for directors who use publicity to 
advance their public image thereby influencing public perception as well as politicians who 
appointed them. Conversely, disparaging print media coverage of high profile cases 
decreases the length of career tenure if the media denigrates or distorts the directors’ 
actions or image. Therefore, the effect of print media coverage of high profile cases is 
analyzed by examining the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the North Carolina State 
Bureau of Investigation.
After careful examination of the literature on Hoover, his publicity style and its 
relationship to his career trajectory, research indicates that the relationship between his 
career trajectory and the print media in high profile case investigations has not previously
30 Stephen R. Jones, Personal Interview of Former SBI Latent Print Examiner and Special Agent,
30 September 1998. Jones said SBI Directors Anderson, McBryde, and Dunn would not allow him to 
transfer from the lab to the field as an investigative agent since he did not have a baccalaureate degree.
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been studied. Therefore, these factors are examined in this thesis in relationship to his 
influence in the law enforcement community and the power he exercised over the FBI, 
constituents, politicians, and print media. J. Edgar Hoover made an indelible impression 
on the law enforcement community and especially SBI directors who emulated his 
publicity style. However, although SBI directors emulated Hoover’s print media 
practices, none of the SBI directors experienced long-term successful career trajectory 
outcomes like Hoover.
Two main differences between Hoover’s FBI at the national level and the SBI at 
the state level were the availability of resources and national jurisdiction. Hoover had 
extensive resources and federal law that gave him jurisdiction to collect information on 
citizens. This included sensitive information on political leaders and important people 
throughout the nation.31 On the other hand, the SBI did not have the resources or the 
legal authority to collect information on citizens. Therefore, the SBI directors had less 
political advantage than Hoover to control their career trajectories. Hoover was able to 
use this information along with high profile investigations and the print media to maintain 
his career trajectory.
Chapter one examines historical periods of policing in America in which the major 
eras are identified as well as discusses their influence on police organizations. Also, 
included are the affects of the political era on policing and the formation of the FBI and 
SBI during a period of political turmoil and corruption. This chapter presents the gradual 
addition of increased hiring standards for law enforcement officers and the development 
and implementation of professional training for officers entering the profession and the 
potential for these factors to impact directors’ career trajectories. In addition to 
traditional promotional procedures, high profile cases are defined and illustrated to 
demonstrate their effect on the professional success or failure of law enforcement agency 
directors during the early historical periods of policing. This thesis defines professional
31 Melissa August, Elizabeth L. Bland, Janice Horowitz, Roy B. White, and Rebecca Winters, “27 
Years Ago in Time,” Time, 159:24 (2002): p. 23.
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success or failure as the positive or negative outcome of FBI and SBI directors’ career 
tenures and is referred to as career trajectory.
While there is a shift from political to professional emphasis in the selection 
process of law enforcement directors during the policing eras, the impact of directors’ 
exploitation of print media coverage of high profile cases on their careers is also examined. 
In addition, the origin of the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover’s utilization of high profile cases 
and the print media are detailed and examined in order to establish their relationship with 
Hoover’s career trajectory. Hoover controlled the release of information in high profile 
case investigations and that became identified as his style of reporting news to the print 
media. This style benefited him and became the model for SBI directors who successfully 
imitated his news release method of high profile case investigations.
In the early 1930s when the FBI was newly formed, Attorney General Homer 
Cummings successfully established and promoted a positive relationship with the print 
media.32 Cummings fostered the public relations strategy that Hoover implemented and 
cultivated. Once law enforcement directors, especially J. Edgar Hoover, realized the 
significance of developing congruent relationships with the print media, they gained 
professional empowerment and achieved advances in their career trajectories.
Chapter one examines Hoover’s publicity methods and his rising career trajectory 
with the FBI. Hoover diverts print media attention away from the criminal and redirects it 
in order to venerate the FBI as well as himself. The outcome was a favorable reflection on 
Hoover’s character and reputation as a leader. As the head of the FBI, Hoover used all 
types of media and especially the print media to broadcast his ideal of America’s most 
wanted image of the FBI and himself. Director Hoover became entrenched in the mind of 
the reader as an arch nemesis crime fighter as a result of the print media.
While Hoover established and reinforced his command and control of law 
enforcement and the print media at the federal level, the state of North Carolina initiated a 
state law enforcement agency, the State Bureau of Identification and Investigation (SBI & 
I); later the agency name changed to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). The origins
32 Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life ofJ. Edgar Hoover (New York: 
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1993) pp. 100-101.
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of the SBI, its first two leaders and promotional developments under their leadership are 
examined in this chapter. Director Frederick Handy, the first SBI director, studied 
selected local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in the United States and 
subsequently created an agency similar to the FBI. Not only did Handy model the SBI 
after the FBI, but through discussion of the print media’s coverage of high profile case 
investigations, like Hoover, Handy also made the news releases and bolstered the agency’s 
image by using publicity to generate political and public support for the fledgling state law 
enforcement agency. In view of this, print media coverage of high profile cases benefited 
the director professionally in his political ambitions and his career trajectory.
This chapter will show that directors were recognized for their leadership abilities 
when their agents conducted high profile case investigations that reflected a favorable 
image of the agency. An account of the agents’ tireless efforts in investigating a high 
profile case illustrates the direct career trajectory impact that agents have on directors’ 
positions in law enforcement agencies. Although Handy modeled the SBI after the FBI, 
his position as director did not prevail for decades. However, agents acknowledged that 
the organizational structure of the SBI was similar to the FBI and credited Director Handy 
with that accomplishment.33
In addition, this chapter examines the correlation between the SBI and the FBI, 
and it is evident from the administrative structure of the SBI that Handy’s blueprint 
originated from the FBI.34 Like Hoover, Handy’s career trajectory was positively 
influenced by the way he handled the print media in reporting high profile crimes 
investigated by agents under his direction. When Handy retired he recommended Thomas 
Creekmore to lead the SBI and the attorney general concurred. There is a lack of high 
profile case investigations reported in the print media during Creekmore’s limited tenure 
but his tenure is steeped in political connections. SBI directors who succeeded Handy and 
Creekmore emulated Hoover’s public relations practices in reporting high profile case
33 Bradshaw 2 December 1995.
34 John B. Wemyss, Personal Interview, Former SBI Special Agent, 7 November 1998.
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investigations to the print media and discussions of their career trajectories are included in 
the subsequent chapters.
Chapter two shows an increase in directors providing high profile case 
investigation information to the press throughout the post war years. While the print 
media coverage expands during this period, directors’ career trajectories continue to 
reflect the impact of the print media reporting news stories related to high profile case 
investigations. Also, chapter two includes an examination of studies conducted during this 
period that were designed to assess professionalism, promotional practices and the 
implementation of the findings in these areas in an effort to counteract corruption in law 
enforcement. At the same time these studies prompted changes in police administrations, 
the ongoing influence of the print media and high profile case investigations on directors’ 
career trajectories continued to occur. This time of change in police history came to be 
known as the reform era. During this period, organizations emerged that revolutionized 
the philosophy of police administration and public relations styles. They were interested in 
reforming police administration practices through collecting, studying, standardizing, and 
summarizing factual data to promote professionalism in law enforcement and facilitated 
mutual cooperation between agencies. Prior to this period in police history, directors 
experienced challenges in promoting a positive image through the print media due to the 
popularity among the print media to report corruption and scandals. Chapter two 
illustrates the consequences of positive print media reporting of high profile case 
investigations on directors’ career trajectories during this period of reform. Although 
none of the SBI directors maintained their positions as director as long as Hoover, the SBI 
directors’ who emulated Hoover’s public relations style benefited with increased tenures. 
In the early 1940s, the print media exposure was primarily negative because corruption 
was prevalent during the previous political period in law enforcement agencies at every 
level. Chapter two shows that while organizational reform had an impact on the 
professionalism of police organizations, print media trends also reformed and began to 
report on high profile case investigations with a more positive emphasis toward police 
leaders.
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Chapter two introduces the shift from the political to the reform era as evidenced 
through training and education for law enforcement personnel. As a result of this shift, the 
SBI experienced the advantage of training provided by the agency that it was modeled 
after. Noted is Hoover’s first step toward reform in North Carolina law enforcement. He 
released one of his FBI training agents to assist with training at the Institute of 
Government in Chapel Hill. Training and education fostered a more professional agency 
equipped to promote better relations with the print media thus advancing directors’ career 
trajectories. Although more in depth print media reporting of high profile cases occurred 
during the beginning of the reform era, even more occurred during the mid to late 1940s.
Chapter two examines, in particular, research focusing on traditional and non- 
traditional leadership attributes and their effect on directors’ careers. In a study conducted 
by Melville Dalton, his research findings are relevant when applied to the career outcomes 
of directors’ who supervise investigators who work high profile cases.35 This chapter 
illustrates that investigators of high profile cases enabled their directors to receive 
additional print media recognition through their association with the investigators. 
Additionally, this chapter illustrates that while agencies continued to adapt their 
promotional standards, the use of print media in high profile cases continued to play an 
important part in the director’s tenure.
Chapter two relates how Hoover remained steadfast in the political arena and 
maintained his position as director. Despite investigations that could potentially cause 
some directors’ career trajectories to plummet, Hoover championed his position through 
the print media when investigations involving the espionage, Communism, and organized 
crime ensued. In contrast, it will be shown that two of the SBI directors, Anderson and 
Powell, were unable to endure political pressure despite the fact that they emulated 
Hoover’s print media practices and temporarily experienced promising career trajectories. 
Anderson and Powell had different administrative management styles and philosophies, but 
they both experienced positive career trajectories because of their practices utilizing the 
print media in reporting high profile case investigations. Although they experienced
35 Melville Dalton, “Informal Factors in Career Achievement,” American Journal o f Sociology 
56:5  (1951): pp. 407-408.
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positive career trajectory benefits from print media coverage of high profile cases, the two 
SBI directors’ potentially long-term benefits were short lived due to changes in the 
political climate at the state level.
As the reform era continued, chapter three examines the consequences of 
technological changes that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s. Print media options 
expanded. For example, the AP provided a more global audience, and directors took 
advantage of the worldwide dissemination of high profile investigations using this 
advanced print media. They reported such high profile case investigations as organized 
crime, Communism, counterintelligence, Civil Rights, local politics, and corruption that 
not only benefited their career trajectories but also in some instances devastated their 
career trajectories. This chapter discusses the decline in public and political support 
following newspaper reports of two high profile investigations involving an SBI agent and 
a state college basketball team scandal. We see in this chapter that unlike Hoover who is 
never defeated by negative print media, SBI directors cannot overcome the effects of 
negative print media on their career trajectories. In the print media, Hoover’s public 
position always put national security and interest first; therefore, he is perceived as the 
defender of American ideals. SBI directors discussed in this chapter did not have state 
issues that affected voters as much as Hoover did at the federal level; therefore, they 
remained at the mercy of the politicians not the voters.
Moreover, chapter three illustrates how political leaders not their constituents 
determined directors’ career outcomes based on the print media and high profile 
investigations. At the state level, we see how Jimmy Powell’s career trajectory as SBI 
director waned because the Attorney General was dissatisfied with Powell’s leadership. 
Consequently, print media reports developed that lead to an internal high profile 
investigation of Powell’s effectiveness as SBI director and eventually lead to this 
dismissal. Anderson replaced Powell and Anderson’s appointment to a second term to the 
SBI is a classic example of a master politician at work. Anderson was resourceful and
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knowledgeable pertaining to party politics.36 However, this chapter also demonstrates that 
negative print media coverage of high profile case investigations contributed to the decline 
of Anderson’s career trajectory. It is shown that decisive factors in the failure of 
Anderson’s administration were the consequence of the print media in the investigation of 
high profile cases.
This thesis concludes in chapter four with the concept of community policing and 
continues to explore the relationship of high profile case investigations in the print media 
on the career tenures of Hoover and SBI directors during this era. The community- 
policing era is representative of innovative technology and modern reform in police 
leadership styles. Examples of how Hoover and SBI directors used technology and 
criminal justice philosophy are discussed in reporting high profile case investigations 
associated with civil and social unrest. Even though these changes affected the directors 
of the FBI and SBI, they continued to use the print media in high profile cases to maintain 
positive career trajectories.
In some instances, the print media was used to describe innovative changes that 
reflected positively on the directors. It is demonstrated in this chapter by Hoover’s 
continued use of the “Ten Most Wanted List” and print media to publicize and assist in 
tracking down America’s most wanted criminals. The central theme that high profile cases 
reported in the print media impacts directors’ careers is reinforced throughout this 
chapter. Just as high profile case investigations impacted Hoover’s career trajectory early 
in his career, they continued to play a key role in Hoover’s final years as FBI director. 
This chapter notes the details of the Martin Luther King’s assassination and social unrest 
investigations that appeared in the print media. As a result, Hoover’s reputation was 
reinforced as the successful number one national crime fighter. SBI Director Charles 
Dunn’s tenure and his emulation of Hoover’s public relations practices that benefited him 
much like Hoover are discussed. That is to say, he was the beneficiary of public and 
political support that promoted his career trajectory as SBI director.
36 Warren W. Campbell, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Supervising 
Agent, 26 October 1997.
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C h a p ter  1
Career Trajectories of FBI and SBI Directors: Agency Evolution and Publicity 
Impact Top Administrators, 1937-1946
Eras in Policing
Trends in police leaders’ career advancement are fundamentally founded in the 
evolution of police organizations as they developed during the changing periods in police 
history. However, before J. Edgar Hoover became FBI director, no police leaders utilized 
the print media in high profile case investigations to advance their career to the extent that 
he did during any period in 20th century police history. While the periods in police history 
evolved, Hoover became a role model for state law enforcement directors, particularly for 
the directors of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation.
Researchers have identified three periods in police history using corporate analysis 
and organizational strategy as a model to examine past and present police conditions. 
They identified these periods as the political, reform and community eras. In this 
organizational analysis and evaluation, seven fundamentals are used to classify the three 
eras. They are authorization, function, organization, demand, environment, tactics and 
outcomes.
Police researchers, George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, characterized the first 
period in policing as the political era, and the seven fundamentals were assessed in their 
study of police. It was determined that locally controlled municipalities with no central 
controlling authority over the agencies authorized local law enforcement.1 Consequently, 
the police obtained both power and resources from political leaders. Furthermore, a 
strong bond between the two groups emerged, and to some extent a symbiotic relationship 
developed. In other words, the police relied on the politicians and the politicians relied on 
the police.
1 Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofski, eds., Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality 
(New York: Praeger, 1988) p. 3.
During the political era, police agencies served numerous functions such as 
assisting with community services involving the homeless and assisting emigrants with 
occupational needs generally at the direction of politicians. The organizational structure 
of early agencies was quasi-military in style and decentralized. For example, during the 
political era in New York City, a captain was assigned to each precinct and independently 
controlled precinct operations. The expectation may be that a quasi-military style 
organization is highly centralized; yet, the New York City Police Department at that time 
was not. They operated from a precinct or ward controlled by a politician. When citizens 
in the community including the politicians needed police service they made requests 
directly to the uniformed officer although the officer’s response was most often 
determined by political influence in the precinct. Like routine police operations, advances 
in career trajectories during the political era relied on the relationship between police and 
politicians.
Police tactics throughout the political era included foot patrol and detectives. The 
foot patrol officer customarily exercised any means necessary to carry out the politician’s 
wishes and did not expect to suffer any repercussions. During this period investigative 
divisions were in their early development, and it would be years before detective divisions 
earned today’s prestigious reputation in solving cases. Draconian methods and informants 
were employed to collect information and solve cases. In addition to solving cases with 
the information collected, frequently politicians benefited personally or politically from the 
information obtained. Unlike modern times, during the political era, the use of technology 
was limited; call boxes and automobiles comprised the most advanced technology at the 
time. Despite limited resources, police were expected to maintain order and respond to 
complaints in an emerging society. The most important goal for the police was to satisfy 
the politicians in power. Crime prevention was not a primary concern. Consequently, 
directors could expect to receive politically influenced promotions by being subservient 
and loyal to the political powers in their precinct or ward.
Following the political period, Kelling and Moore identified the second era in 
police history as the reform era. This period began in the late 1920s and continued 
through the 1970s. The impetus for change in law enforcement resulted from the efforts
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of two police administration pioneers, primarily O. W. Wilson and his protege, August 
Vollmer. Wilson’s fundamental objective was to advance police professionalism through 
the elimination of corrupt political influence and practices. At the same time that J. Edgar 
Hoover was orchestrating organizational reform in the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), Wilson was promoting and supporting reform in all police agencies throughout the 
United States.2 It was also during this period that the North Carolina State Bureau of 
Investigation (SBI) was created and the first director examined other law enforcement 
agencies to use as models in establishing a modern professional state investigative agency.3
J. Edgar Hoover Appointed as FBI Director
When Hoover became director of the Bureau of Investigation approximately 
twenty-five years after the bureau originated, he was charged with eliminating malfeasance 
that had become so prevalent in the agency. He initiated changes to restore the agency’s 
reputation. Since the FBI originated during the political era, it was embedded in political 
corruption. During that era dishonest political practices were all too prevalent and had 
tarnished the bureau’s image.4
Corruption and scandal were at their pinnacle when William J. Burns, the director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in office. Before becoming director of the FBI 
in 1921, he was Secret Service director until his retirement from that agency in 1909. 
After he retired from the Secret Service, he embarked on his privately owned investigative 
company, the William J. Burns National Detective Agency. His reputation for illegal entry 
and questionable investigative methods were apparently recognized as investigative
2 Greene pp 9-17.
3 Myron McBryde, Personal Interview of Former SBI Director, 19 December 1997. McBryde was 
a special agent with the FBI prior to becoming SBI director. He left the FBI to attend law school and was 
a practicing attorney when he received the appointment as director of the North Carolina SBI. As the 
chief executive of an agency modeled after the FBI, McBryde’s knowledge of the FBI’s structure and 
administration was useful in his role as SBI director.
4 Don Whitehead, The FBI Story A Report to the People (New York: Random House, 1956) pp
66-69.
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strengths rather than weaknesses until Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone took office. 
The new Attorney General Stone searched outside the agency for someone who had a 
distinctly contrasting and different character from Burns to fill the director’s position but 
was unable to find a satisfactory candidate.5
Herbert Hoover, who was not related to J. Edgar Hoover, recommended Hoover, 
a single attorney in his late twenties who worked in the Justice Department. When 
Attorney General Stone offered young Hoover the job, he responded, “I’ll take the job, 
Mr. Stone on certain conditions.... The bureau must be divorced from politics and is not 
to be a catch-all for political hacks.”6 Furthermore, Hoover emphasized that only the 
attorney general should maintain control over the bureau. J. Edgar Hoover was hired May 
10, 1924 and began cleaning out one of the most corrupt agencies in federal government 
at the time by firing employees who had been involved in unlawful activities.7
Hoover did not refer to his actions as reform, but future police researchers 
recognized Hoover’s action as the turning point in police history. Due to the history of 
scandals in the bureau throughout the administrations that preceded Hoover, his initial 
goal was to promote an image of professionalism within the agency and not to seek 
personal publicity. Despite his lack of interest in publicity initially, he eventually 
discovered the power of the media. Through media manipulation and high profile case 
investigations, Hoover was the first FBI director whose career trajectory surged upward 
as a result of using the media in his powerful position. He became one of the most highly 
publicized crime-fighting figures in America. Consequently, fledgling state investigative 
agencies recognized Hoover’s commitment to develop and maintain a professional law 
enforcement organization and fostered professional growth at the state level as they 
emulated Hoover and the FBI.
For example, North Carolina’s first SBI director, Frederick C. Handy sought to 
develop a professional state law enforcement organization by replicating many of 
Hoover’s successful innovations and public relations style. Also, just as Hoover was
5 Sanford J. Ungar, FBI (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1976) p. 45.
6 Ungar pp. 48.
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recognized nationwide, Handy was recognized statewide for developing a professional 
state law enforcement agency equipped with modern technology and staffed with educated 
agents of impeccable integrity.8 Handy, like Hoover utilized the print media at every 
opportunity to promote the newly formed agency and in so doing he garnered recognition 
for himself as well; however, Handy’s tenure as SBI director was short in duration 
compared to Hoover.
Through clever utilization and control of the print media, Hoover successfully 
maintained his position for over forty years without jeopardizing his appointment despite 
the fact that it was politically motivated. To better understand Hoover’s accomplishments 
as the highest police investigator in the nation, it is important to examine the background 
of crime detection at the federal level and the corruption within the Bureau of 
Investigation that led the agency to hire a director of his character.
Before the Bureau of Investigation, federal crime detection and investigations were 
the responsibility of the attorney general that served at the pleasure of the President. On 
September 24, 1789 during the first United States Presidency, Congress passed a law 
creating the first official federal law enforcement office in the nation, the Office of the 
Attorney General. For approximately one hundred years, the attorneys general did not 
have investigators at their disposal. If any case investigative work was required, it had to 
be done by the attorney general.
As the nation grew, criminal activity increased and the attorney general needed 
assistance in enforcing federal laws. Consequently, the Department of Justice was 
authorized by an act of Congress June 22, 1870 to enforce newly enacted federal laws. In 
less than a year after this congressional act was passed, the long trend that involved the
7 Ungar pp. 39-41.
8 John B. Wemyss, Personal Interview, Former SBI Special Agent, 7 November 1998. Wemyss 
was among the few original agents who was hired with expertise in a specialized area, photography, and 
had obtained education beyond high school. He attended Louisburg College, Wake Forest, North Carolina 
and was a newspaper photographer with the Fayetteville Observer prior to joining the SBI. When he was 
employed with the SBI, he worked as a special agent in the Raleigh, North Carolina office and 
periodically Director Handy commuted to work with Special Agent Wemyss. Wemyss’s expert knowledge 
in photography lead to his position in charge of the photographic laboratory and periodically, he assisted 
agents in the field by photographing major crime scenes. On occasion, Agent Wemyss’ photographs that 
involved SBI activities and high profile case investigations were released to the print media.
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attorney general working alone was about to change. March 3, 1871, congressional 
funding was appropriated that provided $50,000 solely for the purpose of federal crime 
detection and prosecution. For the first time in the history of the attorney general’s office, 
employees in other federal agencies, namely the Secret Service, could be hired to work for 
the attorney general when needed.9 Some of the funds were used to employ part-time 
investigators with the Pinkerton Detective Agency but Congress intervened in 1892 and 
stopped the practice.
Limited resources, political influence and corruption during the political era slowly 
eroded the integrity and respect the federal crime detection agency had held at one time. 
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt took the first initiative to create a central federal 
authority responsible for enforcement of federal laws. He was outraged that large tracts 
of government land were being taken from the government, but when he tried to put a 
stop to it, his efforts were unsuccessful. He instructed his attorney general, Charles 
Joseph J. Bonaparte to intervene but Bonaparte did not have the investigative resources to 
do the job and could not employ agents from the other two federal branches with 
investigators to help him. The only departments that had investigators at the time were 
the U.S. Post Office and the Treasury Department. Bonaparte employed some 
investigators from the Treasury Department but the opposing political constituents 
convinced Congress to intervene and prohibit Bonaparte from using the Treasury 
Department’s investigators.
In 1907 still under the Presidency of Roosevelt, Attorney General Bonaparte 
requested Congress to approve a small number of highly qualified, special investigators, 
some of whom were Treasury Department employees, to be designated as agents for the 
Department of Justice. Apparently, some of the same agents chosen by Bonaparte had 
successfully investigated a land fraud case that resulted not only in the indictment but the 
conviction as well of several congressmen. Consequently, Congress responded with
9 J. Edgar Hoover, introduction, The Story o f  the FBI: The Official Picture History of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Edited by Look editors (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co, Inc., 1947) pp 9-
10.
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legislation prohibiting the use of Treasury agents by the Department of Justice.10 On May 
27, 1908, the Sundry Civil Service Bill passed which barred secret service agents from 
working for the Department of Justice. A month later, Bonaparte ordered that any 
Department of Justice investigative concerns be assigned at Chief Examiner Stanley W. 
Finch’s discretion to a special agent.
Bonaparte’s tenure ended when William Howard Taft was elected as President and 
a new attorney general replaced Bonaparte. Though the new President was about to take 
office and the end of Bonaparte’s tenure was eminent, Bonaparte left his mark on the 
federal investigative agency. When Bonaparte prepared his annual report at the end of 
1908, he emphasized the importance of the attorney general’s control over the 
investigators and recommended the investigators report directly to the person holding that 
office. In the year that followed, President William Howard Taft appointed George W. 
Wickersham as Attorney General. The new attorney general agreed with his 
predecessor’s recommendation. The unit named by Wickersham, Bureau of Investigation, 
became widely accepted.
From 1908 when the Bureau of Investigation was organized until May 1924, 
controversial investigative activities by the Department of Justice investigators included: 
unfair treatment of suspected communists, Palmer Raids; mistreated draft dodgers, Slaker 
Raids; collusion with organized criminals; union activity interventions; wiretapping; and 
unlawful entry.11 The nature of the cases being investigated required strict hiring 
guidelines to ensure qualified agents were employed to detect and investigate federal 
criminal cases.
The FBI was organized under the United States Department of Justice with the 
director appointed by the U. S. Attorney General and is analogous to the SBI being 
organized under the North Carolina Department of Justice with the director appointed by 
the N. C. Attorney General. Originally, the SBI came under the control of the governor; 
however, on July 1, 1939 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a law that placed
10 Ungar pp. 39-40.
11 Ungar pp. 40-41.
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the SBI under direct control of the North Carolina Justice Department. The SBI director 
no longer reported to the governor but to another elected official, the state attorney 
general.
In 1939 when the SBI was removed from the governor’s control, the degree of 
political influence diminished but was not completely eliminated when the agency was 
transferred to the state attorney general’s office. The frequency that high profile case 
investigations were reported in the print media influenced the constituency’s perception of 
law enforcement under the control of the attorney general. Consequently, SBI directors’ 
career trajectories were impacted by the attorney general’s popularity among the voters 
based on their reaction to high profile case investigations reported in the print media.
In 1939 the print media was a primary source for news and information to the 
general population. Therefore, the print media provided an excellent source of 
information and documentation for the analysis of high profile cases reported by Hoover 
and SBI directors. While radio and television became increasingly popular, the print 
media continued to be a dominant force in the transmission of news and information. 
According to Dr. Ted Curtis Smythe, professor emeritus, School of Communications, 
California State University-Fullerton, the number of newspaper circulations per urban 
dwelling in the United States ranged from 2.36 to 1.33 from 1930 to 1970. Smythe 
acknowledged in his research that the print media “influences American society, 
economics, politics, and culture... ,”12 Articles that appeared in the print media pertaining 
to both the FBI and SBI demonstrate how SBI director Handy and those who followed 
him as director emulated Hoover’s utilization of the print media in high profile case 
investigations and the consequences on their career trajectories.
Unlike the FBI, the SBI did not originate from corrupt political practices within an 
existing law enforcement agency. On the other hand, the SBI originated from the political 
ambitions of Clyde R. Hoey, gubernatorial candidate. Hoey sought to win voter support 
by establishing a police retirement fund; thereby, he hoped to win votes from constituents 
in the law enforcement community in all one hundred North Carolina counties.
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Additionally, an aspect of the SBI that mirrored Hoover’s reforms was the SBI’s hiring 
standards that reflected the FBI’s hiring standards. The SBI emphasized hiring educated 
and qualified agents with specialized training to investigate criminal cases at the state 
level. In some cases the SBI was unable to fill positions with college graduates but hired 
experienced police investigators, some of whom were graduates of the FBI national 
academy.13
Throughout Hoover’s career as director, the FBI had limited original jurisdiction in 
specific areas of federal law, and the SBI had limited original jurisdiction in North 
Carolina state law much the same as the FBI. Congress determined the jurisdiction for the 
FBI and the jurisdiction for the SBI was determined by the General Assembly. The 
territorial area of the FBI was in the United States, and the territorial area of the SBI was 
in North Carolina. Both FBI and SBI provided a forensic science laboratory service to 
local law enforcement agencies for the analysis of physical evidence. Since the territorial 
jurisdiction of the FBI was national, they accepted physical evidence from any law 
enforcement agency in the nation. The SBI accepted physical evidence from any law 
enforcement agency in the state of North Carolina. Both agencies provided local support 
by assisting investigators with investigations and provided laboratory services for the 
analysis of physical evidence.14
Two primary objectives of both agencies were the detection of crime and 
apprehension of offenders.15 In order to accomplish these, each agency had three main 
divisions: support staff, field agents and laboratory agents. The FBI and SBI collected 
and maintained similar types of records such as criminal histories, investigative files, and
12 Ted Curtis Smythe, “The Diffusion of Urban Daily, 1850-1900,” Journalism History 2 (2002): 
pp. 73-95.
13 Warren W. Campbell, Personal Interview, Former SBI Special Agent and District Supervisor, 
26 October 1997. Campbell was a police investigator for the City of Goldsboro, North Carolina. After 
completing the FBI National Academy, he was hired as a special agent with the North Carolina SBI.
14 Robert W. Pope, Personal Interview, Former FBI and SBI Special Agent, 28 February 1998. 
After college and serving in the Korean War, Pope joined the FBI. Pope was employed with the FBI for 
approximately two years before being hired by the SBI where he worked for six years before pursuing his 
law degree.
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crime statistics. Each agency published a crime newsletter in order to apprise the agents 
of current criminal investigative activities. In order to prepare an elite law enforcement 
organization, both agencies implemented internal training for their personnel and external 
training for local law enforcement officers. The agencies also trained investigators to 
assist local authorities with minimum interference from supervisory personnel.16
Also, the bureaucratic organizational structure of the FBI and SBI shared 
commonalities. Neither of the agencies had uniformed officers. Their agents were plain 
clothed investigators. Just as the FBI had a central headquarters with field offices that 
were responsible for specific territorial jurisdictions, so did the SBI. Although both 
agencies had large jurisdictions each agent was assigned a specific area to work and was 
only responsible for that assigned area. FBI and SBI agents used the same type of 
investigative techniques and tactics to conduct criminal investigations even though the FBI 
had more resources than the SBI.17 In addition to the organization being very similar, SBI 
directors modeled Hoover’s public relations style when making news releases to the print 
media.
Notwithstanding the many similarities there were a few differences. One major 
difference between the agencies was that the FBI had responsibility for internal national 
security; however, the SBI never had a similar role. Conversely, the FBI never provided 
the security for the President; yet, the SBI provided personal security for the governor.
Selection, Training and Career Advancement
15 J. Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Annual Report of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation,” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938) p. 5.
16 J. P. Thomas, Personal Interview, Former SBI Special Agent, Supervising Agent, and 
Assistant Director, 10 April 1998. In addition to Thomas’ SBI duties, he also taught at the SBI Training 
Academy, conducted in-service training for all bureau agents, and provided workshops and seminars for 
local law enforcement. One of Thomas’ investigative specialties was safe robbery investigation.
17 Robert D. Emerson, Personal Interview, Former FBI and SBI Special Agent, 24 January 1998. 
After college and serving in the Navy as a Naval intelligence officer, Emerson became a special agent 
with the FBI. Subsequent to his experience with the FBI he joined the SBI. Although Emerson’s 
experience with the FBI was limited, he was immediately aware of the similarities between the two 
agencies.
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Early hiring guidelines in the Bureau of Investigation constitute the foundation and 
beginning of the reform era and very few modifications have been made throughout the 
years since their adoption in 1924. Agents had to be graduates of a recognized law school 
or college; age limits were 25 to 35 years of age for law graduates and 25 to 40 years of 
age for accountants. It was recommended that preferential consideration be given to 
applicants who graduated with a degree in law.18 Contrary to the political era when 
political connections were emphasized during recruitment, political consideration was not 
a widely popular criterion for employment during the reform era.
Mirrored in the modern hiring requirements are the same expectations and 
requirements of an agent in the days when Hoover became director of the bureau. Special 
Agent W. Mark Felt described the modern hiring process for new agents as “very 
demanding and very thorough” yet, the basic requirements are very similar to those 
adopted in 1924.19 The basic hiring standards still require that the applicant have a law 
degree with three years of experience. The employment application also asks detailed 
questions about every aspect of the applicant. If the applicant progresses to the next level, 
someone in the administrative division conducts an interview. The interviewer determines 
if the applicant is serious and career orientated.
After the interview, the applicant is required to pass a legal examination. The 
exam consists mainly of analyzing factual case situations to determine if a violation has 
occurred. At this stage the applicant is required to have a physical examination. In the 
meantime, the agency conducts a background investigation, checks educational records, 
employment records, and interviews references. It takes approximately two months from 
the time the application is filed before an applicant is offered a job.20 Hoover developed 
these strict hiring guidelines during the reform era in order to prevent political patronage 
within the agency that led to the corrupt practices early in the history of the bureau. As 
Felt indicated, they have undergone few changes.
18 Hoover, Story o f the FBI pp. 13-14.
19 W. Mark Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1979): p.
19.
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Initially, the SBI did not have the same minimum qualifications as the FBI; 
however, the SBI raised its entry requirements over a period of years to require applicants 
to have a college degree. Additionally, the original agents brought specialized skills with 
them from their previous occupations like fingerprinting, photography, handwriting and 
documents examinations, firearms, and tool marks. However, the SBI gradually 
implemented specialized training for new special agents. New agents who lacked 
specialized training in forensic areas received training from senior agents. In addition, 
early SBI training included senior agents mentoring new agents in apprenticeship type 
roles. The mentoring agent determined the training period for each agent. The training 
process became more structured as the SBI expanded.21
Traditionally, from the beginning of the reform era when hiring guidelines were 
widely adopted, hiring standards at all police organizations ensured that every new agent 
entered with the same qualifications. Considering this, every investigator had an equal 
opportunity to advance with the agency; however, factors outside the promotional process 
such as print media and high profile cases often affected investigators’ rates of 
advancement and their potential to become director.
During the reform era, print media became increasingly popular in publicizing high 
profile police investigations. Hoover was among the first who realized this and took 
advantage of the power the print media afforded investigators and investigative agencies 
to advance his career trajectory.
FBI Director, Public Relations and Use of Media
Hoover accepted the helm of the Bureau of Investigation with the intention of 
allowing Stone to make all the decisions and not be influenced by outside politicians. 
However, within a few years of becoming director, Hoover controlled the bureau, not the 
attorney general. Also, shortly following his appointment, when Hoover realized the
20 Felt p. 20-21.
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power and benefits of public relations that resulted when the bureau worked high profile 
cases, he wanted complete control of bureau news release responsibilities. J. Edgar 
Hoover is an example of how the media played a salient role in his career trajectory by 
keeping a law enforcement officer at the pinnacle of his career.
Jack Alexander with the New Yorker did a series of articles on J. Edgar Hoover in 
the thirties in which he suggested Hoover did not directly seek publicity. To the contrary, 
he said Hoover actually declined requests for information by writers and moviemakers. 
However, crime was so rampant in the mid-thirties, even though he initially sought 
attention for the agency not himself, Hoover received a significant amount of media 
attention. As the spokesperson for the bureau, he decided to take a proactive approach 
and become an anti-crime crusader through the print media. As director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Hoover realized he could use his position to fight crime by 
diverting the print media’s fascination and attention from the criminals to the FBI. Instead 
of the print media glorifying the criminal, his intent was to have them place the emphasis 
on eliminating crime and increasing awareness of the crime-fighting bureau, the FBI. 
However, the actual outcome was that Hoover received the attention thereby reinforcing 
his own position with the bureau and promoting his career trajectory.
In 1968 Drew Pearson, a columnist, wrote an article in True magazine detailing the 
events that removed Hoover from behind the closed secure doors of the bureau and thrust 
him into a very public life representing the federal crime detection agency. In Drew’s 
article he detailed how Jack Alexander, the New Yorker magazine writer who wrote about 
Hoover in the thirties, did not exactly portray Hoover’s desires for the limelight truthfully. 
According to Pearson, when Hoover communicated some FBI publicity concerns to the 
attorney general, the attorney general invited a group of reporters to a dinner to inquire 
about how to improve the bureau’s image.22 In a period of just a few days following the 
dinner, the attorney general hired Henry Suydam, the Washington chief correspondent for
21 Haywood Stading, Personal Interview, Former SBI Special Agent, Supervising Agent, and 
Director, 28 November 1997. Starling worked as a fingerprint identification expert for the City of 
Wilmington Police Department prior to joining the SBI in 1946.
22 Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life ofJ. Edgar Hoover (New York: 
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1993) pp. 100-101.
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the Brooklyn Eagle and later chief of the Washington bureau for Life Magazine, as a 
public relations specialist for the bureau. Suydam and Hoover became responsible for 
promoting the image that the attorney general wanted portrayed for the FBI.23
Within a year, Hoover, a man who was virtually unknown by anyone with the 
exception of only a few bureaucrats, became a legendary crime fighter for all Americans, 
and his name as well as the term G-men became household words. The term G-men was 
popularized by the print media to refer to government law enforcement agents and 
eventually appeared in North Carolina newspaper headlines as a result of SBI agents 
emulating their FBI role models.24 Magazine articles, newspaper stories, and movies all 
featured stories of how Hoover’s G-men solved cases. Some politicians were the first to 
criticize the Hoover publicity campaign. Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee and 
George W. Norris of Nebraska, both critics of Hoover and his publicity tactics suggested 
that Hoover compromised the FBI’s ability to solve cases by revealing their methods. 
Their negative reactions did not discourage Hoover; he continued his publicity campaign. 
Hoover soon discovered he not only enjoyed the limelight but also the association with 
celebrities. He even did an autograph signing session with Shirley Temple.25 Hoover’s 
exaggerated sense of self-importance and his career trajectory were successfully on the 
upswing.
Attorney General Homer Cummings produced a media blitz in 1933 and 1934. He 
sought to bolster the FBI’s image as America’s elite in the war on crime. Under the 
direction of Cummings, Hoover accomplished this by arresting or eliminating criminals 
like John Dillinger, Machine Gun Kelly, Pretty Boy Floyd and Baby Face Nelson. In late 
July 1933, the agency already had the media on its side because of its earlier gang busting 
exploits that made front-page news. In all of those front-page stories, Hoover played the
23 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1991) pp. 178-179.
24 “State G-Men Add-Science to Policing: Sleuths Encounter Comic Along with Tragic,” Mews 
and Observer 26 April 1942.
25 Richard Gid Powers, G-Men: Hoover’s FBI in American Popular Culture (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1983) pp. 97-98.
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supporting role to Cummings. When Suydam was replaced, Hoover’s role moved to the 
forefront in the publicity and the attorney general took a back seat. Suydam’s replacement 
was Louis Nichols.
Louis Nichols was in charge of Crime Records and Communications. The purpose 
of the office was strictly for producing FBI propaganda “and devoted to the greater glory 
of Edgar.... Edgar succeeded at self-advertisement like no comparable public figure....”26 
This section was primarily responsible for developing public messages for the FBI and 
Hoover. The messages bolstered Hoover’s reputation and centered on what Hoover 
wished to tell America. Saving America from destruction and Hoover’s ability to prevent 
and protect the fall of America through the FBI were the general themes. Hoover also 
used the messages from this department as a forum to bash political enemies.
The media events that brought Hoover center stage in 1935 were the radio stories, 
television shows, and print media that followed from popular sensational accounts of real 
criminal cases and the “G-men.” “Hoover’s emergence as the symbolic leader of 
American law enforcement was a vivid demonstration of public opinion’s power to 
reshape political realities in the United States, and the popular arts’ power to determine 
what the public believes.”27 After successful radio and television programs, the 
newspapers continued to carry the message, “Hoover’s F.B.I.” According to Tom 
Wicker, a New York Times Magazine writer, “J. Edgar Hoover wielded more power, and 
wielded it longer, than any man in American history.”28
Courtney Ryley Cooper, a free-lance writer who specialized in crime stories, was 
the first writer to organize FBI activities into a story instead of developing individual 
episodes as stand-alone-pieces. In 1933 American Magazine assigned him to write about 
the bureau but had reservations about the prospect that he would find enough material to 
write a good story to capture their readers’ interest. However, he found more than
26 Summers p. 51.
27 Summers p. 51.
28 Summers p. 51.
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enough material. In a period of seven years, he wrote twenty-four stories, three books, 
and four screenplays adapted for the movies.
Cooper always connected each story to the next in an easy episodic style that 
hooked his audience who was interested in the real aspects of fighting crime. His ability to 
link each criminal episode back to the FBI agency and its mission not only made his stories 
interesting but credible. Cooper’s writing formula included always having a hero who 
would carry the reader “on fantastic flights of ego-projective identification” and Cooper’s 
hero was J. Edgar Hoover.29 In other words, he knew the importance of the reader’s 
mental participation in solving the crime and his writing allowed readers to project 
themselves into the heroic role in the story. Hoover, himself, used Cooper’s style as a 
blueprint for speeches, books and articles that he had prepared or edited by the bureau.30 
Hoover continued to bolster his position and reinforce his job security while he maintained 
control of his career trajectory by taking advantage of print media opportunities that came 
his way.
Hoover’s Image and George “Machine Gun” Kelly
In July 1933 with Hoover’s relationship well founded with the media, he was about 
to investigate a high profile kidnapping case that influenced his career trajectory and 
positioned him to enjoy continued popularity among the public as well as politicians. The 
FBI had just been authorized by Congress to carry weapons and investigate kidnapping 
cases.
July 23, 1933 a high profile kidnapping case took place in which J. Edgar Hoover 
applied his skillful ability to manipulate the media to his career advantage. The highly 
publicized case involved George “Machine Gun” Kelly, his wife, Kathryn, and their gang 
who kidnapped Charles F. Urschel, a wealthy oil businessman from Oklahoma.
29 Powers, G-Men: Hoover’s FBI p. 99.
30 Powers, G-Men: Hoover's FBI p. 99.
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Although the kidnappers warned Mrs. Urschel not to contact the authorities, she 
immediately contacted the police, and they arrived at Urschel’s home shortly after the call. 
Because of the victim’s wealth, Hoover realized this was going to be a high profile case 
and draw extensive media attention but he assured Mrs. Urschel that her husband’s safe 
return was the bureau’s first concern.
Mrs. Urschel described the intruders and the events of the evening in detail to the 
FBI. She explained that the Urschels and two friends were playing bridge that night in the 
screened area of Urschel’s residence when two strange men abruptly entered with 
weapons and demanded to know their identity. Urschel and his friend, Jarrett, soon stood 
up and were directed to proceed to a waiting vehicle with the abductors. Urschel and 
Jarrett were led out of the house and placed in the back seat of an awaiting vehicle. The 
frightened women described to the FBI that the captors left them behind while they fled 
the scene rapidly with the kidnapped victims, Urschel and Jarrett.
While Mrs. Urschel contacted and waited for the police to arrive, Machine Gun 
Kelly and his gang who were ten or twenty miles from the Urschel’s residence on an 
unpaved road in a rural area. The captors stopped, took both men out of the vehicle and 
searched them. They checked the victims’ wallets, identified Urschel; however, they 
released Jarrett with the warning not to divulge the direction the vehicle was traveling, o'r 
they would return and take care of him later.31
The Urschel kidnapping was the first high profile case in which Hoover exercised 
his control of the print media and initiated the groundwork for making him a legend. 
Consequently, Hoover’s career trajectory with the FBI benefited from the print media 
attention he received when reports documented how well prepared the bureau was to 
solve cases like this high profile case. It not only illustrated how well the bureau was 
prepared in the early days to solve crime through the use of scientific methods, but it also 
illustrated how Hoover and his publicist used inside information to represent the bureau as 
well as Hoover in roles of superiority. They left nothing to chance.
31 John J. Floherty, Inside the F. B. I. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943) pp. 167-
172.
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While one group of FBI agents were working on the Urschel case and following 
leads based on Urschel’s abduction, another group of FBI agents were investigating leads 
in another part of the United States. It had been reported in Fort Worth, Texas that 
Kathryn Kelly approached a local detective and asked him to help kidnap a wealthy 
banker. The detective refused Kathryn and went to the FBI with the story. Based on this 
information, the Kelly gang members were suspects as soon as Urschel was kidnapped. 
Later, Kathryn contacted the detective again to inquire if anyone suspected them in the 
kidnapping and again the detective informed the FBI. However, this information was not 
released when Urschel’s abduction was reported.
Hoover did not want the public to think any of the FBI’s work was based on luck. 
It was more important for the public to believe that through investigative skill and 
deductive reasoning, the FBI agents were able to determine investigative leads based on 
Urschel’s detailed observation such as the recollection of a storm, airplane flight patterns 
and schedules. Hoover released only the deductive reasoning version as the official 
version of the investigation, portraying the FBI agents as super sleuths and his agency as 
invincible.32 This deductive reasoning version was more valuable to Hoover and his career 
trajectory than acknowledging that Machine Gun Kelly’s careless wife drew attention to 
the gang. Therefore, Hoover did not release the information to the print media that he 
obtained from the detective in Texas who was approached by Machine Gun Kelly’s wife, 
Kathryn.
When the FBI identified a farm where Urschel had been held captive, they raided it 
and arrested Harvey Bailey. Unfortunately, Albert Bates, Machine Gun Kelly and his wife 
fled the scene before the FBI arrived. The FBI agents pursued the three escaped gang 
members across six states after the ransom money was paid. During the pursuit of the 
gang, Machine Gun Kelly scoffed at Hoover by sending him letters criticizing him and 
calling FBI investigators his “sissy college boys.”33
32 Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life ofJ. Edgar Hoover (New York: The Free 
Press, 1987) pp. 187-188.
33 Powers, Secrecy and Power pp. 187-188.
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Eventually, when the agents located and confronted Kelly and his gang, it is 
alleged that the nickname “G-Men” was first given to the FBI agents. According to 
bureau accounts, Kelly and his gang cried out “Don’t shoot, G-men! Don’t shoot.” 34 
Kelly and his gang used “G-men” as a shortened name for “Government Men.” At the 
time other police officers gave a different account of the events, but the press made the 
“G-men” story famous to Hoover’s satisfaction.35
From the time Kelly was arrested until his trial ended, Hoover reveled in retelling 
the story of Kelly’s arrest concomitantly strengthening the success of his career trajectory. 
Hoover’s account always included the fictional “G-men” scenario. Federal agents were 
referred to as “Feds,” but Hoover told the “G-men” story with such zeal that the print 
media popularized the expression although Hoover contrived the story. Every time 
Hoover retold FBI arrests stories, his reputation was strengthened and reinforced; 
moreover, the newspapers liked to print the stories.36
According to Detective Sergeant W. J. Raney of the Memphis Police Department 
in Tennessee, the true account would not impress Hoover’s print media hounds. 
However, Hoover wielded enough control over information released to the print media to 
never allow Raney’s version to reach the press. According to Raney, he, not the FBI 
agents, covertly entered the residence of Kelly while Memphis police and FBI agents 
waited outside as back-ups. Once in the residence, he quietly crossed the front room. As 
he stood in front of the bedroom door, it suddenly opened. Kelly stood there. He put a 
shotgun to Kelly’s stomach and ordered Kelly to drop his weapon. Kelly dropped his 
automatic weapon, smiled and said, “I ’ve been waiting all night for you” and Raney 
responded, “Well, here we are.”37 Nonetheless, the media accepted Hoover’s accounts of
34 Summers p.69.
35 Summers p.69.
36 Jay Robert Nash, Citizen Hoover: A Critical Study o f the Life and Times o f J. Edgar Hoover 
and his FBI (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1972) p. 36.
37 Nash pp. 37-38.
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the high profile Urschel kidnapping investigation not Raney’s, and Hoover continued to 
reap the benefits in his career trajectory.
While Hoover established the precedent involving high profile cases, the print 
media, and career advancement, Handy followed suit. For example, Handy also initially 
utilized the print media to gain recognition and approval. In a straightforward news 
release to the Raleigh Times newspaper, Director Handy sought to achieve additional 
political and public support.
“In my opinion, the main achievement of the SBI during the past year has 
been the winning of the respect and confidence of enforcement authorities 
and the general public throughout the State. The general public had a 
vague notion at first that we were a bunch of amateur detectives who had a 
desire to be a small-scale FBI and law officers of the State... thought we 
would try to steal all the credit and glory from them. But we finally 
convinced most of them...that we’re only too glad to help them to the 
extent of our abilities without seeking or asking any credit.”38
Within a three-month period, Handy routinely made news releases to the print 
media pertaining to high profile homicide, rape, and bombing investigations that were 
circulated regionally and across the state.39 Also, like Hoover, Handy not only gained 
recognition for the SBI but gained professional recognition and popularity in his position 
as director. Much like Hoover who used the print media in the Urschel kidnapping case at 
the national level, Handy exercised the same public relations tactics involving high profile 
cases at the state level. Discussed in more detail in the SBI’s High Profile Cases section 
of this chapter is one high profile case that involved the disappearance of a mother and
38 Frederick C. Handy, “SBI Gains Recognition in N. C. Law Enforcement,” Raleigh Times, 30 
December 1939.
39 Frederick C. Handy, SBI news releases to News and Observer and Raleigh Times, “State 
Investigators Ordered to Granville: Four State Bureau of Investigation Men Will Probe Fatal Case
Shooting,” News and Observer, 15 August 1939; “Camden Murder Investigated,” Raleigh Times, 28 
August 1939; “SBI Traces Youth to Honolulu Post: State Bureau Presses Plans to Extradite Boy Charged 
with Rape,” News and Observer, 26, September 1939; “SBI Agents Get Murder Mystery: Identity of Man 
Shot to Death in Yadkin Puzzles Investigators,” News and Observer, 30 September 1939; “SBI Agents 
Investigate Dynamiting,” Raleigh Times, 7 October 1939; “North Carolina’s Own G-Men: State G-Men 
Enemies to Criminals,” Raleigh Times, 30 October 1939.
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daughter in eastern North Carolina. Handy made numerous news releases in this case 
which benefited his career trajectory.
Melvin Purvis and the High Profile Dillinger Case
From the next famous FBI investigation after Kelly, the infamous Dillinger case, 
Hoover garnered a tremendous amount of print media coverage. The search for John 
Dillinger was one of the most prominent high profile cases of the FBI. John Dillinger’s 
spectacular crime rampage started in the spring of 1934 and continued for about a year. 
By a sheer stroke of luck for Hoover, it unfolded as an unstructured news event that 
reinforced Hoover’s image and was one of the many high profile cases that advanced his 
career trajectory. Dillinger was as legendary as Jesse James, and Attorney General Homer 
Cummings wanted to use the Dillinger case as a benchmark to illustrate how effective the 
FBI was in bringing in a fugitive of his notoriety. It would be a political achievement for 
Cummings and support his anti-crime message to Congress as well as the country. It 
would also be important for Hoover in his career trajectory as FBI director.
When Dillinger crossed the state line with a stolen vehicle, he violated the 1919 
Dyer Act, interstate auto theft. Now the FBI had official jurisdiction in the case.
Cummings used Dillinger’s escape from Crown Point to lobby for the passage of 
his anti-crime bill before Congress. His crime bill proposal would include federal 
jurisdiction for interstate racketeering, robberies of federally insured banks, and murder of 
federal officers.40
Melvin Purvis, good friend of Hoover and special agent in charge of the Chicago 
FBI office, received a lead in April indicating that both Dillinger and his gang were in an 
area of northern Wisconsin at a resort known as Little Bohemia. Acting on the tip, Purvis 
and a group of agents chartered a plane from Chicago and flew to Wisconsin. Another 
group of agents from St. Paul pursued Dillinger as well. Hoover notified a select group of 
print media representatives and had them meet him at his office. He told them that
40 Powers, Secrecy and Power p. 189.
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Dillinger was trapped this time and could not escape the FBI agents and the 
reinforcements who were on their way to put an end to Dillinger’s criminal activities.
In the meantime, while Hoover prepared the media for the impending raid in 
Wisconsin, FBI agents were approaching the resort for the capture. As the agents moved 
through a wooded area, dogs started barking and alerted the gang. Both agents and 
gangsters fired anxiously at each other. Regrettably, an innocent hotel guest was killed 
during the escapade and Dillinger and his gang made another back door escape. The raid 
was a disaster and Purvis later described the Little Bohemia fiasco in his memoirs as an 
embarrassing incident for the bureau, Hoover as well as himself.
Despite the fact that Dillinger was never believed to have killed anyone, now 
Hoover portrayed him as a result of his high profile criminal activities to be public enemy 
number one and began an all out effort to apprehend him. Despite the alluded arrest, the 
unfortunate circumstances surrounding Dillinger’s apprehension justified Cummings’ need 
to get his legislation through Congress. The incident provided Cummings with an 
opportunity to ask for another 200 agents, armored vehicles and airplanes for the bureau. 
He got the political support he needed when on May 19, 1934 six of Cummings’ first 
crime bills became law after President Roosevelt signed them.41
Through unconventional print media channels, the bureau was strengthening its 
position to fight the criminal element. There were Dillinger sightings all over the country. 
Newspapers and magazines were ridiculing the FBI’s unsuccessful efforts to capture 
Dillinger but at the same time the publications brought more attention to the high profile 
case. Time Magazine published a story paralleling the FBI efforts in a board game called 
“Dillinger Land.” A dotted line marked the reported route Dillinger’s crime spree had 
taken him throughout the country. Everywhere a law enforcement officer was killed, 
whether associated with Dillinger or not, a skull marked the unfortunate spot on the game 
board. When Dillinger was definitely seen in a particular location, for example, Little 
Bohemia, question marks radiated from the known location indicating possible places
41 Powers, Secrecy and Power pp. 190-191.
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where he could be hiding. Public pressure to apprehend Dillinger was escalating steadily. 
Cummings issued an order “Shoot to kill, then count to ten.”42
Dillinger’s days of roaming the streets of America were waning. Purvis had an 
informant in Chicago who was willing to inform on Dillinger in exchange for favors from 
the FBI. She was the famous “Lady in Red,” Anna Sage. Ms. Sage ran a brothel in East 
Chicago and the immigration officials were trying to deport her. If Purvis would help with 
her immigration matter as well as give her the reward money, she was willing to help 
capture Dillinger. Purvis agreed to her conditions. She told him that she and another 
female were supposed to go to the movies with Dillinger the next day.
Purvis briefed his agents and told them if Dillinger escapes “it will be a disgrace to 
our bureau.” In the meantime, Hoover was being updated every few minutes by phone in 
Washington. In Chicago, Purvis’s agents surrounded the Biograph movie theater. When 
the movie ended about 10:30 in the evening, Dillinger exited the theater, and Purvis 
approached him from behind and ordered him to surrender. Dillinger ran and the FBI 
agents began firing. That night, July 22, 1934, the most notorious and high profile 
gangster ever sought by the FBI at the time died from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted 
by FBI agents and police officers.
Details of Dillinger’s death made newspaper headlines across the nation. 
Newspaper reporters were not sure who actually killed Dillinger but they were giving 
Purvis the credit. Although Hoover was pleased that Dillinger was no longer prowling the 
streets, he was unhappy that he and the FBI were not receiving the attention that Purvis 
was receiving from the media. Hoover contemplated ways to distance Purvis from the 
media’s attention so they would redirect their attention to him. Like the Urschel case, 
Hoover had his own version of the Dillinger arrest.
Hoover’s version of how Dillinger was captured failed to mention the fiasco in 
Little Bohemia as well as the fact that information was obtained from the informant, the 
“Lady in Red,” and the arrangements she made with Purvis. Hoover chronicled the case 
to the print media based on the bureau’s scientific method of detection and stressed how
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the bureau’s involvement was derived from the auto theft at Crown Point. He noted the 
theft of the sheriffs car was the turning point in the case that led the bureau to Dillinger’s 
location.43
With Dillinger’s death, Hoover, not only added another high profile case 
investigation that empowered him even more and strengthened his career trajectory 
advancement, he increased his personal macabre collection. One of Hoover’s prized 
possessions in his museum-like outer office was a death mask. It was a plaster casting 
made of Dillinger’s face shortly after his death. Hoover proudly displayed artifacts from 
famous high profile cases, and the visitors he received in fos office were allowed to gaze 
upon authentic crime artifacts while Hoover looked on with pleasure at his trophies.44
The two main lessons Hoover learned in the Dillinger case were that the media 
glamorize the police official whom they perceived as being in charge of an investigation 
and reporters associated success with the highest-ranking official who makes the news 
release. After the Dillinger case, Hoover made it known to all bureau agents that he was 
to be acknowledged as the person in command in every important case, and he was to be 
the one making the news releases.45 Therefore, Hoover became the spokesperson to the 
media and as a result his career trajectory continued to travel along a path of success when 
he released high profile case information pertaining to cases that occurred in the years 
following Dillinger’s death. Publicity followed criminals who were labeled by the FBI as 
public enemy number one.46 Following the high profile Dillinger case, two more high
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profile cases, Pretty Boy Floyd and Baby Face Nelson, gained print media recognition and 
impacted Hoover’s career trajectory.47
In an effort to continue to control his career trajectory, Hoover exercised his 
tactics to project himself into one of the most highly publicized crimes in the United 
States. “No kidnapping in American history achieved more notoriety or produced more 
public clamor than the abduction of the Lindbergh baby.”48 Charles Lindbergh, the first 
transatlantic aviator and American hero, and his wife were victimized when intruders 
entered their home, kidnapped their young son and demanded ransom for the safe return 
of him. However, the deceased child’s remains were located about two months later. At 
the conclusion of the Lindbergh kidnapping case in September 1934, although the 
Treasury Department agents solved the case, Hoover boldly interjected himself into the 
publicity associated with the high profile case. He immediately flew to New York and met 
with Police Commissioner John F. O’Ryan when Bruno Richard Hauptman was arrested. 
Hoover relished the opportunity to have press photographs taken with the police 
commissioner afterwards. In a matter of days, pictures of O’Ryan and Hoover were 
appearing in newspapers throughout the nation.49
When the Lindbergh case first occurred, the FBI did not have jurisdiction; 
however, the FBI was requested to assist in the case. By the conclusion of the case and 
arrest of Hauptman, Congress became alarmed at the number of kidnapping crimes and 
passed legislation making it a federal crime to send a ransom demand or kidnapping threat 
through the mail. This period represents J. Edgar Hoover’s rise to popularity.50 In 1935 
following the years of so many highly publicized investigations like Urschel, Dillinger, and
47 Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American 
Inquisition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) pp. 122-123.
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1992) p. 429. The Federal Kidnapping Statute is also referred to as the Lindbergh Law.
49 Powers, Secrecy and Power pp. 193-194.
50 Ovid Demaris, The Director: An Oral Biography o f J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Harper’s 
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Lindbergh cases, the official name of Hoover’s investigative agency changed to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.51
According to William W. Turner “The post-Dillinger reputation of the FBI has
been sustained largely by ‘front page’ crimes such as kidnapping and bank robbery,
coupled with statistical ‘achievements’ that give the impression of relentless efficiency.”52 
This is not to say that the FBI has not had an astonishing record of crime fighting 
achievements, but media coverage contributed in part to the image of the FBI and 
specifically Hoover’s long tenure as director. William C. Sullivan, a colleague and 
contemporary of Hoover discussed Hoover’s image management in his book, The Bureau. 
Sullivan remarked, “From the beginning, I was intrigued by the FBI’s public relations 
operation, and by the time I held senior staff positions I realized that J. Edgar Hoover had 
created a public relations miracle.”53
Hoover exploited both print media and FBI publications to promote him and 
advance his career. The Law Enforcement Bulletin in 1932, a magazine that started as a 
publication for wanted suspected criminals, became a magazine that brought “Bureau 
views--or rather Edgar’s--to every policeman in the land.”54 By 1937-38 it had a 
circulation of 11,000 and many law enforcement agencies throughout the United States 
and some foreign countries were receiving the bulletin.55
Throughout the history of Hoover’s tenure as director of the FBI, even though he
rarely became directly involved in investigations, he used the high profile cases
investigated by his agents to promote and enhance his career trajectory through skillful 
media manipulation. The affect high profile cases had on Hoover’s career as the top crime
51 U. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Your FBI: FBI Facts and Figures 
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Norton & Company, 1979) p. 15.
54 Summers p. 50.
55 Hoover, “Annual Report” 1938 p. 14.
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investigator in the United States had a positive outcome. He remained in office as FBI 
director from 1924 until his death in 1972. Had his administration lacked substantial 
positive print media coverage, the humble beginnings of the FBI would no doubt have 
been drastically altered as well as Hoover’s career trajectory.
As Hoover and the FBI rose to popularity among the American public for their 
widely publicized crime-fighting expertise in the 1930s, North Carolina lawmakers were 
considering the possibility of establishing their own state investigative agency. The origin 
of the FBI and the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation are very different. Unlike 
the FBI that evolved from an existing federal office, the office of the attorney general, the 
SBI originated from legislation passed by the North Carolina General Assembly. As 
previously discussed, the North Carolina SBI was established during the reform era; 
however, some law enforcement agencies were still philosophically operating in the 
political era. North Carolina was included among them due to the political appointment 
process for the director’s position and the political circumstances that prompted the 
legislation that established the SBI.
Origin and History of North Carolina SBI
Through the efforts of three key people, Governor Clyde Roark Hoey, 
Representative Cyrus Conrad Johnston, and Malcolm Sea well, the North Carolina State 
Bureau of Investigation began in 1937. During Hoey’s gubernatorial campaign in 1936, 
Mr. Hoey advocated the idea of a state and local law enforcement retirement fund. His 
intent was to gain the support of police officers and sheriffs throughout the state. When 
he introduced the concept to the General Assembly, his colleagues in the Legislature 
supported the proposal of a law enforcement retirement fund. Several explanations 
concerning the origin of the SBI have been suggested; however, one young attorney may 
most likely be credited as one of the most instrumental founders of the state law 
enforcement agency.
Malcolm Seawell, who worked at the Institute of Government, developed a 
proposal for a state investigative agency during the summer of 1936. Seawell envisioned a
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state agency that would assist local law enforcement officers in the investigation of crime. 
In the process of drafting a legislative bill at the request of gubernatorial candidate Hoey 
for a law enforcement officers’ benefit fund, Seawell included provisions for the creation 
and funding of the State Bureau of Identification and Investigation.56 In the year that 
followed, the General Assembly enacted Seawell’s proposal into law, and he maintained 
an avid interest in the bureau throughout his career in state government. While serving as 
North Carolina’s Attorney General, some years later, he demonstrated his continued 
interest by following some of the high profile criminal investigations undertaken by the 
bureau he helped create.57
During Clyde Roark Hoey’s tenure as governor, 1937-1941, Representative Cyrus 
Conrad “Con” Johnston of Iredell County, Chairman of the House Roads Committee, 
introduced House Bill 393 in the 1937 North Carolina General Assembly. When 
Representative Johnston introduced House Bill 393 to create the State Bureau of 
Identification and Investigation, Malcolm Seawell’s efforts from the previous year 
formalized. On March 22, 1937, the ratified bill resulted in the State Bureau of 
Identification and Investigation’s creation, and the agency was included among the other 
authorized state government departments in North Carolina. According to the original 
bill, the governor’s office exercised jurisdiction over the SBI & I, thereby establishing the 
political precedent that influenced SBI directors’ career paths from the onset of the 
agency. In addition to political influence, the print media and high profile case 
investigations also contributed to directors’ career trajectories that practiced Hoover’s 
public relations style utilizing the news media in high profile case investigations.
As specified in Section 10 of House Bill 393, the State Bureau of Identification 
and Investigation could not begin until sufficient funds were collected and paid to the 
State Treasury for the bureau’s budget. Included in this bill, legislation provided agents 
with statewide power of arrest. Also at the request and by the authority of the Governor, 
the director had authority to authorize special investigations. Local law enforcement
56 “SBI, Organized in 1937, Has Had Stormy History,” Winston-Salem Journal 11 December
1966.
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agencies such as sheriffs, police, solicitors, and judges originally initiated these requests. 
Additionally, at the Governor’s direction, the bureau provided investigative assistance to 
the North Carolina Parole Office. The bureau was to collect records and provide 
laboratory facilities for analysis of evidence. The original bill provided that any scientists, 
doctors, or state employees were directed to render assistance to the bureau when 
requested. Also, the state radio system was made available to the bureau for their use in 
investigations. The conditions of the original legislation provided a foundation for the 
organization and gave investigators some statutory authority to conduct investigations.
House Bill 393 provided that there be an increase in court costs for guilty 
defendants in criminal cases. As specified in the bill, allocated funds that resulted from the 
collected revenues of criminal case convictions supported two entities, the SBI & I as well 
as the Law Enforcement Officer’s Benefit Fund. The SBI & I ’s portion was fifty cents per 
case. That seems like a minimal amount of money; however, it generated enough revenue 
within the first year to fund the agency and hire a director.
At the Governor’s discretion, the bureau became operational on March 15, 1938, 
and the Governor appointed Frederick C. Handy to become the first director of the North 
Carolina Bureau of Identification and Investigation.58
As directed by Governor Hoey, Mr. Handy, spent several weeks in Washington, D. 
C. studying the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s organization. Handy’s purpose for 
observing Hoover and the FBI was to model the North Carolina SBI’s investigative law 
enforcement agency after Hoover’s agency.59 Reported in the FBI’s 1937-38 annual 
report, the year Handy observed their operation during his personal visit, the FBI had 
forty-two field offices throughout the United States. Each office was routinely subject to 
inspections to improve the efficiency of the FBI and to identify employees who were 
possible candidates for promotion. Handy’s objective as he surveyed administrative and
57 “SBI, Organized in 1937,” 11 December 1966.
58 “Handy to Direct New N. C. Agency,” Wilmington Morning Star 5 March 1938.
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organizational structures at FBI headquarters and other police agencies was to develop his 
findings into a prototype for the State Bureau of Identification and Investigation.60
Also, according to the FBI’s annual report, the primary types of criminal activities 
investigated by the FBI during the year of Handy’s visit included: violations of the
National Stolen Property Act, Federal Bank Robbery Act, National Bankruptcy Act, 
White Slave Traffic Act, War Risk Insurance, National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, antitrust 
crimes, kidnapping and extortion. Criminal investigation statistics for these crimes 
included sixty-seven convictions for kidnapping, 103 convictions for extortion, and 
twenty-four convictions for violations of the National Stolen Property Act that involved 
cases of over $5,000 dollars each in value. In addition, there were 110 convictions for the 
Federal Bank Robbery Act, 127 convictions involving the National Bankruptcy Act, 576 
convictions involving violations of the White Slave Act, 2093 convictions for violations of 
the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, and seventy-three convictions for the Antitrust 
Violations. Although the FBI’s annual report made no specific reference indicating the 
number of FBI agents on staff in 1938, North Carolina needed agents with equivalent 
skills in the SBI & I to implement similar statewide criminal investigations.
For any appointed state law enforcement director, the FBI’s conviction rate of 
95.93 percent of 5420 cases brought to trial in 1938 would have been an impressive 
number and Handy would have been no exception although he was a newly appointed 
director. Additionally, the FBI had an impressive record in operating cost justification for 
an administrator who would have budgetary concerns. Besides the FBI cases investigated, 
the agents located 1,923 federal fugitives. As well as the value in fines, recovered stolen 
property was more than $47.5 million. Compared to the value of the items recovered, 
Hoover’s operational agency cost was approximately $6.2 million, which was 14 percent 
of the recovered property value and fines for that year.
Knowledge of a relatively new function of the bureau that was contributed to 
voluntarily by law enforcement agencies, the FBI’s National Stolen Property File, aided 
Handy in his organizational planning for the SBI. To assist in investigations, the FBI
60 “Handy to Direct” 5 March 1938.
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established this section on April 1, 1936. The section functioned as a repository for 
information submitted by local agencies describing stolen property and designed so stolen 
property could be cross-referenced when suspicious property was identified in subsequent 
cases. The SBI & I developed a similar system to identify stolen property from various 
local jurisdictions throughout the state and published a newsletter listing stolen property in 
major and high profile cases.
Foremost in Handy’s plan for a state investigative agency was the creation of a 
state crime laboratory to assist local jurisdictions with analyzing physical evidence.61 He 
observed the FBI’s laboratory operation that was implemented six years before on 
September 1, 1932.62 At the time of Handy’s visit in 1938, the FBI’s crime lab had 
conducted 5,994 examinations. The crime lab Handy formed for North Carolina 
incorporated similar crime laboratory sections as the FBI’s into the SBI & I ’s crime lab. 
The FBI’s forensic laboratory included: chemical, toxicological, firearms examinations, 
footprint comparisons, and other similar types of forensic examinations. Though the state 
crime laboratory was not as large as the federal laboratory, it provided essential laboratory 
services that would aid in the investigation and detection of crime. Furthermore, Handy 
established a fingerprint identification section in the SBI similar to the FBI; however, the 
two agencies were vastly different in the volume of prints they classified and filed in 1938. 
When the FBI’s identification division began in 1924, approximately 810,000 sets of 
fingerprint records from the National Bureau of Criminal Identification, an organization 
formed by the International Association of Identification and the fingerprint records at 
Leavenworth Penitentiary were combined and transferred to the FBI’ s new fingerprint 
section.63 When Handy met with FBI administrators, the FBI’s identification division had 
grown to about 9 million prints. In order to serve urban and rural law enforcement 
agencies throughout the United States, it was operating 24 hours a day. The Single 
Fingerprint Section conducted examinations in 5,910 cases. Also by 1938, within six
61 “Under the Dome: Director Frederick C. Handy New Methods in Crime Detection and 
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62 Hoover, Story o f the FBI p. 15.
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years of the beginning of the FBI’s International Fingerprint Exchange, it had agreements 
with eighty-four countries to use fingerprints to identify criminals attempting to elude 
detection.
The same North Carolina law that created the SBI & I required the agency to 
report crime statistics to the state attorney general before Handy went to Washington, D. 
C. Although, Handy had to make his report to the state attorney general, the FBI’s 
system that was authorized by Congress in 1930 would have been a good model for 
Handy to study.64 Like the FBI’s initial monthly crime report, Handy upon return to 
North Carolina eventually adopted the same schedule for the SBI’s crime report. The FBI 
collected and compiled crime statistics for the United States and the SBI for North 
Carolina.65
The FBI was responsible for initiating the practice of collecting crime statistical 
data compiled and published in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. This section of the FBI 
collected crime statistics on the number of crimes committed, number of persons arrested 
and case dispositions, and the number of convictions. In 1937-38 there were 3,723 local 
and state agencies contributing statistical information to the UCR that was 292 more 
agencies than had reported the previous year. Also, after Handy’s firsthand observations 
of the FBI’s administration, he eventually formulated a similar system to the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Report to collect crime statistics and in order to disseminate information 
to other law enforcement agencies. During Handy’s administration as well as today, 
unless the SBI had original jurisdiction, they did not report the crime to the FBI.
To have professional agents, paralleled having a professional organization, and in 
order to accomplish this goal, it meant employing agents with excellent qualifications and 
backgrounds in specialized areas. The FBI’s training standards of 1938 were an 
exceptional model for Handy. During the same year that Handy was at FBI headquarters 
gathering information for structuring the SBI, the FBI reported that they conducted a
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fourteen-week training academy for its new agents. Although the training academy had 
only been in operation since July 29, 1935, it gained police recognition throughout the 
United States.66 Because media coverage of high profile investigations promoted 
Hoover’s successful federal investigative agency, local police agencies sought to have 
their officers trained by the FBI. According to the 1937-38 FBI annual report 
approximately 108 police officers participated in training at the FBI National Academy. 
The sessions were limited to thirty-six officers in each session.67
Since North Carolina was only one of a few states during this time to establish an 
investigative agency, in addition to studying the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
operations, the new director visited a limited number of other states to determine how 
large law enforcement agencies were structured.68 He also examined police organizations 
in Boston, Massachusetts; Providence, Rhode Island; Mineola, Long Island, and Nassau 
County, New York.69 The year Handy examined these law enforcement agencies, a 
change in the hiring philosophy ensued throughout the United States as the reform era 
gradually replaced the political era. Applicants were being hired and promoted based on 
their qualifications not their political contacts. When Handy met FBI agents, he was 
impressed by their professional appearance and conduct.70 After three months of intense 
observation of the five agencies, Handy returned to North Carolina and formulated his 
guidelines for the bureau. These included educational criteria and professional 
qualifications.71
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Although Handy expressed concerns relating to hiring guidelines, the need for 
promotional standards would have been premature during his tenure as director because 
the fledgling agency had so few agents. However, based on interviews with SBI agents 
when the agency was in its formative years, there were no promotional boards, tests, or 
assessments used to promote agents. As more agents were hired and supervisory 
positions became available, promotions in the early years resided strictly with the 
director’s appraisal of the agent.72
Consequently, SBI investigators who worked high profile cases that were 
publicized in the print media received recognition from the senior bureau administrators. 
Understandably, the director was partial to agents who investigated high profile cases 
especially when those cases resulted in positive publicity for the bureau and the director. 
In view of this, high profile cases and the print media played a salient role in promotions.73 
While high profile cases in the print media made an impact on Handy’s promotional 
decisions, Handy also integrated the observations he made at the FBI into the SBI’s 
policies.
Handy advocated that each agent should have a college education or at least be a 
graduate of the FBI academy. In addition to educated recruits, when Handy concluded his 
police survey of the police agencies, his objectives for the SBI included that it be equipped 
with the most up-to-date police technology and that it would provide investigative 
expertise like the agencies he had visited.74
Upon return from his travels and visits to the police agencies in the northeast, 
Director Handy compiled his findings and published a brief summary of his objectives for 
the bureau in the 1938-39 North Carolina Sheriffs' Directory based on his observations. 
The objectives included establishing hiring guidelines for experienced agents who would
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be required to assist in criminal and crime scene investigations anywhere in the state.75 
Included among the services were the that bureau provided adequate equipment and 
personnel for the development and processing of latent fingerprints, examination of 
firearms evidence, handwriting, typewriting and questioned documents. Other services 
provided by the new bureau included testing for the presence of blood, semen, or other 
stains.76 Handy found expanding services provided by the SBI was prohibited by one 
major obstacle, funding.77
While speaking to a civic organization in March of 1938, State Treasurer Charles 
M. Johnson suggested that the 1939 General Assembly appropriate funding from the state 
budget to operate the State Bureau of Identification and Investigation. Furthermore, Mr. 
Johnson indicated he would like to see all the revenues collected from the new court 
assessments go toward the officers’ benefit fund.78 It took at least three years before 
legislation changed the funding based on court fines when the Legislature added the SBI 
budget as part of its annual appropriations in 1941.79
Initially, the State Bureau of Investigation and Identification reported directly to 
the Governor’s Office, until the General Assembly passed an Act July 1, 1939 establishing 
the State Department of Justice directed by the State Attorney General.80 At that time, 
the name was changed to State Bureau of Investigation and control of the bureau was 
transferred to the Department of Justice where it came under direct control of the State 
Attorney General’s Office.81 Formerly, the governor appointed the SBI’s director;
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however, that responsibility shifted to the Attorney General, another elected official. The 
SBI’s director now would work at the pleasure of the State Attorney General.82
Prior to the bureau’s transfer to the Department of Justice, Director Handy made 
monthly reports to the governor pertaining to crime statistics involving the bureau’s 
assistance. These local newspapers published these reports and following are some of the 
statistics included in them. During fiscal year 1938-39, the agency investigated 289 
cases.83 There was an increase in the number of cases in which the SBI & I received 
requests for assistance that indicated a growing acceptance of the bureau by many 
agencies. In the December 1939 report, Mr. Handy acknowledged that the agency had 
been successful in its efforts to work with local law enforcement agencies in fighting 
crime, and with funding more stable, Director Handy hired four additional investigators.84
In 1939 sixty-two out of one hundred sheriffs’ departments requested assistance 
from the SBI, and SBI agents investigated a total of 425 cases. Twenty-five to thirty 
firearms cases were investigated and eleven were successfully identified. Twenty 
questionable documents out of forty to forty-five questioned documents were identified. 
Convictions were obtained in nine fingerprint cases. Though the number of cases 
investigated and the convictions obtained demonstrate the initial success of the agency, 
Mr. Handy expressed the agency’s challenge “was to convince the general public in North 
Carolina that we were worth our salt, and to gain the goodwill and confidence of the 
sheriffs and police departments of the state.”85 In other words, become recognized.
The demands were great on the agents and required them to work thousands of 
man-hours in overtime without extra compensation. In addition to working criminal 
cases, the agents were involved in presenting lectures to local civic groups throughout the 
state. At the time, the agency was not very well known and these presentations
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introduced the bureau, its agents and mission to the community. Mr. Handy remarked the 
agency “made crime a little less attractive in North Carolina” and that the agency’s efforts 
“in the future will serve not only to solve crimes but also to deter criminal practices.”86
As Handy made more news releases to the print media, his name and the role of 
the SBI became more familiar. The SBI “will not interfere with local officers but seek to 
lend aid or information when requested and coordinate their efforts in dealing with mutual 
crime problems.”87 Early in Handy’s career as SBI director, newspaper reporters began to 
refer to him as “Handy man” because his agency was represented as an assisting agency. 
Also, Handy’s new nickname soon lent itself to SBI agents as well. It was not unusual for 
reporters to also refer to them as “Handy men;” however, the name was not popularized 
because there are very few references in later newspaper articles citing the agents as 
“Handy men.”88 Nor do the agents who worked for Mr. Handy indicate that the nickname 
ever became widely accepted.89
From early news releases beginning in 1939 through the early 1940s, reports 
indicated that the bureau received approximately thirty-five to sixty cases each month. 
Some months Director Handy cited the number of cases solved and the number of cases 
pending in newspapers. Some figures were given for laboratory services such as the 
number of blood tests, fingerprints, firearms, documents, handwriting, and microscopic 
examinations. On April 8, 1943 the monthly report that appeared in the News and 
Observer included additional technical services such as photography and polygraph tests 
with the other case reports. The format varied and in some releases the types of crimes 
and victims’ names were given and sometimes they were not. During the first three years, 
approximately 1200 cases were accepted and investigated by the bureau. Of these, a final 
disposition was made with the bureau’s assistance in more than 625 cases. The remaining 
cases were either still under investigation or pending trial. In addition, the bureau
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processed approximately 800 additional miscellaneous requests for technical assistance for 
fingerprinting, handwriting, firearms examinations, and so on.90
As mandated by the 1937 North Carolina General Assembly, the State Bureau of 
Identification and Investigation prepared required biennial and annual reports to the 
Governor in addition to the voluntary monthly reports Handy released to the print media. 
Both the biennial and annual reports included statistical tabulations of investigative 
activities for the SBI.91 According to the State Bureau of Investigation’s first published 
annual report in 1940, the crime lab included the following five sections: chemical
analysis, photography, fingerprints, firearms identification, and questioned documents. 
This report also indicated that the majority of requests for services for the SBI came from 
police departments and sheriffs’ offices. There were 228 requests from sheriffs’ offices in 
the state and 147 from police departments. Other requests came from solicitors, judges, 
the Highway Patrol, and the coroners’ offices. By 1942 Director Handy estimated that 
about one-third of the requests came from sheriffs’ departments throughout the state, one- 
third from police departments, and the remaining one-third from North Carolina State 
Highway Patrol, judges, prosecutors, coroners, and executive governmental 
departments.92 After the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the onset of World War II, among 
the cases that SBI assistance was requested in included subversive activities. Although the 
FBI investigated high profile espionage and sabotage cases prior to 1941, the SBI 
investigated some of its initial sabotage cases in 1942.93
Originally, the working relationship between the SBI and these many local 
agencies initiated the foundation for favorable career opportunities for investigators. 
When investigators did meticulous and comprehensive case investigations on behalf of the 
bureau for local agencies, agency officials attributed the excellent investigative work to
90 “State G-Men Add” 26 April 1942.
91 Handy, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, “Report of the Director of the Bureau of 
Investigation to the Attorney General,” (Raleigh, N. C.: N. C. Department of Justice, 1942) p. 1.
92 “SBI Reports Little or No Decrease in Crime,” News and Observer 29 December 1942.
93 “SBI Investigates Sabotage Cases: Director Fred Handy Says Serious Cases are Under 
Investigation,” News and Observer 12 August 1942.
57
good leadership and commended the supervisors as well as the director, thereby, 
advancing the director’s career trajectory. Consequently, the director recognized and 
rewarded agents who professionally and conscientiously carried out their investigations.
SBI High Profile Cases
High profile cases were considered important within the organization; therefore, 
agents who worked these cases were in a position to receive recognition and accolades 
from the director when the print media publicized an investigation positively. Positive 
print media in high profile cases conveyed the perception of success. Consequently, in 
order to prolong their career trajectories on a positive path, successful directors relied on 
maintaining an effective relationship with the attorney general and positive print media in 
high profile cases contributed toward that goal.
The importance of high profile cases is evident in the 1939-40 annual report. The 
report emphasized major and important cases. Summaries of eight major cases and 
seventeen important miscellaneous cases were reported in more detail in the annual report 
to the attorney general. Additionally, in the 1939-40 annual report, crime statistics were 
reported according to crime types and county. Of the 450 cases investigated in 1939-40, 
eight solved major cases received attention from senior SBI administrators and state 
officials. Even though these cases were given special mention in the annual report, like 
major solved cases, unsolved major cases received not only substantial attention within the 
bureau, they attracted a considerable amount of media attention.94 Most often the 
attention was favorable for the investigator as well as the director in both major solved 
and unsolved high profile cases. This phenomenon was observable among the first 
investigators with the SBI.
When Handy concluded in December 1939 that the agency was more stable than it 
had ever been, he employed four new agents. One of these agents was James Bradshaw. 
Bradshaw was hired as an investigator with the bureau based on his specialized expert
94 Handy, “Report of the Director” 1940 pp. 15-28.
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qualifications. His law enforcement knowledge and fingerprint skills earned him 
recogmtion with local SBI investigators. Even though Bradshaw was a North Carolina 
Highway Patrolman, he often assisted the Wayne County Sheriffs Department in 
Goldsboro, North Carolina, with fingerprint cases. His first contact with the SBI resulted 
from a murder investigation he assisted the SBI with while in Goldsboro.95
James Bradshaw was asked to join the State Bureau of Investigation in 1939 as a 
special agent. During the early reform era, political influence often continued to have an 
effect on hiring and promotion; however, the trend was changing. For example, when 
James Bradshaw was hired during the early days of the SBI, reform is evident because 
experienced and knowledgeable agents like Bradshaw were more readily being recruited 
to fill the limited available positions.96
According to Bradshaw, his caseload was always heavy, and he worked ten cases 
among the many he investigated that made news headlines from 1939 to 1940. These 
were among the numerous important and high profile cases he investigated that had an 
affect on his and the directors’ career trajectories.
Bradshaw’s case investigations that were reported by a newspaper with statewide 
circulation included his expertise in fingerprinting and interrogations. Within the first four 
months of his employment with the bureau, Bradshaw was assigned cases that became 
headline investigations. They brought positive attention to the SBI, its director and to the 
young agent.
In September 1939 Bradshaw solved a series of post office robberies by identifying 
latent fingerprints.97 Two months later he investigated a burglary in which two suspects 
were incarcerated by the local sheriff. The SBI investigation uncovered fingerprint and 
handwriting evidence that exonerated the two accused and convicted the guilty party in 
the case. Not only was this case listed as one of important major cases in the 1939-40 
annual report to the North Carolina Attorney General, it also received statewide print
95 Bradshaw 27 November 1995.
96 Bradshaw 27 November 1995.
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media coverage. Bradshaw’s expert investigative skills were once again emphasized in an 
article that ran in the same newspaper as the previous articles. He successfully 
investigated a stolen weapons case in which guns were taken from a Roxboro and Kings 
Mountain store.98 Several days later confessions were obtained and arrests were made in 
the weapons case.99 Also, in December 1939, he successfully investigated a case involving 
robbery and assault with intent to kill a Burlington man.100 He obtained confessions from 
two suspects in two robbery cases in January of 1940.101 In February 1940, Bradshaw 
was reported as investigating a homicide case in Hampstead involving the death of William 
Hudson.102 Within a week of Bradshaw’s initial investigation, George Millis confessed to 
killing William Hudson.103 Of the ten cases that received more extensive media coverage 
than Bradshaw’s other case investigations, one case received widespread print media 
coverage. The director and Bradshaw received a considerable amount of publicity even 
though the case remained a mystery. It involved an unsolved missing persons case in 
Carolina Beach, North Carolina and was one of the highest profile cases that Bradshaw 
was assigned to investigate.104
This case involved an investigation that began a few months before World War II 
and continued until after the war ended. The case that involved a missing mother and 
daughter from Carolina Beach was never solved but Director Handy, special agent 
Bradshaw, and other agents worked for years on this case. Mr. Bradshaw said they did
97 “SBI Fingerprinting Men Trace Robbery Series: Director of State G-Men Reveals 
Identification in Local Crimes,” News and Observer 20 September 1939.
98 “Two New Cases Due SBI Investigation,” News and Observer 6 December 1939.
99 “Greensboro Negroes Confess Gun Theft: South Boston Pick Up Couple Responsible for 
Roxboro Crime,” News and Observer 12 December 1939.
100 “SBI Investigates Burlington Case,” News and Observer 15 December 1939.
101 “Confessions Close Two Robbery Cases” News and Observer 10 January 1940.
102 “SBI Aid Requested on Pender Murder,” News and Observer 9 February 1940.
103 “Man Confesses Pender Killing: S. B. I. Head Says George Millis Admits Killing, Robbing 
‘Best Friend,’” News and Observer, 11 February 1940.
104 Bradshaw 27 November 1995.
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everything possible to solve it. Director Handy was involved in the investigation to a 
limited extent. He attempted to obtain resources for the agents working the case, and 
there were periodic meetings in Raleigh to update Director Handy on the progress of the 
case.
Mrs. Lelia Bryan, a thirty-six-year-old mother, and her four-year-old daughter, 
Mary Rachel, left home at 9 in the evening on Saturday night, May 10, 1941, to go to the 
grocery store. When she did not return home in about two hours, her husband notified the 
Carolina Beach Police Department and then he began looking for his wife and child. Mr. 
Bryan went to the grocery store; however, upon questioning the clerk and owner, he 
discovered his wife and child never arrived. The Carolina Beach Police Department 
searched the area for two days but was unable to find the pair. At that time the police 
department requested assistance from the New Hanover County Sheriff s Department and 
the State Highway Patrol. Those three agencies continued to search the area, but they too 
were unable to find the missing woman and her child. Several days lapsed when the 
Carolina Beach Police Department requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
State Bureau of Investigation assist in the search.105 The case was a complete mystery and 
the impact on the local beach community was devastating, but the agencies involved 
persevered in the search.
The next day, Sunday, local law enforcement authorities conducted a foot, vehicle, 
and air search for the missing couple between Carolina Beach and Wilmington. During 
this time there was a significant undeveloped forested area between the two towns.106 
One week later a $100 reward was published in the local paper. No trace of the couple or 
the 1935 Ford coupe had been seen since their disappearance. Authorities dragged the 
nearby Cape Fear River in downtown Wilmington on May 16, 1941 in an effort to locate 
the vehicle. Some believed it may be somewhere along the riverbed.107 However, they did 
not find any evidence of the vehicle in the Cape Fear River.
105 Bradshaw 27 November 1995.
i°6 “officers Search for Wife, Child: Foul Play is Feared in Strange Disappearance of Couple at 
Wilmington,” News and Observer 13 May 1941.
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Approximately three weeks after Mrs. Bryan and her daughter disappeared, 
Director Handy requested two hundred soldiers from Camp Davis to assist in the search 
for the couple.108 However, a general in the War Department in Washington D. C. denied 
Handy’s request for use of federal troops in the search for the missing couple. The 
general simply said he, “regretted that the war department cannot authorize the use of 
troops.”109 The next day Director Handy was in the Carolina Beach area to personally 
direct the search operations.110 In July, as the high profile case builds, Handy made 
arrangements with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to have 150 of their men search 
the swampy woodlands in the surrounding area.111 The amount of area searched was two 
miles wide and seven miles long, but they too were unable to find any trace of the missing 
pair.112 Although the search for the missing mother and her daughter continued for 
months, Director Handy’s persistent dedication to solve this high profile case impacted his 
career as director of the fledgling state agency.
Multiple media sources were used to publicize the missing pair. Photographs of 
the mother and daughter with their physical descriptions were published in the American 
Journal o f Nursing. Descriptions of the young woman and child were sent to the FBI and 
were published in the FBI Bulletin xu The agency exhausted every possible source in 
solving the case. In addition to posting descriptions of the pair locally, statewide, and 
nationally, the agency contacted everyone who knew or had contact with Mrs. Bryan in
107 “Foul Play Feared In Case of Missing Woman, Child: Wide Search is Made,” Wilmington 
Morning Star 17 May 1941
108 “Soldiers Ready for Bryan Hunt: Army Men Stand Prepared to Join Search Upon War 
Department Approval” Wilmington Morning Star 25 June 1941.
109 “Missing Couple Believed Alive: New Evidence Modifies Suspicions of Foul Play Against 
Woman and Child” News and Observer 27 June 1941.
110 “Bryant Hunt Is Pressed Anew: Police Check Columbus County Report That Pair Seen 
There,” News and Observer 28 May 1941.
111 “CCC Camps to Furnish Manpower for Search: 150 Men from Three Eastern Camps Ready 
to Seek Missing Couple” News and Observer 1 July 1941.
112 “SBI Picks Territory to Search for Couple” News and Observer 4 July 1941.
113 “SBI Still Hopes to Find Couple: New Hanover Disappearance Most Baffling Case in SBI 
Experience,” News and Observer 4 July 1942.
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the last few days before she disappeared. The high profile investigation included 
investigative interviews with the missing woman’s husband.
Eight years after the couple disappeared in 1941, the case remained unsolved and 
more headlines ran featuring the mysterious case. Vivid accounts of investigative 
techniques were reprinted in an effort to find anyone who knew something or would be 
encouraged to talk to the SBI. “Detailed descriptions of the mother and daughter were 
flashed to neighboring states. Every State Highway Patrolman in North Carolina was 
alerted for the 1935 Ford coupe bearing license number 219-056.”114 The search was 
expanded to routes between Carolina Beach and Bladenboro to determine if Mrs. Bryan 
and her daughter went to visit relatives. All gas stations were checked but no one 
reported seeing Mrs. Bryan and her daughter. The Sheriff of New Hanover County 
assigned a deputy to work on the case full time, the Highway Patrol assigned a State 
Highway Patrol trooper to work the case full time and the director of the city and county 
identification bureau devoted much time investigating the case. The serial number of the 
vehicle was sent to every motor vehicle bureau in the nation but not one trace of the 
missing vehicle was ever found.115
On August 25, 1949 District Solicitor Clifton L. Moore requested the return of a 
22-year-old Florida prisoner named Daniel Webster, alias Robert Anderson. Webster was 
also wanted for escape from the New Hanover County Prison Camp, but Moore was 
interested in Webster for another reason. Webster confessed to the murder of the 
Carolina Beach couple that took place eight years-before.116
Once back in New Hanover County, Bradshaw brought him to the vicinity of the 
crime to search for the bodies. While on the search he told Bradshaw his confession was a 
hoax, he just wanted to get back to North Carolina. Webster wrote the Star News 
newspaper and said that his confession was a “fantastic lie” to get out of the Florida State 
penitentiary where he was being mistreated. Again, the lead ended with the wrong
114 “What Happened to Coastal Mother, Daughter?” News and Observer 13 March 1949.
115 “What Happened” 13 March 1949.
116 “What Happened” 13 March 1949.
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conclusion, no arrest.117 “Today, the case remains unsolved and stands as one of North 
Carolina’s major mysteries of all time.”118
Fifteen years later the Bryan case came to life. New Hanover County law 
enforcement officers from the Carolina Beach area called the agency and Bradshaw’s 
attention to the Bryan case again. On April 10, 1956 George Tregembo, a zookeeper, 
found two skeletons near Carolina Beach by on a section of Carolina Beach road in the 
Fort Fisher area. After interviewing Tregembo, Bradshaw delivered the skeletal remams 
he collected from Tremgembo to Dr. Joffre Coe, anthropologist at the University of North 
Carolina in Chapel Hill, for evaluation. According to Director Powell “the case has 
remained one of the most baffling mysteries in the SBI’s files. Through the years it has 
stood as a challenge to every SBI agent.”119 Bradshaw described the case as “one of the 
most unusual and sensational ever to come out of North Carolina.”120
Dr. Coe, director of the department of anthropology released his findings April 24, 
1956; however, it was dismal news for the investigators. After examining the skeletal 
material, he determined that the remains were not the missing pair from Carolina Beach. 
The high profile investigation was once again at a dead end.121
The missing mother and daughter from Carolina Beach was a highly publicized 
unsolved case. When Handy retired, the Carolina Beach case remained one of the 
unsolved cases the SBI investigated extensively during his tenure. While Handy was 
director, he managed the print media pertaining to this high profile case to his career 
advantage like Hoover did with so many high profile cases. Evidence of Handy’s 
favorable relationship with the print media was evident in the reports that conveyed the
117 “Double Murder Confession Repudiated at Wilmington,” News and Observer 8 September
1949.
118 “What Happened” 13 March 1949.
119 “Skeletons Found at Carolina Beach May Be Clues In Tar Heel Mystery,” News and Observer 
11 April 1956.
120 “Bones and the Bryan Mystery: Million-to-One Shot, Sheriff Says,” News and Observer 15 
April 1956.
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extraordinary efforts that Handy and the bureau displayed in their search for the missing 
Carolina Beach mother and child. The mutual respect that Handy and the media shared 
for one another resulted in favorable press for Handy and the bureau and benefited 
Handy’s career trajectory with the agency until his retirement. Also without the support 
of the governor and Attorney General, Handy could not have continued the investigation 
for the length of time that he did.
Even though the lead investigative agent, Bradshaw, was never able to solve the 
case, he and the director received recognition for their efforts in investigating the high 
profile case. By the time the 1956 articles appeared in the newspaper, Handy had retired 
after a successful tenure as director, and Bradshaw’s career trajectory with the SBI had 
taken a positive turn. Bradshaw had become the State Bureau of Investigations’ assistant 
director.
The SBI would like to solve every case; however, the high profile Carolina Beach 
case remains unsolved. Nevertheless, as more local law enforcement agencies requested 
the SBI to provide investigative assistance, unsolved cases did not slow the SBI’s growth 
and changes that were occurring. Handy mirrored Hoover’s publicity style, in that, he 
successfully managed the media in the missing pair investigation. Also, as the first director 
of the SBI, Handy set a precedent in media relations for future SBI directors to emulate 
him as well as Hoover.
The SBI continued to expand its investigative services and hired new agents as its 
funding and caseload increased. Additionally, during the SBI’s early history, investigators 
and their caseloads were not generally subject to political pressures. However, the 
political process affected SBI directors because they served at the attorney general’s 
pleasure. In addition to the political impact on SBI directors’ careers, media coverage of 
cases, like the unsolved high profile Carolina Beach case, played an important role in 
directors’ career trajectories. For example, no conflict between the media, the SBI and 
Director Handy occurred despite the fact that the case was never solved. Negative 
publicity not only could have damaged Handy’s career trajectory, it could have damaged
121 “New Hanover Bones Not Those of Missing Mother and Child,” News and Observer 25 April
1956 .
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the image of the fledging SBI. Handy remained as director until he decided to retire. He 
successfully held his position as director under two gubernatorial administrations that had 
authority over his position.
Creekmore Appointed as SBI Director
Upon Handy’s retirement, Thomas L. Creekmore was appointed director.122 This 
appointment did not come as any surprise to Director Handy since Attorney General Harry 
McMullan, head of the State Department of Justice, had discussed it with Handy six 
months or more prior to Handy’s decision to leave office.123 McMullen conferred with 
Governor J. Melville Broughton, and Broughgton approved McMullen’s recommendation 
to appoint Thomas Creekmore as the new Director.124 Since the SBI began in the 
Governor’s Office, it would not have been unusual for the attorney general to confer with 
the Governor for the appointment of a new SBI director even though the appointment was 
the sole responsibility of the attorney general. Through the use of the media and high 
profile cases, Handy created a positive image for himself and the SBI, and he maintained a 
successful career trajectory until his retirement. Even after retirement he returned to the 
SBI headquarters to provide assistance.125
In 1939, at the age of 54, Creekmore began his employment with the bureau as a 
legal advisor and special investigator. Later in the same year he became the assistant 
director. When he became assistant director, Handy commented, “Tom Creekmore is a 
capable man, and I am happy to announce his appointment....”126 It is apparent from this
122 “Creekmore Named to Post” News and Observer 17 November 1953.
123 “Fred Handy’s Resignation As SBI Chief Accepted: To Stay as Agent; Creekmore to be 
Director, Gatling to Head Agents,” News and Observer 1 October 1943.
124 Head Quits Post in Raleigh: F. C. Handy to be Succeeded by T. L. Creekmore,
December 1,” Wilmington Star News 7 October 1943.
125 William S. Hunt, Jr., Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Training and 
Research Supervisor, 31 May 1999. Hunt was the SBI training director for the academy and personally 
knew many of the early agents. Hunt is knowledgeable regarding much of the SBI’s unwritten history.
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quote and Creekmore’s professional background that he earned his appointment through 
political connections rather than through investigative experience since he was promoted 
in less than a year to the position of assistant director. Creekmore, who was a political era 
remnant, had limited experience in criminal investigations and no high-profile cases that 
were identified in the media, yet he was appointed assistant director of the SBI.127 Unlike 
Bradshaw who later became assistant director, Creekmore’s successful career trajectory 
cannot be attributed to his investigative skills with high profile cases.
Creekmore graduated from William and Mary College in 1908 and George 
Washington University with a degree in law in 190 8.128 Prior to joining the State Bureau 
of Investigation, Creekmore practiced law for eighteen years in North Carolina and was 
associated with Seaboard Railroad’s legal department for ten years.129 Creekmore was a 
native of Wake County and in 1923 served as an enrolling clerk of the State House of 
Representatives. In 1925 he was elected as Wake County’s Representative to the North 
Carolina General Assembly and elected again in 1927.130 His educational, professional and 
political background provided him with a solid foundation for public state service.
At the end of 1943, Director Creekmore predicted an increase in crime as millions 
of Americans returned from World War II. However, compared with crime statistics of 
past years, the ratio of crimes remained about the same. Approximately one-third of the 
bureau’s investigative requests were burglaries, one-third were homicides and 
embezzlements, and one-third were assaults and robberies. The requests were also equally 
divided among the police, sheriff, and state law enforcement agencies. Creekmore 
indicated in his first annual news release that there were more laboratory requests from 
local agencies in the following areas: identification of poisons, examination of bloodstains,
126 “Creekmore Named Acting SBI Assistant,” Raleigh Times 3 December 1939.
127 “Creekmore Named Acting,” 3 December 1939.
128 “Creekmore Named Acting,” 3 December 1939.
129 “Creekmore Out at SBI: Anderson Gets Position,” News and Observer 19 March 1946.
130 “Creekmore Named to Post” 17 November 1953.
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and other types of microscopic tests. The number of requests for firearms examinations, 
fingerprints, and documents also increased.131
New interest in police training and standards reflected evidence of police reform 
during Creekmore’s administration.132 The bureau reported that it investigated 
approximately 500 criminal cases. Among these were organized burglary gangs in which 
arrests were made. During this time, more citizens became interested in serving as 
auxiliary police, and it was believed that this effort contributed to crime prevention and 
increased arrests in local communities and cities.133 Additionally, Creekmore recognized 
the Institute of Government at Chapel Hill and the bureau’s role in law enforcement 
instruction. The Institute and the SBI, though he described the SBI’s contribution as 
modest, collaboratively offered law enforcement training that Creekmore attributed to 
more effective and professional law enforcement.134 Through the media Creekmore’s 
promotion of professional training affected his career trajectory with the agency. His 
political position was strengthened with his desire to professionalize law enforcement 
careers, and he used the print media to promote, articulate and reinforce his position on 
professionalism.
The bureau continued to investigate old unsolved cases in 1945 along with all the 
new cases that occurred. There were approximately 350 new cases added to the SBI 
caseload annually. Some of the 1945 requests were outside the SBI’s jurisdiction and 
were referred to the appropriate agency for investigation. In 1945, the bureau also 
continued to receive laboratory requests for the examination of physical evidence.
Between March 1946 when Creekmore resigned from the SBI and November 
1953 when he was employed with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, he
131 “SBI Chief Gives Review of Year: Creekmore Says Increase in Crime Will Be One of Post- 
War Problems,” News and Observer 23 December 1943.
132 “Instructors of Law Enforcing Schools,” News and Observer 1 September 1944.
133 “Best Antidote for Crime Is Fine Law Enforcement: In Enforcement as in Everything Else, 
Public Gets What It Orders,” News and Observer 22 December 1944.
134 “Police Institute Planned at UNC: Faculty Members Named for Law Enforcement School 
Opening October 22,” News and Observer 20 October 1944.
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worked in six different government jobs ranging from a prosecutor for the U. S. 
Department of Justice investigating war criminals in Japan to the head of the Financial 
Responsibility Section of the Motor Vehicles Department. As Creekmore prepared to 
take his last position with the State of North Carolina, a newspaper editor described him 
as “a man who’s popped in and out of State government like a political jumping jack... ”135
Although Thomas L. Creekmore’s rise in state government is a compelling 
example of political favoritism so prevalent during the political era, his interests and 
support of professionalism in the state law enforcement agency illustrates the prevailing 
trend of reform during this period. At any rate, supporters of Creekmore recognized that 
he had the educational background and experience to make rational, philosophical 
decisions concerning a newly organized police agency.136 Well-trained agents insured the 
future success of the agency and like Handy, Creekmore’s objective was to create a 
professional state investigative agency.
Conclusion
The promotional process in state law enforcement continues to undergo changes, 
but none have been greater than those experienced when police administrators and citizens 
sought to overcome corrupt political influence. Police promotions in the 18th and 19th 
centuries were deeply rooted in a system of political corruption, the spoils system. 
Rewards were expected and given for political party affiliation and support. State leaders 
were aware of the corruption scandals in the federal government that evolved over a 
period of approximately two hundred years. During the 1930s, they recognized the 
consequences of the late 19th and early 20th century flaws in the promotional process in 
federal law enforcement agencies that were based on the philosophy of the spoils system 
and did not want to repeat those experiences at the state level.
135 “Under the Dome: Creekmore,” News and Observer 10 November 1953.
136 “Under the Dome: Creekmore,” 10 November 1953.
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Even though Handy studied the FBI and other large metropolitan police 
departments as models for the SBI, those agencies had already undergone reform, 
especially Hoover’s FBI. Hoover dealt with politics and corruption while working with 
the Department of Justice and understood that in order for an agency to be professional, it 
could not be based on the spoils system. In the case of the FBI, at least in the upper 
echelon of FBI administrators, J. Edgar Hoover personally chose his senior administrators. 
To parallel this in the North Carolina state law enforcement agency, Handy was given 
authority to select and employ his investigative team though it was small. At this time, 
formal minimum-hiring standards had not been developed for the North Carolina State 
Bureau of Investigation. Also, professional police organizations had not developed 
agency standards for agency accreditation. The hiring process was based on the director’s 
assessment. Handy supported educational standards for investigators and Creekmore 
actively promoted bureau participation with the Institute of Government in conducting 
police training.
Hoover used the print media in the beginning without realizing its impact; 
however, within a very short period, he realized its significance and consciously engaged 
the print media to promote himself and the FBI. Director Handy was much more 
conservative in his use of the media when compared to Hoover. However, when he did 
take advantage of the print media in case investigations, SBI agents not the director often 
received the media attention. As a result, skilled investigators became well known across 
the state in association with high profile cases, much like Hoover became well known in 
the many high-profile cases that he publicized. The favorable recognition that the agent 
received impacted the director’s career trajectory positively.
The career trajectories of J. Edgar Hoover and SBI directors were influenced 
disproportionately by high profile cases reported by the print media compared to other 
career factors. Though their use of the print media progressed at different rates, Hoover, 
Handy, and Creekmore effectively used the print media to build a positive image for the 
agency as well as promote their professional career goals. Although the high profile case 
that involved the missing mother was not solved, on a state level it was equivalent to 
Hoover’s federal investigations involving the Urschel and Dillinger cases. Like Hoover,
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Handy’s career trajectory received positive reinforcement from the print media’s broad 
coverage of the high profile case. However, unlike Hoover, there is no documented 
evidence that Handy nor Creekmore used the print media as skillfully to their advantage as 
Hoover employed it to his benefit. Since Handy organized the SBI to be comparable to 
the FBI and adopted the same image-building techniques that Hoover employed, 
similarities between the two agency leaders’ career trajectories are observable. Although 
Creekmore’s tenure with the SBI as director was short in duration, Creekmore continued 
Handy’s positive image of the agency and added his contributions by advocating training 
for investigative agents.
In addition to the directors’ direct involvement in high profile investigations and 
print media coverage of these investigations, there are often high profile case 
investigations that indirectly affect the directors’ career trajectories. Moreover, when 
James Bradshaw received print media attention for the fingerprint analysis that he did on 
cases, his career trajectory was not only affected but the director’s career trajectory was 
affected as well. The positive articles about the agent’s investigations that appeared in the 
print media reinforced the political support that the director needed in order to extend his 
appointment as director and promote his career trajectory.
Prior to World War II limited positions existed for promotions in the formative 
years of both the FBI and SBI, but the initial leaders ambitiously explored every resource 
to promote their career trajectory and to create investigative agencies comprised of 
qualified professionals. On the state level, hiring, training, and promotional criteria 
occurred several years after the agency was formed; nevertheless, outside factors 
influenced the careers of the early directors. Namely, high profile case investigations 
played a significant role in the promotional process regardless of whether they became 
high profile as a result of print media attention, political magnitude, or were significant to 
the bureau or a senior administrator. Chapter two will examine the effects of 
professionalism, promotion and the influence of the print media on law enforcement 
directors’ career trajectories after World War II.
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C h ap ter  2
Professionalism, Promotion and the Influence of Print M edia During the Post W ar Years, 
1947-1956
Law Enforcement Organizations and Training
Police reform continued to gain momentum during the 1940s and 50s as law enforcement 
officers pursued their interests in unions and organizations that represented law enforcement 
officers and their career development. During the early reform era, professional organizations 
were limited. However, professional police organizations like the National Conference of Police 
Associations (NCPA) began to emerge as the reform era ensued. The NCPA was the product of 
a meeting in Detroit, Michigan in 1953 that was comprised of law enforcement representatives 
who sought cooperative practices between law enforcement organizations across the nation. The 
purpose of this organization was “to collect, study, standardize, summarize, and to disseminate 
factual data for the purpose of promoting the professionalization of the police service and to 
stimulate mutual cooperation between law enforcement agencies.”1 Furthermore, in order to 
professionalize law enforcement, police agencies throughout the United States started enrolling 
their officers in specialized training. Not only were the SBI and FBI conducting specialized 
training, police organizations were also conducting special police seminars nationally. 
Consequently, the emphasis on police training reinforced the concept of professional police 
organizations and contributed to police reform throughout the United States.
In addition to professional organizational reform, police executives pursued efforts to 
reform the trends in print media exposure of law enforcement agencies. Prior to law enforcement 
officials’ attempts to reform law enforcement, print media exposure was primarily negative since 
the print media exposed corruption in law enforcement agencies at every level. While police 
organizations experienced professionalization as a result of reform in law enforcement, positive 
trends increased in the print media.
1 Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism: Power and Impact in Public Sector Bargaining 
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1973) p. 18.
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Furthermore, as law enforcement organizations implemented professional practices and 
standards, the system of patronage and political corruption subsided. By the late 1940s, 
organizational and leadership trends were developing which led to the end of the political era and 
the reform era began. Collaborative efforts between state law enforcement and the FBI were 
among the first steps taken by North Carolina toward these goals. J. Edgar Hoover released his 
top FBI training agent, Edward Scheidt, to assist Dr. Albert Coates in establishing the Institute of 
Government in Chapel Hill for law enforcement training. Hoover also sent ten FBI agents to 
Chapel Hill to teach North Carolina law enforcement officers selected to attend the special 
training at the Institute of Government. Hoover applauded Dr. Coates’ leadership efforts in 
developing police training in North Carolina.2 By the late 1940s, police training in North Carolina
! was voluntary for local agencies but required for some agencies like the North Carolina State
| Highway Patrol. For officers who received training, it was approximately eight weeks in length;
I . ,
j  however, by the 1950s it had become a twelve-week training program. Additional specialized
training, separate from basic training, emerged and generally improved the professionalism of 
investigators’ investigative activities. However, an advantage for investigators included the 
impact the training had on their career trajectories. Professional training was one of the factors 
that influenced investigators’ career trajectories because it prepared personnel at the investigative 
level to advance to administrative positions, namely the directorship.
During the reform era, the cumulative number of training credits or seminars completed at 
the time of promotion became criteria traditionally accepted for promotional decisions by police 
administrators and brought about changes in state law enforcement directors’ career trajectories. 
Moreover, as professional standards became established, a minimum number of training hours 
were traditionally required by most law enforcement agencies in order to apply for promotion. 
Although, law enforcement organizations experienced professional reform that had a positive
i
I influence over the corrupt practices of the political era, professional requirements during the
reform era were not independent factors in the promotional process. Promotions continued to
[ hinge on outside factors. High profile case investigations in the print media influenced the state
[
law enforcement directors’ career trajectories.
I
| 2 Albert Coates, The Beginning o f Schools fo r Law Enforcing Officers in North Carolina (Chapel Hill,
[ North Carolina: Professor Emeritus Fund, 1983) pp. 14-17.
3 Coates p. 116.
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For example, during the postwar years, Melville Dalton, an American researcher, 
identified traditional hiring attributes as being qualified, trustworthy, and compliant. However, he 
also recognized there were nontraditional factors that influenced employee selection and the 
nontraditional factors sometimes negated the traditional criteria for promotion. The 
nontraditional factors he documented included socialization with the agency hierarchy as well as 
having similar political ideologies, religious affiliations, and similar ethnic backgrounds to those of 
the administrators. In other words, whether or not an individual performed a job as well as 
another candidate, the traditional factors did not influence the selection process as much as the 
informal factors according to the study by Dalton.4 The aspects discussed in Dalton’s study are 
consistent with directors’ careers when they supervise investigators who work high profile cases. 
Namely, directors who supervised investigators investigating high profile cases provided directors 
more opportunities for print media recognition that resulted from their association with the case 
through the investigator. Furthermore, high profile case investigative activities promoted 
socialization and fraternization between investigators and administrators resulting not only in 
advances in career trajectory opportunities for investigators but for directors as well.
In the law enforcement promotional process, agencies attempt to identify officers who 
possess leadership qualities for promotion. In one early leadership study, physical characteristics 
attributed success or failure based on height. This study concluded that tall people made better 
leaders than short people. However, Hoover, not considered a tall man, among other researchers, 
would have disputed the findings of this study since Hoover was a very successful FBI director 
and leader. Other studies examined intrinsic attributes like intelligence, persuasiveness and 
intuition only to find that there was no precise way to define or quantify some of these attributes, 
especially intuition. One major criticism of these research findings was that identifying successful 
leadership qualities in one occupational group did not necessarily apply to another occupational 
group. For example, a highly successful chief executive officer of a successful corporation most 
likely would not be an effective chief of police in a large metropolitan police department or even 
in a small city.
4 Melville Dalton, “Informal Factors in Career Achievement,” American Journal o f Sociology, 56:5 
(1951): pp. 407-408.
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However, although researchers have been unable to identify universal leadership traits, 
before abandoning half of a century of research, one researcher, Ralph Stogdill, decided to take a 
different approach to the study of leadership. He examined three hundred studies and found there 
were some traits common to leaders compared to non-leaders. The traits of a good leader 
according to this study included being goal-directed, venturesome, self-confident, responsible, 
tolerant of stress frustration, and capable of influencing others. If a person possesses only a 
couple of these traits, it is not a valid predictor of leadership. Nevertheless, if the person was self- 
confident, was goal-directed and possessed some of the other traits, these traits represent a 
personality type appropriate for leadership responsibilities. If one argues that people cannot learn 
or acquire these traits, it seriously undermines the need for leadership training based on a system 
of enhancing and developing these traits.
In contrast to the traditional approach of examining the positive attributes of leadership, 
John Geirer, another researcher, devised a reverse set of leadership traits published in 1967 that 
identified candidates’ deficient leadership characteristics. He found these reverse traits to be 
significant in evaluating leadership capabilities in candidates and promotional boards and 
committees neglected candidates who demonstrated these traits for promotional consideration. 
Specifically, he established in his study that evaluators eliminated candidates who exhibited 
specific negative traits from recruitment for potential leadership positions. Gerier’s reverse traits 
included the following characteristics: “uninformed about issues important to the group, a very 
low participator, or very rigid in thinking.”5
Illustrated in these studies are many of the traditional promotional principles that were 
accepted and recognized as part of the promotional process during the reform era, and the SBI 
and FBI retain some of these same promotional principles today. Hoover reinforced the reform 
movement that initiated restructuring and promotional change among contemporary police 
administrators in many United States law enforcement agencies. The FBI and its agents became 
role models among the law enforcement professionals, specifically for the SBI, because of 
Hoover’s leadership, hiring standards and high expectations for his agents.
Other law enforcement officials as well as the public admired FBI agents even though their 
jobs involved difficult working conditions and demanded lengthy hours investigating cases.
5 Paul R. Timm and Brent D. Peterson. People At Work, 2nd ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 
1986) pp. 119-120.
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Although, the job circumstances were not always pleasant, very few agents left the FBI to take 
less demanding jobs that would have paid them more. In 1955 less than one-half of one percent 
left their jobs with the FBI to take jobs outside the agency.6 Although the majority of the FBI 
agents were not seeking employment outside the agency, the director was seeking job security in 
federal government and practiced a publicity style to main his career trajectory. The same was 
true with the SBI. The agents were not seeking employment outside the agency but the SBI 
director was seeking job security. With very little turnover among agents in both the federal and 
state agencies, it contributed to a stable bureaucratic organization. While agents benefited from 
the stability and reforms occurring in promotional practices, directors’ career trajectories 
benefited from factors such as high profile cases in the print media. Even though Hoover was 
responsible for initiating reforms that were emulated by the SBI; nonetheless, external factors 
affected the SBI directors and Hoover’s career trajectories. Hoover advanced his career 
trajectory by exploiting print media attention from high profile cases that ranged from gangsters 
with Mafia connections to international spy rings such as the Rosenbergs. Likewise, SBI 
directors also benefited similarly to Hoover from high profile homicide cases like the Phillips case 
in which a husband murdered his wife to the high profile Tung investigation that involved Asian 
diplomats. External factors such as high profile cases in the print media were critical to directors’ 
career trajectories although Hoover was instrument in initiating law enforcement reforms.
The initial reforms created by Hoover in the hiring process as well as advancement 
remained in place throughout Hoover’s tenure as director and shaped the bureau’s image for 
decades afterwards. Not only did Hoover maintain high standards when Attorney General Harlan 
Fiske Stone initially appointed him as director, he maintained high standards for the duration of 
his tenure. In the beginning, Hoover hired agents who had college and advanced degrees as well 
as those who had military backgrounds in addition to their educational degrees. “Hoover’s first 
move was to fix high standards of personal conduct for his agents. Then he began to get rid of 
the political appointees who couldn’t measure up to these standards. They were replaced by 
young men with training as lawyers and accountants.”7 Hoover was not only concerned about the
6 Don Whitehead, The FBI Story: A Report to the People (New York: Random House, 1956) p. 16.
7 Whitehead p. 14.
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agents’ qualifications but also about the Bureau’s image projected by the agents. “Procedures 
were set up for checking on their conduct and performance.”8
Hoover’s idea of professionalism involved rigorous training, adherence to strict dress 
codes, an impeccable code of conduct, and internal inspections. His basic organizational 
objectives included collecting and classifying intelligence and the application of scientific 
inve stigative principles.9
In addition to having high expectations of the agents who worked for him, Hoover had 
high personal expectations, and he cleverly employed his abilities in order to continue to promote 
himself. It was not uncommon for him to devise methods to gain favor from the attorney general 
as well as the President. Nor was it unusual for him to use the bureau, agents, and high profile 
investigative case activities during the reform era to advance his career trajectory goals and seek 
higher, more important positions in federal government than the position of FBI director. Though 
he promoted professionalism among his agents, Hoover did not hesitate to occasionally engage in 
quid pro quo negotiations to ensure the rising momentum of his career trajectory.
Hoover and President Harry Truman
In 1945 with the death of the United States’ thirty-second President, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Hoover attempted to secure support from the new President, Harry Truman. Even 
though Hoover had created an impeccable reputation for himself, Presidential support guaranteed 
his career trajectory with the FBI. Since each President personally selected the attorney general 
who would serve during his presidency, Hoover knew with the appointment of a new attorney 
general, the attorney general could appoint a new FBI director as well. So when Truman became 
President, Hoover circulated a message among his agents, that if anyone knew a friend or relative 
or anyone who had a connection to the President that they should let him know because he
[ needed a personal envoy to deliver a message to the President. Eventually, Hoover learned there
| was an agent in Missouri named Marion Chiles, III, whose father had been a childhood friend and!
I playmate of the President. Hoover summoned Chiles and explained his assignment. Chiles did 
i  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
j 8 Whitehead p. 14.
| 9 Claire Bond Potter, War on Crime: Bandits, G-Men, and the Politics o f Mass Culture (New Brunswick,
I NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998) p 35.
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not embrace the assignment with enthusiasm; however, he realized that if he did not appease 
Hoover, his career trajectory with the bureau would be stalled or halted.10
Chiles went to Truman and after some casual conversation; the President asked him the 
purpose of his visit. Chiles told the President that he had a personal message from Hoover. 
Hoover wanted him to know that the FBI and Hoover were at his personal service anytime. 
Truman smiled and said; “ ...anytime I need the services of the FBI... I will ask for it through my 
attorney general.”11 Chiles had the unpleasant task of relaying Truman’s message back to 
Hoover. The foiled attempt of Hoover to win Truman’s favor set the tone for Hoover and 
Truman’s relationship in the years that followed. They remained at odds throughout Truman’s 
presidency. This was one of the few times that Hoover’s career trajectory was threatened 
throughout his tenure as FBI director. While Hoover seldom experienced political pressure from 
the President that threatened his position as director, political pressure was somewhat 
commonplace among the SBI directors. Maintaining their position and their positive career 
trajectories was a challenge after every election. Unlike Hoover, the SBI directors during this 
period in police history had not amassed enough support to take some of the same risks and 
political liberties as Hoover.12
Subsequent to Chiles’ visit as an unsuccessful emissary, Hoover sought ways to undermine 
Truman’s administration. In 1948 Harry Dexter White was accused of giving aid to Communist 
spies. White was President Roosevelt and Vice President Truman’s most trusted economic 
advisor. To take revenge on Truman, Hoover seized the opportunity and testified before a 
congressional investigation against White. However, in order to discredit Hoover, Truman 
referred to the congressional inquiry as a “red herring” which incensed Hoover even more.
10 William C. Sullivan, The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1979) p. 38.
11 Sullivan p. 38.
12 James R. Durham, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Acting SBI Director, 16 
December 1997. Durham was sworn into the SBI on May 15, 1948. He estimated that in his forty-one-year career 
with the SBI he examined documents in more than 10,000 cases. The directors assigned many of the cases, and 
some involved high profile investigation of election law violations and political candidates. Durham said that 
although the investigations sometimes revealed sensitive information about politicians, the SBI directors did not 
use the information for political purposes to advance their careers.
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There were other instances when Hoover became preoccupied with situations when the 
outcomes were contrary to his viewpoint. Former FBI agent William Sullivan recalled an incident 
m which Hoover became obsessed with advancing in the Masonic organization. One of Hoover’s 
most trusted colleagues, Louis B. Nichols, Assistant Director in charge of public relations, 
summoned Sullivan to the office and asked if he were interested in helping the director with a very 
sensitive assignment. Nichols explained that someone in the Masonic Order was secretly casting a 
vote to prevent Hoover from becoming a thirty-third degree Mason. Since Sullivan knew 
Congressman Joseph E. Casey, Nichols explained that he wanted Sullivan to speak with Casey 
who was friends with Truman because Hoover believed that Truman was preventing him from 
advancing in the Masonic Order.13 Although Hoover attempted to revert to the quid quo pro  
\ tactics that had been so popular during the political era, these tactics were unsuccessful for him, 
and he was never popular with President Truman. Despite the political challenges he experienced 
in Washington, D.C., his public relations style using the print media in managing high profile 
investigations gave him an advantage among constituents. Therefore, he maintained his political 
prestige and FBI directorship while keeping his career trajectory on a positive course.
In addition to initiating attempts to advance his career trajectory through his tactics with 
his superiors, Hoover’s ambition was to become Attorney General or receive a Supreme Court 
Justice appointment. He joined political friends in a plan that would enable him to achieve his 
goal provided their political ambitions were successful. If all went as planned, he would revel in 
Truman’s defeat.
Hoover and two of his closest associates, Clyde Tolson and Louis Nichols, contacted 
Presidential contender Thomas Dewey and offered the bureau’s assistance to him during his 
campaign. They anticipated that Dewey would win the nomination and defeat Truman. If Dewey 
became President, Hoover would become Dewey’s attorney general and Nichols would become 
the FBI’s next director. Hoover would carry Tolson with him as his assistant and Tolson could 
oversee Nichol’s FBI operation.14
However, the unpredictability of politics resulted in failure of his political patronage 
aspirations when President Harry Truman won re-election. Although Harry Truman did not
13 Sullivan pp. 38-39.
14 Sullivan pp. 41-45.
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remove Hoover from office, Hoover did not reap the rewards of political favoritism during any of 
Truman’s administrations to the extent that he had in past administrations. In the earlier part of 
Hoover’s career, he relied on publicizing high-profile cases in the print media involving 
investigations of organized crime figures and spies, which clearly worked to his advantage as FBI 
director. In addition to high-profile cases, he also used quid pro quo to accomplish his goals. 
Despite his efforts, he did not achieve the political rapport with the President that he would have 
preferred. Hoover experienced repeated political failures with Truman similar to his failure to 
maneuver his acceptance into the Masonic Order. Comparatively, some SBI directors, namely 
Jimmy Powell, experienced similar failures in their career trajectories; however, the SBI directors
I
were unable to overcome the adverse effect on their career trajectories.15
Although Hoover had established a strong hold on his position and managed to control his 
career trajectory, he was not comfortable in his relationship with Truman and the new attorney 
general, Tom C. Clark. Regardless of Hoover’s efforts, he received little to no encouragement or 
support from President Truman. Although Hoover did not gain any support from his tactics 
aimed at Truman, through print media in high profile investigations of communism and espionage, 
he maintained control of his career trajectory.
Therefore, he pursued political alliances from members of Congress, specifically from the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. As an investigator of espionage for the Department 
of Justice before his appointment to the FBI, an opportunity to investigate espionage once again 
presented him with another chance to acquire even more political prestige. “In March 1946, 
Hoover advised Attorney General Clark that he was going to ‘intensify [the bureau’s] 
investigations of the Communist Party activities and Soviet Espionage cases’.... When he 
recalled how attacks from such liberal and civil libertarians...had nearly destroyed him during the 
f Palmer days, he decided that he and the Bureau had no alternative but to treat the Truman
j  administration as a potential enemy and to seek new political alliances.”16 Since he could not
; 15 Dan E. Gilbert, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and SBI Supervisor, 18 January 1998.
[ Gilbert commented on the dissention between Powell and Attorney General Patton. He noted that Patton disliked
Powell’s Hoover-like behavior. Gilbert said that an agent would double park in front of the Justice Building, wait 
for Powell, and open the door for Powell that made Patton angry every time he observed this behavior from his 
second floor office window. Former SBI Agents Ray Garland, James Bradshaw, and James Durham have 
corroborated details of this same information.
16 Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life o f J. Edgar Hoover (New York: The Free Press, 
1987) p. 284.
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depend on Truman and his cabinet to support him and propel his career trajectory in the process, 
when two high profile investigative activities, espionage and communism, threatened national 
security, Hoover seized another opportunity and attempted to use these investigative activities to 
; his career advantage and the bureau’s advantage. In an effort to bolster his relationship with 
congressional members who would be important to his career trajectory and the welfare of the 
| bureau, he solicited their support for his high profile investigative activities. “Some skeptics
| suggested that Hoover’s well-publicized alarm over the national well-being emerged most
; emphatically whenever he was asking Congress for...appropriations.... The Director
i  undoubtedly believed—and he seemed to be right—that the public had an insatiable appetite for
i
news about their G-men.”17 If the FBI was fully funded, Hoover had the guarantee that his high 
profile investigative interests and the programs that he advocated in the bureau would continue. 
Also, through the assistance of the print media in high profile investigations and with 
congressional support, Hoover reinforced his own career trajectory with the FBI.
Unlike the Truman administration, when Eisenhower became President, Hoover once 
again used the patronage system to his advantage and enjoyed the benefits of quid pro quo.
Unlike Truman who turned Hoover away when Hoover offered his services to Eisenhower, he not
only accepted, but also enjoyed secret, privileged communications known only between him and
i
Hoover. When Hoover divulged important information, the President acted on it; however, he 
treated much of it as gossip with no reaction or response.18 
j  Although quid pro quo practices among politically influenced law enforcement
organizations like the FBI were still occurring, by this time in the FBI’s organizational history, 
trends in law enforcement had begun to change. Law enforcement agencies were adopting 
professional standards and guidelines throughout the United States at national and state levels. In 
addition to changes resulting from reforms in the hiring and promotional practices taking place, 
nontraditional factors continued to influence the promotional process as well. Namely, during the 
reform era, as previously mentioned, the print media and high profile case investigations 
contributed to the career trajectories of the FBI and SBI directors during the political era. 
Hoover continued to use high profile criminal investigations during the beginning of the Cold War
17 Sanford J. Ungar, FBI (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1976) p 382.
18 Sullivan p. 45.
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period; however, he also utilized the print media in high profile investigations of espionage and 
communism to promote and maintain his career trajectory with the FBI.
Hoover and Ten Most Wanted List
During the onset of the Cold War, one of Hoover’s more successful programs for 
exposing criminals was the “Ten Most Wanted Fugitives.” The FBI created the list in March 
1950 when a reporter for the International News Service, the predecessor to the United Press 
International, asked the FBI to identify the most notorious criminal it wanted.19 “Give me your 10 
worst, asked an International News Service reporter in 1950, a list of the toughest guys hunted by 
the FBI. The story he published provided so much good publicity that Director J. Edgar Hoover 
decided to make the list an official program... ,”20
The first person named on the list was Thomas J. Holden, nicknamed “Tough Tommy,” on 
May 14, 1950. The FBI described him as a train robber, wife murderer, and escapee. Holden was 
not apprehended right away, but in a few days the third person named to the “Ten Most Wanted 
Fugitives List” was captured. He was William Nesbit, convicted murderer and escapee. After 
newspapers reported that Nesbit was living in a cave near St. Paul, Minnesota, a group of teenage 
boys recognized his picture in a local newspaper. Newspapers gave the following account of 
Nesbitt’s apprehension. The boys went out to the cave with slingshots, Boy Scout knives and a 
toy atomic ray gun. They filled the cave’s stovepipe with snow and sure enough smoked out 
Nesbit. Then they ran to the police with their information. The local police apprehended Nesbit. 
The story released in a ten most wanted list history captured readers’ attention. Consequently, 
with Hoover’s “Ten Most Wanted List” in the print media, his career trajectory was enhanced 
with every apprehension of one of the high profile criminals after the published list appeared in the 
print media.
On June 23, 1951 Holden, the first criminal listed among the criminals on the FBI’s most 
wanted list, was finally apprehended by the FBI in Beaverton, Oregon by someone who
19 Gordon Witkin, “45 Years of Bad Guys on the Run,” U.S. News & World Report 118:10 (1995): p. 15.
20 Jeff Glasser, “In Demand for 50 Years: The FBI’s Most Wanted List: Good Publicity and a History of 
Success,” U.S. News World Report 128:11 (2000): p. 60.
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recognized him from a picture that was published in the Portland Oregonian 21 The ten most 
wanted list’s success was two-fold, agents apprehended criminals, and Hoover received print 
media recognition through the program. Hoover used the program that received national print 
media publicity throughout the remainder of his career. Again, the print media brought attention 
to the cases, making them high profile, and the attention increased the probability of successful 
arrests. Citizens and law enforcement officials recognized fugitives’ photos and stories like Omar 
A. Pinson and Orba Elmer Jackson. Pinson, number five on the Ten Most Wanted List, was 
apprehended five months after the FBI included him on the list. An automobile salesman 
recognized Pinson and alerted the police. On March 21, 1950, Jackson, the seventh fugitive 
i listed, was apprehended the day after his name appeared on the list. “The list’s publicity drew theI
j  attention of a local resident... he confirmed his suspicion .when he read a story and saw a 
photograph of Jackson in a local paper.”22 Subsequently, arrests as a result of the Ten Most 
Wanted Program publicity augmented the director’s career trajectory.
Hoover and House Un-American Activities Committee
Additional high profile activities investigated during the early Cold War period by the FBI 
included the threat of espionage and Communism. In fact, with the gangster era diminishing, the 
FBI placed its primary emphasis on the fight against Communism.23 The House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) first formed in 1938 to investigate subversive activities and 
Communist Party members.24 In addition to the Communist threat, however, the bureau still had 
to contend with increasing crime in the United States. Although criminal activity was a major 
component of the bureau’s investigative caseload, American sensitivity to communism provoked 
| outrage when international spying was exposed and initiated a response at the national level,
i  Hoover capitalized on America’s outrage as he did during the gangster era. He used the bureau
j
i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _i
| 21 Mark Sabljak and Martin H. Greenberg, Most Wanted: A History o f the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted List,
j (New York: Bonanza Books, 1990) pp. 29-30.
! 22 Sabljak pp. 33-36.
23 Whitehead pp. 15-16.
: 24Ungarp. 85.
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to promote his career trajectory by highly publicizing in the print media the threat of Communism 
and espionage cases in the United States.
“One crucial element in the Bureau’s image-building was the material turned out over the 
years under the Director’s name.”25 The FBI produced and distributed an extensive collection of 
literary materials under Hoover. Not only were there articles written for law reviews, magazines, 
and newspapers, the agency published the book, Deceit: The Story o f Communism in America 
and How to Fight It. The lengthy book defined Communism and enlisted every reader to perform 
their patriotic duty by reporting any Communist activities and espionage they were aware of to 
the bureau.26
Hoover’s colleagues seemingly supported his political ambitions but one individual was 
openly critical, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan. In one of his final letters to Hoover, he 
expressed how time and again Hoover willingly assisted anyone who was powerful and held an 
influential position in government. According to Sullivan, if it served Hoover’s interests or career 
advancement goals, Hoover eagerly took whatever measures were necessary to promote himself 
and achieve his ambitions at the taxpayer’s expense with help from anyone in the bureau that he 
needed to help him.27 Namely, books portraying the hero, J. Edgar Hoover, and his bureau like 
Masters o f Deceit and A Study o f Communism, were written for Hoover “on public time, during 
the day at taxpayer’s expense.”28
As Sullivan pointed out, Hoover, who was concerned with his professional image, cleverly 
manipulated not only the press but many politicians as well during the perceived threat of 
Communism in America. With a resurgence of Communist activity after World War II in the 
United States, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) became active in the 
investigation of Communist activities again. The second HUAC inquiry began March 8, 1951 and 
continued for a year and a half. This committee emphasized Communist infiltration in the 
Hollywood motion picture industry.29
25 Ungar p. 380.
26 Ungar pp. 380-381.
27 Sullivan p. 276.
28 Sullivan p. 268.
29 Gerald Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst: Documents in the Cultural History o f Film in America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) p. 550.
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HUAC hearings targeted Hollywood celebrities and important members of the movie 
industry. The committee called witnesses that were sympathetic and friendly to the committee’s 
interests and subpoenaed nineteen others they considered communists or unfriendly. The 
committee actually called eleven people to testify before the committee and only one of those, 
Bertolt Brecht, answered questions for the committee. Brecht, a German playwright, denied 
being a Communist but after he testified, he returned to East Germany. The remaining ten refused 
to testify before the committee and did not answer any questions. Each one claimed their Fifth 
Amendment rights. Unfortunately, for them the committee did not recognize the use of their Fifth 
Amendment rights before the HUAC committee. Consequently, they received six to twelve 
months of imprisonment for their refusal to testify. The print media coined the name “Hollywood
| Ten” for the ten who refused to testify. Included in this group of ten people were one director
I
and nine screenwriters. After the ten appeared before the HUAC, fifty Hollywood executives had 
a secret meeting and agreed to suspend them without pay. The Hollywood movie industry 
blacklisted them. Major movie producers would not hire them nor purchase their work; however, 
some produced and marketed work under pseudonyms.30
Despite the fact that the FBI was supposed to be an impartial investigative agency, it 
pursued any radical or liberal and worked closely with the HUAC and the Subversive Activities 
Control Board (SACB). Anyone who agreed with Communist issues was a suspected 
Communist. They could be investigated by the FBI or brought before both committees to 
testify.31 Hoover exercised his position of authority and this committee to gain general support 
from the American citizens who were afraid of Communist infiltration into American society. The 
investigation of Communist activities was high profile because of the uncertainty of the
introduction of a foreign government whose principles were vastly different. Hoover exploited
this fear and the print media to secure his career as FBI director. Nationally circulated
I newspapers, specifically The New York Times, quoted Hoover’s threatening descriptions of
| Communist and Communist sympathizers while he was championed in the articles over the evils
| of Communism. For example, “Mr. Hoover said, internal security problems were growingi
I
I ' — —
. 30 Jeanine Basinger, American Cinema: One Hundred Years o f Filmmaking, (New York: Rizzoli
I International Publications, Inc., 1994) pp. 240-241.
I
! 31 Ungar p. 128.
85
steadily... and declared: the need...is paramount to control the dangers that are inherent in
communism.’”32 Also, “ ...Hoover warned Senators...that unprecedented numbers of 
Communists were seeking United States atomic, military and industrial secrets.... He said the 
F B I. must... ‘preserve our internal security’ in the event of emergencies.”33
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg Case
Hoover recognized the importance of the Communist issue in American politics and 
foresaw its impact on his career trajectory. He wanted to be among the winners and the climate 
was not leaning in Truman’s favor or the Democrats’. Therefore, Hoover, anticipated a 
“Republican victory in the 1946 congressional election and that the Republicans were going to 
win the Presidency in 1948. Political expediency dictated that he move over to the winning 
side.”34 With the defeat of the Democrats in mind, Hoover avidly pursued exposing Communism 
in the United States and built his alliances among politicians and the public taking advantage of 
high profile investigations, the print media and his position as FBI director.
Following the war, the FBI investigated Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in an espionage case 
that was one of the highest profile cases the FBI investigated during the late 1940s and early 
1950s. The court convicted them of espionage, and they were executed for their role in spying.35 
The United States government accused the Rosenbergs of stealing atomic bomb secrets from the 
United States for the Soviet Union. As the investigative leads were corroborated and confessions 
obtained, Hoover hyped the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg case utilizing the print media as the crime 
of the century and had enough evidence to try it as one of the most renowned cases of the 
1950s.36
32 “F.B.I. Calls Spy Fight Greater than in War,” New York Time 27 January 1950.
33 “U. S. Reds Go Underground To Foil F. B. I., Hoover Says: 540,000 Communists and Followers Seek 
Our Atomic, Military, Industrial Secrets, He Tells Closed Senate Unit Session,” New York Times 9 June 1950.
34 Powers p. 287.
35 Oliver Pilat, The Atom Spies (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1952) pp. 291-292.
36 Ungar p. 110.
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When the Soviets tested a nuclear bomb in 1949, the print media overwhelmingly 
supported the apprehension of the traitors responsible for giving away atomic secrets to the 
Communist enemy. Hoover participated in the investigation and publicity that ensued. In 1950 
following the arrest in England of Klaus Fuchs, a former Los Alamos, New Mexico employee and 
informant to the Soviets, the Rosenberg case developed. Hoover used the high profile espionage 
case as an opportunity to promote his viewpoint against Communism utilizing the print media. 
Reports revealed that officials working with the United States government intercepted and 
decoded some of Fuchs’ messages to the Soviets. As a result, he was arrested, confessed, and 
named his American courier, Harry Gold.37 As a result of the chain of confessions that followed 
Gold’s arrest, the Rosenbergs were implicated in the high profile case.
In 1944 when United States Army Intelligence Corps’ top-secret program, code name 
“Venona,” intercepted a communique between the Soviet Consul in New York and Moscow, the 
message could only be partially deciphered. Four years later in 1948, the Army Signal 
Intelligence Service, the National Security Agency’s predecessor, decoded the 1944 communique. 
With the deciphered message available, the FBI had more than circumstantial evidence to piece 
the case together. Even though they had no intent to use the communiques in court, gradually, 
the message that could only partially be deciphered for years led FBI agents to confirm leads in 
the high profile espionage case. As the momentum of the high profile investigation accelerated, 
Hoover took advantage of print media opportunities while he ardently searched for more 
Communist supporters. For example, in an article that appeared in The New York Times May 
1944, he expressed his outrage at the probability that Communism was infiltrating youth 
movements. Something that no American family would want, “He charged that ‘alien-minded and 
un-American forces’ are now ‘endeavoring to inject their sinister poison into the veins of our 
American youth.’”38 Hoover’s fight against Communism was a fight for freedom in every 
American family.
Among the articles that appeared in The New York Times, one occurred in 1945 in which 
Hoover spoke against Communism and in defense of American institutions. Hoover described 
Communists as “panderers of diabolic destruction who are concentrating their efforts to confuse
37 Jacob Cohen, “The Rosenberg File,” National Review 45 (1993): pp 48-53.
38 “Wider Aid to Youth Urged by Hoover,” New York Times 5 May 1944, p. 1.
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and divide by applying the Fascist smear to progressive police departments, the FBI and other 
American institutions to conceal their own sinister purposes.”39 In addition to gaining public 
support with fervent words published in newspaper articles, the print media also evidenced that 
Hoover sought and received political support using the print media. For instance, in The New 
York Times article, “Senators Hear F. B. I. Chief, Favor Plea for More Agents,” Hoover 
requested additional FBI agents from Congress to fight Communist. “A Senate appropriations 
subcommittee was understood tonight to be ready to recommend an expansion of the staff of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.”40 With every newspaper story on Hoover fighting Communism 
in American society, he advanced his career trajectory and built public as well as political 
support.41 Following the Venona break in the espionage case, through continued print media 
support against Communism, Hoover’s fight against communism culminated with the arrest and 
conviction of the Rosenbergs.
However, despite Ethel’s involvement in the high profile case, Hoover opposed her 
execution. Although the authorities were unable to decode the messages until the late forties, the 
messages exposed Julius’ activities that included operating a spy ring and providing the Soviets 
with information. It was not proven at that time that the transmissions involved atomic secrets; 
therefore, they did not implicate Rosenberg’s wife.42 When Julius and Ethel were convicted, 
Hoover was opposed to executing Ethel because of the investigative and prosecutorial techniques 
used as well as adverse public opinion. However, during and after adjudication, Hoover never 
intervened.43 The Rosenbergs were executed in June 1953 in the electric chair at Sing Sing 
Prison.44
39 “Major Crime Wave Due, Says Hoover,” New York Times 11 December 1945, p. 26.
40 William S. White, “Senators Hear F.B.I. Chief, Favor Plea for More Agents,” New York Times 8 
February 1950.
41 Myron McBryde, Personal Interview of Former FBI Special Agent and Former SBI Director, 19 
December 1997. McBryde recalled when he was a special agent with the FBI, Hoover placed high priority on 
espionage investigations.
42 Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, “Cryptic Answers,” Nation 261 (1995): pp. 152-154.
43 Cohen pp 48-53.
44 Herbert Romerstein, “Venona Intercepts Confirm Rosenbergs’ Guilt,” Human Events 51:30 (2000): pp.
10- 12.
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After the arrest and trial, zealous Rosenberg supporters questioned his guilt. In 1995 the 
National Security Agency (NSA) released some of the decoded Soviet messages that were 
transmitted from 1943 to 1947 between the Soviet consulate in New York and the KGB in 
Moscow. The U.S. Army’s top-secret program, Venona, was used to intercept the wireless 
communications during the Rosenbergs’ activities that were used to implicate them. The FBI and 
CIA officials made the decision to keep Venona a secret from the public and restricted knowledge 
of its existence to others within the government. Because Truman and Hoover had different 
philosophies on Communist activities in the United States, Hoover definitely did not want the 
President to have knowledge of the Venona program.
Since the relationship between President Truman and Hoover was one of distrust, Truman 
believed any communications he received from Hoover involving Soviet espionage were
j
| exaggerated. Truman suspected Hoover’s actions were motivated by self-serving political
ambitions.45 Truman’s suspicions were not unfounded. Communist propaganda and the
Rosenberg case benefited Hoover’s career. Through print media coverage associated with these 
two high profile investigations, he retained political and public support as well positive control 
over his career trajectory.
Prior to the Rosenberg trial, when the House Un-American Committee invited Hoover to 
testify before them, he initially declined. Hoover suspected the committee members were allies of 
Truman’s administration who were seeking to have Hoover disclose the Bureau’s investigative 
practices that would result in extinguishing their sources for Communist information. However, 
one of Hoover’s colleagues, Louis Nichols, delivered the following message to Hoover from the 
committee chairman, J. Parnell Thomas, “HUAC knew ‘the Director had been under wraps for 
years, that the Administration favored Communists.’ Hoover could use the committee as a 
‘sounding board...a grand opportunity’ to ‘say anything he wanted to say.’”46 So Hoover 
decided to accept HUAC’s invitation. When he spoke before the committee, he “told HUAC its 
mission was to rally the public against Communism.... I feel that once public opinion is 
( thoroughly aroused as it is today, the fight against Communism is well on its way.”47 Gaining
45 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven:
I Yale University Press, 1999) p. 15.
I
46 Powers pp. 286-287.
47 Powers pp. 288-289.
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support from Congress through HUAC, Hoover obtained the status he had been seeking. He 
perceived himself as a national leader.48
The outcome of the Rosenberg case fortified Hoover’s position on Communism and 
espionage in America during this period. He contributed to the successful prosecution of Julius 
and Ethel Rosenberg for their role in stealing atomic secrets and brought print media publicity to 
himself and the bureau. Hoover would “turn public events into moral lessons, and use 
controversy to increase public support for the central values of society.”49 Not only did Hoover 
champion public support for the issues at hand, he received even more recognition and his 
credibility was reinforced. All of which ultimately served him well as the director of the FBI while
‘ his career trajectory continued along its successful path.
I
| Hoover and the Mafia
i
One of Hoover’s major oversights occurred while he was preoccupied with Communism. 
However, he managed to overcome potentially damaging consequences and completely reversed 
the outcome to his benefit. In 1950, Senator Estes Kefauver from Tennessee chaired a senate 
crime committee when the committee discovered the existence of the Mafia. The committee 
found widespread police corruption and police involvement that circumvented the vice laws.50
Communism was first and foremost on Hoover’s mind and he did not believe the Mafia 
existed. On November 14, 1957 there was a meeting of the “Mob Bosses” in Apalachin, New 
York at Joseph Barbara, Sr.’s home. Local police and state troopers raided the meeting and some 
of the fleeing guests were apprehended. The legend of the Mafia’s existence became a reality. 
The Apalachin raid caused Hoover considerable embarrassment because he had so adamantly 
denied that the Mafia existed. Hoover immediately established the “Top Hoodlum Program” and 
asked each of his chiefs to send FBI headquarters information on the top ten gangsters in their 
territory. He also instigated an extensive wiretap program to gain further intelligence regarding
I
[ 48 Powers pp. 289-290.
1 49 Powers pp. 289-290.
50 Charles D. Edelstein and Robert J. Wicks, An Introduction to Criminal Justice (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1977) p. 100.
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their organization and activities. In 1958, Hoover played catch-up to the activities of organized 
crime.51 In doing so, he shifted the emphasis from investigating Communism to investigating 
organized crime. The FBI produced a two-volume report documenting the existence of the 
Mafia; unfortunately the report established that the Mafia had been in existence as long as Hoover 
had been in office.52
Anderson’s SBI Administration During the Postwar Era
While the FBI continued to investigate federal criminal cases, it also focused investigative 
efforts on national security issues; whereas, the North Carolina SBI continued to concentrate its 
efforts on the investigation of state criminal cases. The national security issues investigated by the 
FBI included Communist activity and espionage that were perceived by many, especially 
politicians, as a national threat. However, during this same time, a lack of reported Communist 
activity in North Carolina indicated there was very little evidence of Communism that required the 
assistance of the State Bureau of Investigation.
During the post war era, structured promotional procedures in the SBI slowly replaced 
political favoritism. Although SBI directors did not attempt to gain political favors to promote 
themselves like Hoover was doing during this same period, directors continued to be politically 
appointed and worked at the pleasure of the state attorney general. While their careers were 
dominated by the will of political authorities that had power and control over their positions, their 
careers were also influenced by high profile investigations reported in the print media.
In the SBI, favoritism continued to frequently be used for promotions because there were 
no formal promotional procedures in place and promotions were at the director’s discretion.53 
Nonetheless, it was during this period, 1947-1957, that training was high on police
51 McBryde. McBryde worked as an FBI special agent in Kansas City, Missouri and Chicago, Illinois
| field offices. Some investigative activities out of these field offices included using informants to collect
j information on organized crime figures.
! . 
i Michael D. Lyman and Gary W. Potter, Organized Crime (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
| 1997) p. 28.
| 53 Max Bryan, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Supervisor of Organized Crime Control
! Division (OCCD), and Director of Governor’s Security, 4 December 1999. Among the SBI Special Agents, Bryan
j was one of Anderson’s loyal supporters and was promoted to supervisor at SBI headquarters in Raleigh as well as
\ given special assignments by Director Anderson.
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administrators’ agendas. For example, between 1947 and the late 1950s, the basic training school 
for the North Carolina State Highway Patrol increased from eight weeks to sixteen weeks. By the 
early 1950s, training for local police and sheriffs increased from three days to four weeks. Also, 
the FBI was active in assisting local officers with basic police training during this period.54 
However, with the onset of increased training opportunities, favoritism or quid pro quo continued 
to influence promotions but gradually the promotional process became more professional.
According to one special agent, when Anderson promoted investigators, the predominant 
quality he recognized was loyalty to the organization and the director.55 Furthermore, during 
Anderson’s tenure, there was a shift in the political structure of the SBI described as an 
authoritative structure. Anderson was a strict authoritarian who demanded loyalty from his 
agents. His leadership style was similar to J. Edgar Hoover’s since they both required extremely 
loyal subservient employees especially from their upper management positions.
Unlike the FBI’s continuous leadership by the same director, partisan politics affected the 
director’s position with the North Carolina SBI. When Anderson was appointed as the SBI’s 
third director, his appointment was based purely on political favoritism and it was publicly 
reported in the Raleigh News and Observer newspaper. The newspaper released an article that 
stated, “Governor Cherry offered Anderson the directorship of the State Highway Patrol, but 
Anderson... declined.... Governor Cherry kept looking for a new job for his friend... Attorney 
General Harry McMullan got word from the Governor’s Office that Cherry was going to appoint 
Anderson as SBI chief.”56 At the governor’s recommendation, McMullan appointed Walter 
Anderson to become director of the State Bureau of Investigation on April 1,1946.
When the SBI initially formed, the governor appointed the first SBI director; however, 
when the General Assembly transferred the SBI agency to the attorney general’s office, selecting 
and appointing the director became the attorney general’s responsibility. However, in Anderson’s 
case, the governor actively contributed to his appointment. Even though Anderson received his 
appointment through political favoritism, he promoted professionalism among the agents and also
54 Coates p. 55.
55 Haywood Starling, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Supervisor, Deputy Director and 
Director, 28 November 1997. Alter more than ten years of loyal service to the SBI, Anderson promoted Starling in 
1958 to Supervisor. Starling said this was his supervisory job with the SBI.
56 “Poor Policy Hounds SBI,” News and Observer 15 December 1946.
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encouraged police training.57 In fact, Anderson was an instructor for the FBI and routinely 
traveled to Washington, D.C. to teach in the FBI National Academy.58
Unlike the directors who preceded him, Walter Anderson was the first SBI director who 
had practical experience in law enforcement. He served as police chief in Charlotte, North 
Carolina and was a well-known law enforcement officer at state and national levels.59 In addition 
to teaching in the FBI National Academy, in 1947 he was elected as the president of the FBI 
National Academy Associates.60 Also, while active in prevention and control of juvenile 
delinquency, U. S. Attorney General Tom C. Clark appointed Anderson as chairman for the 
committee on the role of police in juvenile delinquency matters.61 During this same time, 
Anderson was named as the fifth Vice President of the International Association of Chiefs of1
| Police and was honored at the convention in Mexico City.62
! When Anderson became SBI director in April 1946, his foremost goal for the agency was
to hire four agents to fill the vacant positions. He retained one of the positions for Special Agent 
James Powell who was serving in the military.63 The remaining three positions were available to 
be fulled at Anderson’s will. Little is known about the hiring criteria during Anderson’s first 
administration. At that time no specific hiring guidelines had been developed and agents were 
hiredl at the director’s discretion.64
57 William S. Hunt, Jr., Personal Interview of Former Special SBI Agent and Training Academy Director, 
31 May 1999. Hunt recalled that the Democratic Party asked department heads to secure contributions from 
employees during elections; however, Anderson never asked the agents for contributions. Hunt believed that 
Anderson made personal contributions to the Democratic Party and never discussed political issues with agents.
58 Warren Campbell, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Supervisor, 26 October 1997. 
Campbell first met Anderson when he attended the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. While Anderson 
was SBI director he was a guest instructor at the academy. During Campbell’s enrollment there, Anderson 
encouraged Campbell to apply with the SBI after completing the training.
59 “Creekmore Out at SBI: Anderson Gets Position,” News and Observer 19 March 1946.
60 “Anderson to Attend Washington Meeting,” News and Observer 19 November 1946.
61 “SBI Chief Appointed Committee Chairman,” News and Observer 14 November 1946.
62 “Anderson and Hatcher Honored at Convention: State SBI and Highway Patrol Chiefs Elected to 
Offices in Association.” News and Observer 27 September 1946.
63 “SBI Post Held Open for Man in Service,” News and Observer 5 April 1946.
64 Robert D. Emerson, Personal Interview of Former FBI Special Agent and SBI Special Agent, 24 
January 1998. Emerson said that when he applied to the SBI, Anderson interviewed and offered him the position 
as Special Agent at the conclusion of the interview.
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Anderson like Hoover was a popular law enforcement leader. He frequently spoke before 
civic organizations and religious groups. Frequently articles referencing SBI Director Anderson’s 
speaking engagements appeared in local newspapers across North Carolina. Like Hoover’s 
utilization of the print media, Anderson also used the print media. Although he was unable to 
overcome the unpredictable political changes in the attorney general’s office, the print media 
reinforced his popularity among political leaders and constituents for more than twenty years 
while he served the State of North Carolina.65 As newspaper records illustrate, when the 
opportunity to promote himself and the SBI before civic groups or any organization occurred, he 
took advantage of these occasions to use the print media to his career trajectory advantage.
| Building positive public relations through public speaking engagements was a key strategy he
i
i used for political and public support in order to advance his career trajectory among the political 
leaders who controlled his appointment.
In addition to Anderson generating attention for himself and the SBI, print media coverage 
of high profile case activities also heightened the public’s awareness of Anderson, the agency and 
its agents. The Phillips murder case in the early 1950s received substantial print media attention 
making it a high profile case and it was the catalyst in the career advancement of Special Agent 
Powell who testified as an expert witness. This agent’s masterful investigative skills and the 
media attention the case received had a direct impact on the successful career trajectory of 
Anderson’s position as director as well as Powell’s.
High Profile Murder Case Impacts Future Director’s Career Trajectory
While Anderson was SBI director, the Governor of North Carolina, Robert Gregg Cherry, 
requested that the SBI assist in a rural investigation that escalated into a high profile case, the
I
| Charlie Phillips murder trial. Anderson assigned special agent Powell, who would later become
i
SBI director, to the case. Powell demonstrated his skills as an SBI agent and expert witness 
although his testimony was controversial. Before the Phillips case, Powell’s duties did noti
! generally take him beyond the confines of the SBI laboratory.
I 65 Hunt. Hunt recalled that Anderson was appointed by Governor W. Kerr Scott in 1951 to serve as State
I Prisons Director between SBI Director appointments.
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When Anderson assigned Powell to the Phillips case, Powell was an experienced agent 
with the State Bureau of Investigation. He joined the SBI in 1938 as one of the first four original 
special agents hired by Director Frederick Handy.66 Powell served as the agency’s handwriting, 
firearms, and polygraph specialist during the time he was a special agent. However, a two and a 
half-year tour of duty in Europe interrupted his tenure with the bureau during World War II 
where he was a military intelligence officer and reached the rank of major by the time he was 
discharged in December 1945.67
When Powell returned from the war, he resumed his duties with the SBI. His training and 
experience in Army intelligence were additional areas of expertise that he could offer the bureau.68 
While in Army intelligence, he also mastered a useful criminal investigative skill, locksmith 
techniques.69 The SBI routinely investigated burglaries and illegal safe entries that made Powell’s 
training as a locksmith valuable in these types of investigations. As well as specialized training as 
a locksmith, Powell’s army training and professional discipline were assets to him as an SBI agent 
and expert witness when he testified in the Phillips case. Powell’s specialized background and his 
behavior captured the attention of the reporters covering the trial. Newspaper reporters noted 
that his demeanor was impressive when he testified and even though his testimony was 
controversial, Powell received no negative publicity from the print media.
SBI and FBI in the Phillips Murder Case
High profile cases did not always begin with extensive print media coverage. The Charlie 
Phillips murder case when it was first tried received minimal print media coverage. However, 
with the discovery of additional evidence, a chain of events propelled this seemingly typical 
murder case into a high profile case. Three factors lead to the development of the Phillips case 
becoming high profile. Namely, they were: 1) potential for the miscarriage of justice if an
innocent man was executed, 2) editorial decision to report feature articles and extensive
66 “Under the Dome,” Raleigh Times 18 July 1951.
67 “Powell Named SBI’s Chief,” News and Observer 20 July 1951.
68 “State’s New SBI Director Begins Duties,” News & Observer 1 August 1951.
69 “Powell’s Sacking Ends 19-Year-Old Career,” Raleigh Times 26 June 1957.
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newspaper coverage and 3) the lack of newsworthy events in North Carolina to compete with 
coverage of the story.
Print media interest was piqued when Phillips’ sister discovered additional evidence that 
resulted in the governor granting a stay of execution within twenty-four hours of Phillips’ 
scheduled hour of death. The Phillips case is an example of a media frenzy developing in a 
criminal case that initially they found uninteresting. Consequently, as the print media’s interest 
escalated, it contributed to the case becoming a high profile case.
Originally, in 1946 when Phillips was tried for murdering Etta Mae Phillips, his wife, the 
SBI was not requested to assist in the investigation. However, with the discovery of new 
evidence, a suicide note, not only did the SBI become involved but SBI special agent Powell 
I participated in a prominent role as an expert witness. At the time of the Phillips’ trial de novo,
i Powell’s areas of specialization included handwriting and documents analysis for the SBI. The
I
discovery of the suicide note not only interrupted Phillips’ impending execution but also brought 
about a second trial and discovery of the note also generated print media interest in the case that 
was absent the first time Phillips was tried. However, reporters are trained to be suspicious and 
never assume that new evidence is true simply because it is new evidence.70 As a result of the 
discovery of evidence and pursuing their curiosity in writing their reports, reporters emphasized 
aspects of the second Phillips murder trial that contributed to elevating the case to a high profile 
status.
Circumstances surrounding the retrial of Charlie Phillips prompted the print media to take 
particular interest in the story because the possibility existed that an innocent man was nearly 
executed. “It is not easy to second-guess a jury or judge. However, some defendants do get 
railroaded and by re-examining the facts, journalists might be able to right a wrong.”71 With this 
objective in mind, the print media, whether consciously or unconsciously, propelled this case into 
i  high profile status by chronicling the daily case developments. It appeared in the Phillips murder
! trial with the discovery of the suicide note, that there was possibly a miscarriage of justice.
|
I Throughout the case, captivating headlines appeared regularly. For example, one of the
[ first headlines in the print media that brought this case into notoriety was “Suicide Letter May
| 70 Steve Weinberg, The Reporter’s Handbook: An Investigator’s Guide to Documents and Techniques, 3rd
ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996) pp. 239.
71. Weinberg p. 239.
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Sa/e Life of Harnett Farmer: New Trial Sought for Man on Death Row Awaiting Execution for 
Wife Slaying” and was published by a newspaper with statewide circulation, the News and 
Observer. The newspapers’ reporting techniques and role in making this case a high profile case 
are examined in the following detailed analysis and discussion of Charlie Phillips’ second murder 
trial as portrayed in newspaper articles.
In addition to the possibility that the convicted husband had actually been victimized by 
being wrongfully accused, the newspapers also dramatically reported the involvement of the 
highest official in the state, the governor, to heighten interest in the case. Without delay, 
newspapers immediately released reports revealing the details involving the governor. When the 
SBI was requested to examine the evidence in this high profile case, Anderson and Special Agent 
Powell were poised to garner positive attention. As the case gained recognition with each report 
that appeared in the print media, their career trajectories benefited.72 Reporters did not overlook 
reporting any details once the governor requested the SBI to become involved in examining 
handwriting exemplars to justify a retrial. As the newspaper accounts of the case appeared, public 
and political interest mounted. With every newspaper article that appeared, the high profile status 
of the case continued to escalate.73
Following the reprieve, a local newspaper reporter submitted his account of the case to the 
Associated Press. Subsequently, Phillips’ name began to appear in newspaper headlines across 
the United States, and one local newspaper reported, “Discovery of the suicide letter and its 
revelation by Salmon has put Harnett County on the front pages of the nation’s newspapers in all 
sections of the country.”74 Headlines like this and the widespread coverage of the story 
reinforced the high profile nature of the case.
72 Newspaper articles by Hoover Adams in The News and Observer detailed the high profile activities 
associated with the retrial of the Phillips Murder Case. Anderson and the SBI agency received positive recognition 
for their contribution in the high profile investigation. “Suicide Letter May Save Life of Harnett Farmer: New 
Trial Sought for Man on Death Row Awaiting Execution for Wife’s Slaying;” 14 May 1947; “Phillips Ruling 
Expected Today: Court Scheduled to Get Motion on New Trial for Harnett Man on Death Row,” 19 May 1947; 
and “Attacks on Suicide Note Offered at Phillips Trial: SBI Agent Says Writing Appears Authentic; Defendant 
Cross-Examined,” 3 August 1947.
73 James Bradshaw, Personal Interview of SBI Special Agent and Assistant Director, 27 November 1995. 
Bradshaw joined the SBI in 1939 and was a special agent under Director Anderson. He recalled that Anderson 
was a skillful politician and took advantage of every opportunity to advance his career.
74 Hoover Adams, “Burgwyn to Hear Phillips Motion: Salmon Invites Solicitor to Examine Suicide Letter 
in Phillips Case,” News and Observer 17 May 1947.
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When the story was reported, the details read more like fiction than nonfiction. The 
melodramatic details of the high profile case were what the reporters wanted to quote for the 
press. For example, newspapers recounted in detail summaries of the Phillips story. Newspapers 
released stories that indicated initially Phillips was accused of shooting his twenty-eight-year-old 
wife.75 He was arrested and after a seemingly short trial that ended approximately one month 
after the death of his wife, the jury found thirty-six-year-old, Charlie Phillips, guilty of first-degree 
murder. He was sentenced to receive the death penalty. Phillips remained on death row at 
Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina approximately seven and a half months.
The case that might have gone unnoticed became the topic of conversation when 
newspaper accounts began appearing day after day. The print media rapidly aided in transforming 
Phillip’s name and the case into a household word when less than a year before few people 
outside Harnett County, North Carolina knew anything about him or the crime. With every 
headline and newspaper story, the case gained widespread recognition.
Prior to the second trial, a new jury was chosen, and reporters were present to record the 
jury selection process. Reported in the print media were accounts of question after question that 
each potential jury member had to answer as the trial progressed. During the voir dire 
examination of venire men, the defense asked, “Would you give more credence to the testimony 
of an agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation than you would to that of another witness, 
such as an SBI agent?”76
The defense did not want the jurors to believe the FBI expert testimony over the expert 
testimony of the SBI because the SBI testimony would tend to exonerate Phillips. On the other 
hand, the FBI testimony would tend to incriminate him The preliminary proceedings of the 
second trial were reported with precision that also contributed to the high profile significance of 
the case as it progressed through the trial process. After the jury selection was determined, the 
second trial began.
While the print media reported details of the proceedings leading up to the second trial, 
not only did Powell’s career trajectory receive a boost, but Anderson’s did as well. Anderson was
75 Adams, “Saved from Death, Hamett Man Expects to Beat Murder Charge,” News and Observer 27 July
1947.
76 Adams, “Nine Jurors Are Selected as Phillips Trial Opens: State Testimony in Hamett Wife-Slaying 
Case Expected to Start Today,” News and Observer 30 July 1947.
98
well known among the SBI agents as a politician. For example, in an interview with former SBI 
agent James Bradshaw, he remarked that, “Anderson was strictly a politician.” When the SBI 
received positive print media reports based on Agent Powell’s professionalism as an expert 
witness in the trial, Director Anderson also benefited since he was Powell’s supervisor and the 
SBI’s chief administrator. This was subsequently reflected in the consequent career advancement 
of Special Agent Powell and longevity of Director Anderson in state service.
The Phillips case that received minimal print media recognition during the initial trial 
illustrates how a case escalated into a high profile case when alleged exculpatory evidence 
surfaced. Any murder case involving capital punishment is significant because no one wants to 
execute an innocent person. So when the print media published details pertaining to exculpatory 
evidence the public’s attention became focused on the details of the case.
Historically, in an effort to increase sales and circulation, newspapers often placed 
emphasis on stories that appealed “to the common people with extensive, flamboyant coverage of 
crime....”77 Law enforcement leaders like Hoover and Anderson used this to their advantage in 
providing high profile case information to the print media. For example, journalists reporting 
criminal cases featured explicit facts like those in the Phillips murder case during the second trial. 
Journalists took advantage of the explicit and often startling testimony to compile sensational 
newspaper stories. As they reported the Phillips murder trial proceedings, reporters emphasized 
the emotional testimony that had a sensational appeal to newspaper readers. Specifically, heated 
arguments, testimony from children, dramatic outbursts, meticulous crime scene descriptions, and 
explicit extramarital affairs were among the emotional testimony reported. Through the course of 
the trial, the print media provided extensive coverage of the Phillips murder trial. Specifically, 
following are court testimony highlights as reported that illustrate the significance the print media 
played in advancing the prominence of the case. These excerpts illustrate how a typical murder 
case becomes high profile when the print media systematically chronicles testimonial minutiae in a 
case.
One of the first sensational excerpts printed from the trial included quoted profanity. The 
south is generally conservative in the use of printing profanity especially in the Bible belt states
77 John Morton, “Don’t Worry, It Will Go Away,” American Journalism Review  19 (1997): p. 52.
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like North Carolina. Nonetheless, the press exercised no censorship in revealing Mr. Phillips’ 
unscrupulous attitude and remarks directed toward his wife.78
As the case proceeded, tensions inside the courtroom continued to build and newspapers 
reported the specifics of the trial. The tension added to the print media’s intrigue making it 
characteristic of a high profile case as they continued to report the daily trial activities.79 
Increasing drama and tension inside the courtroom continued to provide the media with 
sensational copy for their stories.80 Additionally, when law enforcement officials testified as they 
did in this case, newspaper quotes from the officers intensified the high profile status of the case.81 
While newspapers played an instrumental role in elevating the interest in the trial, they continued 
to advance the high profile status of the case and that directly benefited SBI Director Anderson 
since the SBI was involved with the trial.
One of the critical pieces of evidence in the trial to be reported was one of the most 
sensational aspects in the case, the suicide note. Newspaper reporters recounted the controversial 
testimony that came from Phillips’ sister, Mrs. Rosa Lee Hayes, during the second trial.82 This
78 Adams, “Witnesses Say Phillips Threatened to Kill Wife,” News and Observer 31 July 1947. 
Testimonial details captured and reprinted by the print media contributed to the high profile status of case 
investigations like the Phillips Murder case. During the second trial, Phillips’ landlord, Mrs. Harvey Stephenson, 
testified that she heard him threaten his wife just a few days before Mrs. Phillips’ death. Mrs. Stephenson 
overheard him say, “I am going to knock your [expletive] teeth down your [expletive] throat. I am going to kill 
you and I mean it.”
79 Adams, “Raleigh Girl Brought to Court on Stretcher to Testify Against Hamett Man,” News and 
Observer 1 August 1947. Newspaper accounts of the trial indicated that a friend of the Phillips hired a private 
prosecutor to assist the prosecution that was unusual in a routine trial. Phillips’ attorney attempted to portray the 
individual as a prejudicial witness, and at one point the judge ordered the jury out of the courtroom due to a terse 
exchange between the prosecutor and witness.
80 Adams, “Suicide Note Read to Court; Daughter Testifies Against Father at Trial,” News and Observer 2 
August 1947. Newspapers delivered the drama and tension from the courtroom to the readers by including details 
from the trial. For example, the print media reported details of conversations Phillips’ daughter had with her 
father on the day of the murder.
81 Adams, “Hooks Will Fight Motion For New Phillips Trial,” News and Observer 16 May 1947. 
Reporters contributed to the high profile status of the trial by reporting on its sensational aspects including the 
testimony. Accounts according to Constable Alton Cobb and Policeman Henry Smith’s testimony revealed the 
victim did not have any powder bums on her hands, supporting the state’s theory that the injury was probably not 
self-inflicted. However, conflicting evidence indicated the position of the entry wound through the right arm and 
chest was consistent with the theory that Phillips took the gun away from his wife during an argument and shot 
her.
82 Adams, “Saved from Death, Hamett Man Expects to Beat Murder Charge,” News and Observer 27 July 
1947. Testimony at the hearing revealed evidence that resulted in the governor requesting SBI assistance. SBI 
Director Anderson assigned Special Agent Powell to examine the alleged suicide note found by Mr. Phillips’ sister.
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was the instrumental evidence that led to a stay of execution by the governor and attracted print 
media attention to the Phillips murder case. When this new evidence was introduced, the 
governor also requested assistance in the case from the SBI.
Somewhat like the sensational penny press of the nineteenth century, the newspapers in 
the mid twentieth century believed in printing verbatim murder trial details in the news.83 The 
local papers in North Carolina were following the same format in the Phillips murder trial. With 
all the newspaper reports, the citizens were ambivalent about Phillips’ guilt.84 Journalists included 
the specifics of Phillips’ extramarital affair and repeated his vicious comments in news stories 
knowingly exciting the public and sensationalizing the case.85 Reporting specifics about the case 
was considered a socially responsible practice in reporting news.86 While the print media fulfilled 
the public’s penchant for news, Anderson and Hoover were familiar with print media practices 
and employed their techniques to their career benefit when opportunities availed themselves, 
especially print media reports pertaining to high profile cases.
Although it was reported that handwriting experts, who examined the suicide note, arrived 
the first day that Phillips testified, they did not begin their testimony until the next day.87 The 
newspapers reported that SBI Agent Powell qualified as a handwriting expert. It was also 
reported that Powell testified that he had examined the suicide note in this case and in his opinion 
Etta Mae Phillips was the author. Conforming to the responsibility to report accurate, credible 
facts of the trial, newspapers published portions of the suicide note despite divulging and 
publishing this type of case evidence was unusuaL88 As a result of thoroughly informing the
Mrs. Hayes said she was going through Mrs. Phillips’ effects when she discovered the note in a pair of wrinkled 
slacks, the slacks worn by Mrs. Phillips on the day of her death. She claimed that she found the note on March 26, 
1947 but did not tell her brother about it until almost two weeks later on April 6.
83 Michael Schudson, Discovering The News: A Social History o f American Newspapers (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1978) p. 23.
84 Adams, “Burgwyn to Hear,” 17 May 1947.
85 Adams, “Raleigh Girl Brought to Court,” 1 August 1947.
86 Jeremy Iggers, Good News, Bad News: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1999) pp. 93-95.
87 Iggers pp. 93-95.
88 Adams, “Suicide Letter May Save Life of Hamett Farmer: New Trial Sought for Man on Death Row 
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public of all the sensational evidence and testimony, the Phillips murder case continued to gain 
recognition throughout the region increasing in magnitude as a high profile case.
Newspapers reported a comprehensive analysis of the handwriting experts since the 
evidence in chief was primarily based on a suicide note found after Phillips’ indictment. 
According to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, collecting and distributing news 
provided information to the public that permitted them to make informed decisions reference their 
daily concerns in their community.89 As reporters collected and wrote articles pertaining to the 
Phillips murder case, readers’ interest was piqued and they unofficially participated in the trial 
process. In a similar manner, Hoover also engaged the public by releasing details of investigations 
so the readers, his public supporters who were also voters, could follow the latest developments 
in the investigation. Reporters had the same access to information when a federal case went to 
trial as reporters had in state cases. For example, the Phillips case like the high profile Rosenberg 
case provided reporters detailed information to report during the trial process.
As Powell testified and gave his analysis of the note, the print media recorded his 
testimony for their news stories.90 Even though Agent Powell testified that there was no sign of 
forgery, the newspaper stories noted that the prosecutor did not cross-examine Powell at the 
conclusion of his testimony. Powell was an exceptional witness for the defense and was cited as 
giving “clear and concise answers.”91
An event that rarely occurred in the early days of the SBI took place in the Phillips trial. 
The SBI’s expert witness, Jimmy Powell, presented his testimony; nevertheless, the FBI’s expert 
witness rebutted Powell’s findings.92 Routinely, in criminal litigations, experts disagree in some
89 Iggers p. 116.
90 Adams, “Attacks on Suicide Note Offered at Phillips Trial: SBI Agent Says Writing Appears Authentic; 
Defendant Cross-Examined,” News and Observer 3 August 1947. In this newspaper article, Powell indicated there 
were similarities in the following letters: “D, E, F, K, T, S, T, Y, W, and groupings of ‘CHA’ and contractions 
such as don’t. He cited the words ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ and referred to the proportions and slant of the letters.”
91 Adams, “Attacks on Suicide,” 3 August 1947.
92 Adams, “Experts Differ on Note in Phillips Case Trial: Handwriting Testimony Heard in Trial of 
Hamett Man on Murder Charges,” News and Observer 5 August 1947. In this article, the FBI’s handwriting 
expert testified that suicide notes were generally not lengthy like the note in the Phillips case, and he was of the 
opinion that the writing in the alleged suicide note was inconsistent with the exemplars. Nonetheless, on cross- 
examination, the FBI expert testified, “there was enough similarity in the handwriting to cause disagreement 
among experts.”
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cases that include handwriting evidence.93 However, it was unusual for Powell and an expert 
from the FBI to disagree especially since SBI Director Anderson maintained such close ties with 
the FBI. Powell and the FBI’s expert witness each had an additional handwriting expert who 
corroborated their testimony.94 Even though the handwriting was significant in the case, other 
evidence disproved the possibility that a suicide note could even exist.95
As the second Phillips trial approached closure, it was reported as being “the most 
colorful, most dramatic, most sensational, and most eagerly followed trial in all of Harnett 
County’s history...publicized all over the nation.... Crowds have filled the courthouse to 
overflowing at nearly every session. It is the main subject of conversation throughout a wide part 
of the state.”96 The second guilty verdict “brought to a close the longest, most sensational and 
most vigorously contested case in Harnett’s history.”97 When the judge looked at the defendant 
and asked what he had to say for himself, he responded, “Not guilty.”98
Although Powell’s testimony along with another expert witness for the defense 
contradicted the findings of the other two expert witnesses, it did not alter his public popularity or 
decrease the benefits of professional respect he received from his peers in the law enforcement 
community.99 When Powell presented his testimony regarding the genuineness of the handwritten
93 Richard Saferstein, ed., Forensic Science Handbook (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1982) p. 674.
94 Adams, “Experts Differ on Note,” 5 August 1947. The second handwriting expert, Mr. Harold J. 
Gessel, Veterans Administration, took the stand and corroborated Dr. Miller’s testimony from the FBI regarding 
the notes’ authorship. A third handwriting expert who was a lawyer from Washington, D.C., testified that in his 
expert opinion, Mrs. Phillips wrote the suicide note.
95 Adams, “Witness Claims No Slacks Found in Woman’s Effects: Phillips Case Expected to Reach Jury, 
Thursday; Handwriting Experts Heard,” News and Observer 6 August 1947. In this article it was reported that Mr. 
E. C. Mangum, the trustee who settled the estate in February following Mrs. Phillips’ death contradicted the 
handwriting evidence. Mangum testified that there were no slacks in the suitcase. Mr. Charlie Rambeau, was 
present when the property was released and he corroborated Mr. Mangum’s testimony.
96 Adams, “Trial of Phillips Into Seventh Day: District Attorney, Defense Counsel Confident of Winning 
Case,” News and Observer 4 August 1947.
97 Adams, “Phillip Convicted Again of First Degree Murder: Jury Disregards Suicide Note With Quick 
Verdict; Death Sentence Passes,” News and Observer 8 August 1947.
98 Adams, “Phillip Convicted Again,” 8 August 1947.
99 “SBI Will Make Second Check Into Death of Chinese Here: Governor Scott Directs Probe in Raleigh 
Case at Request of Father,” News and Observer 21 March 1951. In this article, it was reported that the coroner 
requested Powell’s assistance in analyzing a suicide note. The coroner relied on Powell’s expert opinion even 
though he had been previously involved in a controversial case involving a suicide note.
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note, he impressively supported his testimony with scientific analysis. Unwaveringly with 
professionalism, he stood by his expert opinion. Before this trial de novo, Powell received limited 
publicity; however, Powell’s role and the events in the Phillips’ murder case that became a high 
profile case during the second trial not only exposed him to the public through the print media but 
the media exposure proved to benefit his future SBI career. At the time of the highly publicized 
case and trial, not only did Powell’s career trajectory gain momentum, but the widespread print 
media attention given to Powell enhanced Director Anderson’s career trajectory as well. 
Although Anderson did not possess Powell’s expert skills and was unable to participate as a 
primary witness, Anderson received the political benefits of supervising an agent popularized by 
the print media. Unlike J. Edgar Hoover, Walter Anderson allowed agents under his command to 
have complete access to the print media. When an investigator received positive print media 
attention, the agency received positive attention and in turn so did Walter Anderson.
Although Phillips was found guilty, the outcome of the Phillips case did not lessen 
anyone’s confidence in Powell’s credibility. In fact, within months after the Phillips case, Powell’s 
career trajectory had excelled, and he had advanced in rank among the few SBI agents according 
to a 1951 newspaper reference. When his expertise in handwriting was requested in another high 
profile murder case, the print media referred to him as second in command at SBI headquarters.100 
Although he was referred to as a senior administrator, nonetheless he remained the SBI’s principal 
handwriting identification examiner.
SBI and James T. Tung Investigation
In need of a handwriting expert, the Raleigh Police Department requested the SBI’s 
assistance in the investigation of a high profile death investigation. James T. Tung, a Chinese 
student in textiles at North Carolina State University, was found in a stream near Pullen Park in 
Raleigh, North Carolina in 1951. While searching the student’s room, the local investigators 
found a suicide note and requested SBI assistance in the investigation. Powell was assigned to 
examine the note in order to determine if Tung wrote it. After careful analysis of the handwritten
100 “SBI Will Make,” 21 March 1951.
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attention in newspapers, political leaders like the state attorney general recognized his leadership 
potential and acknowledged it when Anderson left the SBI on June 30, 1951 to become director 
of the North Carolina Prison Department.
Powell Becomes SBI Director
In a statement to the press, Attorney General McMullan expressed his confidence in 
Powell, “I am happy to appoint a person who has demonstrated by long service in the Bureau 
character and capacity for the work this organization such as to fully merit and justify his 
appointment. I am also happy to appoint an officer who has the endorsement of a majority of the 
sheriffs and law enforcing officers of the State, as the Bureau of Investigation is dependent upon 
the goodwill and cooperation of law enforcing officers in the State for its success.”104 Powell, 
who emulated Hoover in his behavior as well as his publicity techniques involving the print media, 
was the first SBI director appointed from the ranks of SBI agents. Sworn into office by Associate 
Justice E. B. Denny, Powell became the fourth SBI Director.
The directors did not usually involve themselves in investigations; however, Powell 
participated in a murder case that was recognized as a high profile investigation due to the 
victim’s political personal history. In January 1952 a prominent Bladen County citizen, Ulysses S. 
Page was found murdered at his store near his home.105 The fifty-six-year-old former state 
legislator and resort owner was found shot and lying in the doorway of his store. Page was also a 
former chief of police in three towns, a successful farmer and merchant.106 “James W. Powell, 
director of the State Bureau of Investigation, today took a personal part in the investigation of the 
death of Ulysses S. Page, the former Bladen County legislator who was shot to death. Powell 
helped Sheriff John B. Allen and other officers question suspects as indications mounted that a 
definite break in the murder mystery is near.”107
104 “Powell Named,” 20 July 1951.
105 “Bladen Suspects Questioned As Police Probe Page Death,” News and Observer, 1 January 1952.
i°6 “2,000 Attend Page Funeral As Murder Probe Continues,” News and Observer, 2 January 1952.
107 “SBI Chief Helps,” News and Observer 3 January 1952.
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note, Powell confirmed Tung wrote the note.101 This case unlike the Phillips case was considered 
a high profile case not because it received a great deal of print media exposure but because it 
involved high-ranking domestic and foreign government officials.
When no additional inquiries were made after Powell examined the note and presented his 
findings to the local police, the SBI considered that the agency’s involvement in the case was 
completed. However, three months after Powell initially examined the note, the Chinese embassy 
contacted Governor W. Kerr Scott’s office and requested that the state police investigate Tung’s 
death. Consequently, Governor Scott called the SBI director and requested that they investigate 
the case. Like the Phillips case, the Tung case brought print media attention to Powell, the 
agency, and the director. “The SBI, meanwhile, acknowledged and... received the Governor’s 
instructions and assigned a top ranking member of its staff, Agent Powell, to the case.”102 Unlike 
the Phillips case, the FBI was not requested by the local authorities to examine the suicide note 
and no one disputed Powell’s initial findings in the Tung investigation when the local police 
requested assistance in confirming the handwriting in the suicide note. On the contrary, not only 
did the local police respect Powell’s expert opinion but the director did as well. Anderson was 
confident Powell was capable of handling this investigation as professionally as he had the Phillips 
case; otherwise, when the Chinese Embassy requested further inquiry into the case, he would not 
have assigned Powell to the Tung investigation. He could have assigned the case to special agent 
Jim Durham who was also a documents examiner for the SBI at that time.103
During the Phillips case, Powell’s professionalism under great adversarial pressure was 
recognized and reported in newspapers across the region. Throughout the Phillips case, 
Anderson’s confidence in Powell never faltered. Furthermore, when expert handwriting analysis 
was required, for example, in the Tung case, Anderson assigned Powell without hesitation to the 
case with assurance that he would investigate it thoroughly. Through high-profile cases, Powell 
made a name for himself, not only within the SBI but also among political leaders around the state 
capital and his career trajectory accelerated. While Anderson was SBI director he was one of 
Powell’s primary advocates. In addition to gaining support from SBI colleagues and widespread
101 Jim Rankin, “Notes Explain Suicide Of Chinese College Student: Writing Test Backs Ruling In Death 
Case,” News and Observer 2 January 1951.
102 “SBI Will Make,” 21 March 1951.
103 Durham, 16 December 1997.
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The January 12, 1952 headline in the News and Observer read “U.S. Page Murder Case 
Broken; Ex-Tenant in Bladen Confesses.” Special Agent James Bradshaw, close SBI associate of 
Powell and the special agent who received widespread print media recognition for his 
investigative involvement in the 1941 missing person case, obtained the confession in the Page 
case.
Bradshaw questioned the suspect, Walter Sawyer and Sawyer confessed.108 With the 
assistance of the SBI, Sawyer was convicted.109 Sheriff John B. Allen publicly praised the SBI 
and Director Powell for their efforts in the Page investigation.110
Both Powell and Bradshaw’s career trajectories were directly impacted and benefited from 
the high profile case involving the murdered politician. In addition to the print media attention 
Bradshaw received during the high profile investigation involving a missing Carolina Beach pair, 
as discussed in chapter one, the Page case enhanced his popular reputation among his peers and 
with Powell. The case also enhanced Bradshaw’s career trajectory with the bureau. Two months 
after headlines featured Sawyer’s confession to special agent James Bradshaw and just days 
before Sawyer’s trial concluded, Powell promoted special agent James Bradshaw to supervising 
agent.111 Also, Powell’s involvement in the case strengthened his position as a competent 
administrative leader who represented the bureau and the attorney general favorably. Thereby, 
Powell’s successful investigative involvement in the high profile case involving the local politician 
enhanced his reputation with the attorney general consequently reinforcing his position as SBI 
director.
Bomb Explosion Investigation
108 Norman M’Culloch, “Slayer of U. S. Page Awaits Trial,” News and Observer 13 January 1952. 
Details of the confession were included in the print media. He admitted it was self-defense because when Sawyer 
approached Page at the store, Page went for something in his back pocket. Sawyer also confessed that Page 
cheated him out of money in business arrangements.
109 Jay Jenkins, “Tenant Farmer Gets 20-25 Years For U. S. Page Slaying In Bladen,” News and Observer 
21 March 1952. When Sawyer’s trial ended, he was sentenced twenty to twenty-five years after pleading guilty to 
second-degree murder in the Page investigation.
110 “Twas Big Day for SBI,” News and Observer 12 January 1952.
111 “SBI Director Promotes Pair and Adds 2 New Agents: Bradshaw, Scott New Supervisors: Director 
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While the Page murder investigation was underway in Bladen County, the SBI was also 
involved in another high profile case in Mount Airy, North Carolina. The Mount Airy case 
escalated into a high profile case when the heinous criminal act perpetrated against an ordinary 
citizen outraged the general public. Twenty-four-year-old, William Henry Cochrane, Jr., a high 
school agricultural teacher was the victim.112 A bomb connected to his vehicle’s ignition system 
exploded and he was mortally wounded from the blast. The community was horrified by what 
had happened to the young teacher.
Unlike the Phillips murder case, the FBI and SBI worked together on the Cochrane case. 
Following Cochrane’s death, FBI’s assistance was requested the next day. Parts of the bomb 
were delivered to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C. for analysis. Mr. Cochrane’s wife, 
Imogene Moses, told the authorities that they had only been married a few months and she could 
not think of anyone who might be their enemies. William “Bill” Cochrane was popular with the 
students and everyone at the high school where he taught.113
A few days following the tragedy, Governor Kerr Scott offered a reward for any 
information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person responsible for the bombing.114 The 
SBI assigned three agents to work the case full time.115 A year after the bombing incident Powell 
said that the lack of a state statute made it difficult to trace the sale of explosives and may have 
“hampered the SBI at Mount Airy or in other dynamite cases.”116 Powell strongly recommended 
that the General Assembly enact strict laws regulating the sale of dynamite and the General 
Assembly passed legislation supporting his recommendation in the next session.117 This is a clear 
indication of the political power Powell came to possess as a result of his reputation that had been 
well cultivated by the print media and his involvement in high profile investigations.
1952.
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Newspapers chronicled the events leading up to the discovery of a second bomb. 
Approximately two years after the Cochrane bombing, the SBI was requested to assist in another 
bombing case. The second case was linked to the high profile SBI investigation of the bombing 
that killed Cochrane. Combined with the fact that the second bombing incident involved 
Cochrane’s widow who had become engaged to a local politician, and with stepped up efforts to 
solve the high profile case, it gained even more recognition and prominence within the SBI as well 
as in the print media.118
Powell described the case as being just as “frustrating to his agents as it was shocking to 
the public.”119 Initially, Powell assigned two agents to this high profile case and sometimes three 
or four agents investigated the case. According to Powell, approximately two hundred leads were 
pursued and about four hundred interviews conducted in the investigation. The investigation took 
agents as far south as Florida, and as far west as Tennessee and north up to Elizabeth City, North 
Carolina. Powell intimated that “there is no other case on the SBI agenda I ’m as anxious to solve 
as this one.” 120 Powell also made a guarded news release in 1952 indicating “that his agents feel 
they are on the verge of a solution to the case which... ranked as the number one mystery in the 
SBI files since Cochrane died....”121 As had been proven with other high profile cases like the 
FBI’s “Tough Tommy” Holden investigation, high profile cases were not always resolved 
immediately. The high profile Cochrane investigation like FBI’s Holden investigation remained 
unsolved for months. Director Powell used Hoover’s news release style in providing information 
to the print media in the bombing case. He announced to newspaper reporters that the search for 
the Chatham County bomber was over with the suicide death of George Henry Smith in 1954. 
Powell said Smith had been a suspect since the Cochrane bombing.122
118 “Edenton Widow of Bomb-Slain Man Escapes Explosive Trap in Her Car,” News and Observer 8 April
1952.
119 “Edenton Widow of Bomb-Slain,” 8 April 1952.
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While the Mount Airy car bombing investigation was underway, another high profile case 
involving the suicide of a locally elected official, Sheriff Ralph J. Jones of Duplin County, was 
referred to the SBI for investigation. Circumstances leading up to his death and information 
pertaining to the investigation also received wide media coverage in the state newspaper like the 
car bombing case.123
In early April 1952 newspapers reported the circumstances that were believed to have 
contributed to Sheriff Jones’ death. After being indicted on embezzlement charges, the sheriff 
was investigated by the SBI. Apparently the SBI’s investigation was more than Jones could 
endure. He committed suicide. After Sheriff Jones’ body was found in his car near Warsaw, 
North Carolina, newspaper accounts described how SBI agents found a sixteen-page suicide letter 
and sent it to Director Powell for analysis.124 Some were concerned that his death was not 
suicide; however, it was believed that Jones did in fact commit suicide. Director Powell was 
experienced in investigating high profile cases like the Jones suicide and from 1951 to 1957 the 
print media frequently made references to Powell about other investigations he was involved with. 
Powell’s involvement in high profile cases when he was director strengthened his position while 
Attorney General McMullen remained in office.
When the SBI investigated these high profile investigations in 1954, the bureau’s 
resources were comprised of twenty-five investigative staff members. They included seventeen 
investigators, two agents assigned to narcotics, two agents in the fingerprinting department, one 
firearms and tool mark examiner, one documents examiner, a chemist, and the director. Two of 
these agents were certified as polygraph operators. Powell’s tenacity in working high profile 
cases like the Page and Cochrane cases reinforced the need for growth within the bureau, 
promoted the successful image of the agency, and also ensured his position as director. Focusing 
his energy on investigations and investigative needs prohibited political jealousy from interfering 
with his professional relationship with the attorney general during this period in his tenure as SBI 
director.
123 Durham. During Powell’s administration, Durham recalled Powell requesting that he also examine the 
suicide note in the Sheriff Ralph J. Jones case. He believed the case was weak from the beginning in the high 
profile investigation of the local law enforcement official embezzling departmental funds.
124 “Duplin County Sheriff Kills Self,” News and Observer 9 May 1952.
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it. If local officers didn’t like us, they wouldn’t call us in.”126 Although both Powell and Hoover 
used the print media to their advantage to fortify their career trajectories, Powell allowed local 
authorities to receive news coverage first in high profile investigations. Powell realized that local 
agencies would not request SBI assistance if the agency was perceived as a publicity seeker. 
Statements like Powell’s in the press were assured to win him advocates among local law 
enforcement agencies. Also, not only did Powell gain support for the bureau when statements 
like this appeared in the press, but he earned recognition among politicians as well. Powell was 
receptive to print media attention in high profile cases, and his career trajectory advanced as long 
as the political climate was in his favor.
Hoover and Powell Use High Profile Cases and the Print Media
Like Hoover, Powell took advantage of high profile cases and the print media to advance 
his career trajectory and maintain his position as director. The use of high profile cases bolstered 
and promoted Powell’s career trajectory with the SBI, however it did not protect him from 
political changes. In appointed positions by elected officials in North Carolina, the department 
heads customarily submitted a resignation to any newly elected official who oversees the office. 
Even though the SBI agency head was a non-partisan position, the director served at the pleasure 
of the elected official. Powell’s dismissal as director resulted when the attorney general 
disapproved of his conduct as director. Powell’s career trajectory that had benefited from his 
association with high profile cases for so many years was in jeopardy when a newly elected 
attorney general took office.
One agent reported Powell fell from favor with the attorney general because Powell was 
acting like J. Edgar Hoover. The attorney general was irritated every time he saw an agent scurry 
to open a car door for Powell when a bureau vehicle was parked in the street in front of the 
Justice Building. Something as insignificant as letting another agent open a car door and
126 “SBI Kept Busy,” 16 December 1955.
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One of Powell’s accomplishments as director was to provide a rank hierarchy for SBI 
agents. An overview was included in Powell’s 1955 budget report for the SBI that included the 
promotional guidelines of investigative agents. The special agent positions were divided into 
three classes. Class HI was the entry level for an agent. At this level the minimum requirements 
included a college education with at least two years of investigative experience or a high school 
education with four years of police experience. At the Class II level, a special agent was required 
to complete a minimum of four years as an agent in the Class HI level before they could advance 
to Class II. It is assumed all agents attained this position after four years of employment with the 
SBI. The third and highest level, Class I, was reserved for supervising agents. To attain this 
level, the agent was required to work at the Class II level for a minimum of two years. However, 
there was no guarantee that at the end of two years, an agent would be advanced to the Class I 
level.125 Agents promoted to the Class I level were at the discretion of the director and 
promotional factors were easily influenced by the number of high profile cases worked by agents 
competing for promotion. Although the rank system did impact the career trajectory of the 
agents, it did not influence the next director’s appointment.
For the duration of Powell’s tenure as director, SBI investigative involvement continued 
to rely on requests from local chiefs of police and sheriffs. Powell’s successful career trajectory is 
reflected in the political climate at the conclusion of several high profile cases involving the agents 
he supervised. As indicated by the agency’s growth during Powell’s tenure, the General 
Assembly approved of the SBI director and the agency since funding for additional agents hired 
by Powell would have been appropriated by that government body. Also, the agency’s growth 
signified that local law enforcement was taking advantage of the expert forensic services offered 
by the SBI.
Historically, as indicated previously, some local law enforcement agencies reluctantly 
enlisted the bureau’s assistance due to territorial and jealousy issues; however, the SBI insisted 
that local agencies receive the publicity in high profile cases. Powell was once asked, “how does 
the SBI work to keep down the ugly head of jealousy?” He responded, “It is a standing policy of 
the bureau to let local officers get credit.... When we’re due credit, local officers see that we get
125 Charles Clay, “SBI Kept Busy Aiding Local Authorities, Running Down Clues in Puzzling Crimes,”
News and Observer 16 December 1955.
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chauffeur him around annoyed the attorney general.127 However, according to newspaper 
accounts, it was reported that Powell was dismissed due to low morale within the bureau.128 
According to some agents who worked in Powell’s administration, he was best described as a 
strict authoritative manager who micro-managed the agents. As is the case in many organizations, 
some agents liked him; some did not. Another investigator described Powell as the most educated 
and intelligent agent the bureau ever had.129 Regardless of the agents’ professional feelings 
toward Powell, he played an instrumental role in the history of the SBI and experienced a 
successful career trajectory with the agency. However, unlike Hoover who remained FBI director 
until his death, Powell was unable to sustain a lifelong career with the SBI and overcome political 
changes. Powell’s career trajectory declined when he was asked to resign from the prestigious 
position of SBI director. Powell’s inability to build a powerful support base of politicians and
| information at the state level compared to Hoover’s at the federal level was an aspect of their
j positions that was incomparable,
i
I!
I Conclusion
Gradually, professional reform took place as police agencies accepted professional 
organizations’ training and standards recommendations. During the reform period, the
i
implementation of these recommendations resulted in a shift from the previously practiced 
philosophies in an effort to replace the spoils system and political favoritism with professionalism, 
j  As one of the primary leaders in reform, Hoover advocated education and training in order toI
create professional and qualified police organizations. The FBI National Academy was a model
training institution and state agencies including the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
sent agents to take advantage of the training opportunities it offered. Consequently, many local 
police officers that attended the FBI National Academy advocated training much like they had 
received. In some cases agents returned to their respective agencies and developed training for 
their organizations. As more agents were trained, professionalism became more prevalent and
127 Gilbert..
128 George A. Penny, “SBI Chief, Fired By Attorney General, Says Star Chamber Action Used,” News and 
Observer 26 June 1957.
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was demonstrated through the adoption of standards that included operating procedures, codes of 
conduct, hiring procedures, and promotions. Likewise for agency leaders, leadership training 
provided administrators with an objective foundation when making promotions compared to 
previous methods of promotions that were characterized by political influence.
Hoover’s popularity with the print media during this period stemmed from post war 
activities such as espionage, Communism and the discovery of organized crime as compared to his 
notoriety during the gangster era. On the other hand, SBI high profile cases during this period 
continued to be primarily focused on murders involving political leaders or heinous crimes 
involving the general citizenry. The SBI had high profile cases at the state level: however, they 
were not of the same magnitude as the high profile FBI cases due to the jurisdictional differences 
between the two agencies.
Although Hoover continued to be involved in high profile cases, during this time period, 
the criminal element had changed. The primary emphasis during the post war years at the federal 
level was espionage. For example, during the Rosenberg case, Hoover exercised his ability to 
work the print media so that influential politicians and the American public remained loyal to him 
and supported his patriotic causes. Rhetorically, what better way for Hoover to win the support 
of the country than to expose spies that were undermining the nation’s security by stealing and 
selling atomic secrets? Likewise, SBI Director Powell gained political support and benefited his 
career trajectory when he participated in high profile investigations of murder, suicide, and 
bombings that occurred in North Carolina.
In addition to espionage during this period, the discovery and recognition of the Mafia in 
the United Stated by Senator Estes Kefauver’s crime committee was a monumental step in 
understanding the network of an organized criminal enterprise. Refusing to accept the existence 
of the Mafia would have devastated the careers of most police administrators; however, Hoover 
took advantage of the print media to control public perceptions that benefited him when he finally 
embraced the existence of organized crime. To describe this new type of criminal enterprise, 
Hoover used terminology from the 1930s and 1940’s such as “hoodlums and gangsters” that 
implied the mafia was not new but had existed decades before. Consequently, Hoover’s “Top 
Hoodlum Program” was his answer to the Mafia’s exposure.
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Moreover, when Hoover acknowledged organized crime, he authorized his staff to 
produce a two-volume report documenting the existence of the Mafia. According to the report, 
the Mafia had existed from the time Hoover became FBI director. The belated discovery and 
disdosure of criminal activity of this magnitude was likely to have drawn negative criticism not 
only from the public but also from the print media especially since it had gone unnoticed by the 
FBI for so long and had become so deeply engrained in American society. However, rather than 
unfavorable publicity erupting, Hoover engaged his polished public relations skills and long 
standing good relationship with the press to turn the tables on Senator Kefauver's discovery and 
suppressed any criticism that may have resulted. Regardless of whether Hoover denied the 
existence of organized crime or Powell disagreed with the FBI’s expert witness, positive print 
media in high profile investigations benefited both FBI and SBI directors and their career 
trajectories prevailed.
Ironically, Hoover employed unethical investigative techniques that included wiretapping 
as a method of collecting information from the illegal activities of the Mafia. Seemingly, a 
director who once described the bureau as a place for gentlemen to work would not have been 
involved in invasion of privacy activities. Although, Hoover invaded citizens’ privacy, no one 
attempted to intervene or alter his method of collecting information. Once again the high profile 
investigations that resulted outweighed the unethical invasion of privacy to collect the 
information. Through print media attention devoted to the high profile investigations during this 
period, Hoover continued to safeguard his career with the FBI. On the other hand SBI directors 
were not threatened by negative publicity associated with wiretapping. When former Acting 
Director Jim Durham was questioned about wiretapping by the SBI, he categorically denied that 
the SBI had ever been involved in wiretapping. He emphasized that this would have destroyed 
the SBI director’s career.130 Also, there was no documented evidence found in the print media 
pertaining to SBI wiretapping during this period. Therefore, since the SBI did not investigate any 
wiretapping crimes like the FBI investigated, SBI directors did not receive any print media 
publicity like Hoover received in wiretapping cases.
130 Durham. Durham remembered agents speaking about a service tunnel from the Justice Department to 
the Capitol. The governor’s office was located in the capitol building at that time. Phone lines were located in the 
tunnel; however, Durham said he was not aware of any evidence of wiretapping by the SBI.
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Under the authoritative command of Hoover, his supervisory agents knew the 
consequences of questioning anything Hoover wanted. Questioning his power or authority would 
have stalled their careers. So Hoover received full support from his staff whether it involved 
investigating high profile activities of organized crime like the Mafia or delivering special 
messages to the President. Although the outcome of his tactics did not unfold as he anticipated, 
he managed to exploit high profile situations that ultimately benefited him in his career trajectory 
as well as the bureau even more than his futile attempts to circumvent the political system. Unlike 
Hoover, SBI directors did not request agents to perform political favors in an effort to influence 
political leaders on their behalf. However, Directors Anderson and Powell like Hoover 
maintained control over the agency they managed as well as their career trajectories.131
Walter Anderson like Hoover was an authoritative leader and expected extreme loyalty 
from his agents. Anderson’s career success depended on the success of the agents under his 
command. Those agents who were involved in high profile case investigations reflected a 
favorable image on Anderson and his administration in addition to elevating the investigators’ 
images. As well as investigations, Anderson exploited the print media at every opportunity to 
promote his viewpoint just as Hoover. While Anderson spoke at numerous public venues to 
promote the SBI, he became a popular public speaker and actually advanced himself while 
maintaining his position with the SBI in the process. Through his public speaking engagements, 
he created a positive high profile image for himself.
Unlike Anderson, some agents describe Director Powell as a micromanager who involved 
himself in many investigations. Powell’s involvement in high profile case investigations was one 
of the primary factors that contributed to his prominent image while with the SBI. As a result of 
Powell’s experience as a special agent, his active involvement in case investigations, and releasing 
information to the print media, he knew first hand not only the need for more resources in the 
agency but also the need for organizational changes.
During Powell’s administration, the newspaper reported publicly SBI job descriptions that 
were developed during Powell’s leadership as director. These job descriptions indicated some
131 J. P. Thomas, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Supervisor, and Assistant Director, 10 
April 1998. “Jim Powell was, veiy protective and jealous of anybody infringing on anything the bureau had 
anything to do with. He liked to have things under control.” “He [Anderson] had a law enforcement background, 
but he was not the old briar bush type enforcement that some of them were. He was good at running the bureau 
and keeping it under his control.”
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criteria for promotion whereas in the past promotional procedures were unwritten and generally 
promotions were at the discretion of the director or based on recommendations from other 
political officials. Although the director’s appointment to the SBI came about as a result of 
political patronage, in order to maintain the director’s position, it was important for the director 
to maintain an impeccable public image that often included emulating Hoover’s publicity style in 
high profile case exposure through the print media.
As exemplified in the Phillips, Tung, Page, and Cochrane cases, the SBI provided either 
technical assistance or investigative assistance when requested by local police. Furthermore, the 
preliminary cases were not always high profile, but eventually they escalated into high profile 
cases as circumstances surrounding them drew print media and public attention. Additionally, 
these cases are representative of the specialized technical and laboratory expertise as well as 
expert investigators required in many case investigations that were beyond the capabilities of local 
authorities. At this juncture in the SBI’s history, the agency’s resources included specialized 
equipment and special investigators who were at the disposal of local authorities whenever they 
needed technical or other assistance with criminal investigations. In the Phillips case, although the 
expert assistance and testimony of the SBI’s handwriting examiner, Powell, did give an accused 
man a second chance in court, he was unable to convince the jury to spare this man from the gas 
chamber. The nature of the case made it one of national interest to the print media since it 
revolved around the discovery of last-minute exculpatory evidence that could have exonerated a 
man whose life was in jeopardy. During this sensational trial, without any preconceived notion of 
advancement for himself, the high profile case brought print media attention not only to the SBI 
but also to Powell. The Tung, Page, and Cochrane cases required both technical and investigative 
assistance that resulted in significant print media publicity for Jimmy Powell. Powell’s 
involvement with high profile investigations reinforced his position with the SBI and was a 
significant force in his career trajectory with the SBI and his promotion to director. During high 
profile investigations, not only did Powell garner the print media’s attention, but he also promoted 
the image of the SBI and Department of Justice. The attorney general recognized Powell’s 
potential as a professional leader and promoted him to become SBI Director.
During this period in the history of professionalization of law enforcement, the movement 
was away from political favoritism and quid pro quo to professionalism in law enforcement 
positions. Moreover, agents who worked high profile cases or law enforcement leaders who
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promoted themselves in high profile situations similar to J. Edgar Hoover rose more readily 
among the ranks than their peers who did not investigate high profile activities. High profile 
activities involving communism and organized crime as well as the impact of technological 
developments in forensic science and investigative techniques continued both at the state and 
federal levels to be important factors in the tenure of the directors and will be examined in the 
subsequent chapter. However, Hoover, Anderson and Powell persistently exploited the use of the 
high profile cases and the print media to positively impact their careers.
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better relations with law enforcement agencies in general.5 The SBI in North Carolina was 
among the state agencies to take advantage of FBI training offered during this period. 
Some agents as well as SBI directors continued to attend the FBI’s National Academy.6
Not only did Hoover benefit from this practice but local law enforcement officers 
also benefited from training by establishing contacts and a rapport with officers in other 
police agencies. The relationships that developed between officers from different agencies 
taking classes together was a secondary benefit to law enforcement training. The training 
setting motivated and produced professional networking among investigative agents and 
law enforcement personnel, and researchers identify networking as one of the principal 
steps contributing to a positive career trajectory.7
Also, providing training to local law enforcement agencies produced a quid pro  
quo relationship for Hoover. Police agencies received professional training while Hoover 
fostered police agency support throughout the United States. During this exchange of 
training and developing relationships with local police agencies, Hoover continued to build 
a solid base for himself in his position as FBI Director. As a result of the professional 
relationships Hoover developed while providing training opportunities to local agencies, 
he established a network of connections with local law enforcement officials. When cases 
occurred in their jurisdictions, it provided him with an immediate contact and an 
opportunity to promote his image whenever possible through the print media resources 
that had positive working relationships with the local police authorities.
Crime News, Print Media and the Associated Press
While training reform expanded and gained support among law enforcement 
agencies, the promotional process was also in a gradual state of reform. Although,
5 Julie R. Linkins, “FBI A ca d em y FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 66:5 (1997): p. 12.
6 Dan Gilbert, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Supervisor, 18 Januaiy 1998. 
Gilbert attended the FBI National Academy while he was Assistant Supervisor of Organized Crime 
Control Division (OCCD). After completing the academy he was promoted to supervisor of the OCCD.
7 Matt Bud, “The Truth About Networking,” AFP Exchange 20 (Fall 2000): pp. 144-145.
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training and promotional reform influenced directors’ career trajectories, high profile 
investigations of politically prominent individuals, important cases to the agency or its 
leaders as well as significant newsworthy investigations in the print media continued to be 
a factor in directors’ career trajectories. Also, as indicated previously, the entertainment 
industry utilized high profile case investigative information from the print media to 
develop true crime and fictionalized crime scenarios. The entertainment industry not only 
profited from the print media but also law enforcement leaders like Hoover who willingly 
exploited the print media benefited from the increased exposure.
However, from 1953 to 1959 Hoover took a hiatus and decreased the use of the 
entertainment industry to publicize high profile crime investigations and his activities. 
Rather than focusing on television and the big screen for FBI promotional techniques, 
Hoover adopted an approach that was more esoterically recognized in order to promote 
his career goals as well as the fight against crime. He presented numerous lectures, wrote 
a variety of articles and a bestseller book. In 1958, Hoover’s popular book, Masters o f  
Deceit, which focused on his obsession with Communism, was released.8 In addition to 
these more recognized print media outlets, one popular news organization that Hoover 
and law enforcement officials benefited from was the Associated Press (AP).
The AP influenced the dissemination of crime stories and impacted public and 
political opinion of agents and the cases they investigated.9 Consequently, residual career 
affects also occurred for investigative agents and law enforcement officials within their 
agencies. Since its inception in 1848 most newspapers primarily received crime news 
releases from the Associated Press.10 Even though the AP emerged during the middle of 
the 19th century, it was during the middle of the 20th century that technological changes 
like electronic photo service, teletype, computerized data terminals, and satellite receivers 
enabled the service to distribute news stories including high profile crime stories to more
8 Sanford J. Ungar, FBI (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976) p. 380.
9 Dennis Staszak, “Media Trends and the Public Information Officer,” The FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin 70:3 (March 2001): p. 14.
10 Donald Read, “Don’t Blame the Messengers: News Agencies Past and Present,” Historian 69
(2001): p. 10.
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newspapers faster and more efficiently than had been possible previously. For instance, 
approximately seventeen hundred newspapers and over fourteen thousand other news 
organizations subscribed to this news service during the 20th century. It was the largest 
news organization of its type in the world at the time. Additionally, during this period in 
law enforcement professionalism in the United States, local news organizations also 
disseminated their news through countless regional and local sources such as local 
publications and newspapers.11
With the service’s pervasive capabilities to collect and distribute news information 
on the vast number of crimes committed daily, of the thousands of crime stories collected 
by the AP, a limited number were considered newsworthy enough to be distributed for 
extensive release. Therefore, the print media worldwide reported on less than a dozen of 
select cases out of thousands of cases investigated. Nonetheless, crime stories reported 
have historically resulted in newsworthy press for the print media, especially high profile 
criminal cases. As a result of the wide-ranging publicity aided by news organizations like 
the Associated Press, high-profile investigations impacted public opinion more than cases 
that received less coverage.12
The Valachi Case and Organized Crime
Included in the news stories distributed by the Associated Press, more often than 
not, when news stories occurred involving cases investigated by Hoover and the FBI, the 
Hoover stories were released for international circulation. As a result, the continued press 
coverage that portrayed Hoover as an effective leader and law enforcement administrator 
reinforced his position as FBI director. Print media coverage of one high profile 
investigation, the Joseph Michael Valachi case, was pivotal in altering Hoover’s 
philosophy toward organized crime. Consequently, the print media coverage escalated 
interest in Hoover and his position on organized crime. If the highly publicized Valachi 
case had not been investigated, Hoover’s continued denial of organized crime would have
11 Matthew B. Robinson, Justice Blind? Ideals and Realities o f American Criminal Justice 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002) pp. 97-98.
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caused him indefensible embarrassment. This would have threatened his position as 
director.
Prior to Valachi’s testimony in 1963, a group of local and state police officers 
exposed a meeting of organized crime bosses in upper state New York in 1957; 
nevertheless, the police had no informant with inside knowledge to confirm the structure 
and operational details of the Mafia.13 Furthermore, Hoover was reluctant to commit 
substantial resources to investigate a new type of unconfirmed enemy and especially one 
he had so adamantly denied existed for years. However, Hoover responded summarily 
and utilized the print media to bolster his position as a result of the high profile Valachi 
case although it contradicted his theory on organized crime.14
When Joseph Michael Valachi testified before the McClellan Committee in 1962, 
Hoover seized the print media publicity opportunity. Valachi shocked the nation when he 
exposed the inner workings of the American Mafia, also known as the La Cosa Nostra.15 
Although Hoover failed to recognize the existence of the Mafia for decades, once Valachi 
revealed the secret crime organization in a hearing before a Congressional Subcommittee, 
Hoover was finally forced to acknowledge “that perhaps crime was being committed in a 
big way by a bunch of gangsters who did not conform to the agency’s stereotyping... [such 
as] Dillinger and Baby Face Nelson.”16
Circumstances leading to Valachi’s cooperation with the FBI occurred when 
Valachi was arrested in 1962 on a narcotics charge and incarcerated.17 Rumors circulated 
among the inmates that Valachi was talking to authorities about organized crime. Valachi 
felt threatened and wrongfully killed another inmate. After pondering his situation,
12 Robinson pp. 97-98.
13 Ed Magnuson, “Hitting the Mafia; A Wave of Trails Is Putting the Nation’s Crime Bosses 
Behind Bars,” Time 128(1986): p. 19.
14 David Kaplan, “Getting it Right: The FBI and the Mob,” U.S. News & World Report 130:24 
(2001): pp. 24-25.
15 Jack Kelly, “How America Met the Mob,” American Heritage 51 (2000): p. 76-77.
16 Thomas L. Jones, “The Dying of the Light: The Joseph Valachi Story,” The Crime Library: 
The Mafia, Gangsters, Outlaws and G-Men Archive (2001) Epilogue.
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Valachi decided to cooperate with the FBI and exposed the inner workings of organized 
crime.18 The high profile Valachi case was the impetus for the U. S. Marshall 
implementing the witness protection program in the United States.19
When Valachi’s testimony confirmed the Mafia’s existence, Hoover addressed 
citizens’ concerns related to organized crime through the press and as Hoover had done
many times, he exploited print media coverage to announce a new program and reinforce
20his position as the number one crime fighter in America.
Hoover responded to Valachi’s testimony by simultaneously implementing the 
FBI’s “Top Hoodlum” program when the U. S. Marshall’s office created the witness 
protection program. Headlines around the nation carried Hoover’s story publicizing the 
new FBI program. With names and facts from Valachi’s testimony, Hoover had more 
than enough leads to implement the “Top Hoodlum” program with success.
The print media continued to promote Hoover as the leading crime fighter and 
provided name recognition to the new FBI program. As FBI agents successfully 
investigated organized crime under the auspices of the “Top Hoodlum” program, Hoover 
received print media support and positive publicity that sustained his career trajectory. 
After Hoover implemented the “Top Hoodlum” program, the SBI established the 
Organized Crime Control Division (OCCD) to collect information on organized crime 
figures at the state level.21 In contrast to some criminal activities Hoover investigated that 
were exclusive to the FBI, organized crime was also investigated by the SBI.
17 Peter Maas, The Valachi Papers (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968) pp.27-28.
18 Osborne Elliott, ed., “Whose Thing?” Newsweek (23 May 1966): p. 93.
19 Risdon N. Slate, “The Federal Witness Protection Program: Its Evolution and Continuing 
Growing Pains,” Criminal Justice Ethics 16:2 (1997): p. 24.
20 Myron McBryde, Personal Interview of Former FBI Special Agent and SBI Director, 19 
January 1997. McBryde was employed with the FBI in 1951 and worked in Washington, D.C., Kansas 
City, Chicago, Albuquerque, San Juan, and El Paso. McBryde recalled when Hoover began to place 
emphasis on organized crime in the early 1960s the special agents were encouraged to use informants to 
gather intelligence on organized crime figures. McBryde recalled while he was assigned in Chicago, a 
female informant provided him with investigative leads on organized criminals that he relayed to Hoover 
at headquarters in Washington, D.C.
21 Max Bryan, Personal Interview of SBI Special Agent, Supervisor and Assistant Director, 4 
December 1999. Bryan indicated that the Legislature abolished funding for the Intelligence Unit (IU) so
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While Hoover and the FBI investigated Valachi and organized crime, in North 
Carolina Anderson and the SBI investigated Rosenthal and organized crime activities. 
Three of the areas controlled by organized crime in North Carolina were lotteries, sports 
gambling, and narcotics. Both Hoover and Anderson also received print media coverage 
for exposing large narcotics operations at the federal and state levels.22
Throughout this period in the police promotional process, Hoover and Anderson 
continued to take advantage of high profile cases and the print media in order to promote 
their political and public perceptions of their image. When headlines like, “SBI to Bring 
N. Y. Man Here Charged In State Game Fix” and articles detailing the SBI’s role in the 
basketball scandal investigation appeared in newspapers with statewide circulations, the 
publicity enhanced Anderson’s career trajectory as director.23 In so doing, as long as they 
continued to maintain their position of power among the print media, they retained control 
of their career trajectory.
Hoover Exploits Threat of Communism for Political Gain
In addition to his fight against organized crime, primarily throughout the duration 
of the reform era, Hoover exploited the threat of Communism as a subterfuge to 
accomplish his career ambitions. He used deceptive motives and intentions to collect 
information on the American public and as a result maintained control as director of the 
FBI. Without high profile investigations that resulted from the threat of Communism 
during this period, Hoover’s powerful source of newsworthy information that promoted 
his public image by the use of print media sources would have suffered a great deficit. He
the section was reorganized to create the Organized Crime Division (OCD). The named eventually 
became Organized Crime Control Division (OCCD).
22 William S. Hunt, Jr., Personal Interview of Former Special Agent and Training and Research 
Supervisor, 31 May 1999. Hunt was the arresting Special Agent of Rosenthal.
23 “SBI to Bring N. Y. Man Here Charged In State Game Fix,” News and Observer 5 January 
1962. Additional articles about SBI investigations of basketball scandal in the News and Observer 
include: “Dixie Classic Game Fixed Jury’s Indictments Charge: Wake Jury Charges 10 In Scandals,” 10 
January 1962; “Accused in Fixes, N. Y. Man Arrested,” 20 January 1962; “NCAA Playoffs Linked to 
Fixes,” 23 January 1962; and “Cage Fixing At Charlotte Under Probe,” 31 January 1962.
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shrewdly manipulated the information to accomplish his desired outcome. The 
consequences resulted in continued support from political leaders who controlled his 
appointment.
For example, to illustrate Hoover’s preoccupation with the aggrandizement of his 
career and the influence of the print media on it, Bruce C. Steele, news writer, described 
Hoover as having “an insatiable ego,... a hunger for feme and power;” as well as 
“retribution against young male agents who... stole his limelight.”24 Steele went on to say, 
Hoover exerted “an eternal quest to expose and destroy Communism.”25 Consequently, 
Hoover’s attributes as Steele described them contributed to the successful political basis 
for sustaining his career with the FBI as director. Namely, he earned the support of 
influential political leaders and became “an ally of [Roy] Cohn and the secret power behind 
Senator Joe McCarthy.”26 Undoubtedly, Hoover realized through his career experiences 
that the outcome of widespread positive print media coverage of high profile 
investigations like Communism ultimately benefited him in his career trajectory. The 
extensive coverage on his position against Communism reinforced the positive perception 
that Hoover desired from politicians and political constituents. When positive reports 
appeared in the print media that linked his name to successful high profile investigations 
against Communism, he achieved his objective to advance his career trajectory. Although 
Communist activities in the 1950s were on the decline, when the National Security 
Council met and Communism was included on the agenda, Hoover’s opportunity to 
investigate and exploit high profile Communist activities once again impacted Hoover’s 
career as FBI director. The Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 
had declined in membership from eighty-five thousand to about twenty-two thousand; 
however, during this time CPUSA’s potential resurgence disturbed many politicians. 
Since Communism especially disturbed Hoover, the high profile investigation of
24 Bruce C. Steele, “When Edgar Met Clyd q ” Advocate (11 May 1999): p. 76.
25 Steele p. 76.
26 Steele p. 76.
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Communism provided him with print media opportunities to promote his position against 
it while protecting his career trajectory by winning public and political support.
Hoover Spies on America Through the Counterintelligence Program
Therefore, at a meeting of the National Security Council, Hoover asked and 
received approval from President Franklin Roosevelt for authority to create a 
counterintelligence program to conduct the high profile investigations of Communist 
activity. The extent of the counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) gave Hoover 
and the FBI carte blanche investigative power. Hoover used COINTELPRO against the 
CPUS A as well as other organizations.27 The COINTELPRO activities were kept strictly 
secret in the FBI, and Hoover approved every operation. The nature of the investigations 
made them extremely high profile within the political setting of the agency and influenced 
the relationship the director had with the President and other politicians.28 During the 
course of the high profile investigations targeting Communism, Hoover collected sensitive 
information not only on Communist activities but on private citizens as well.29 With the 
information he obtained in these secret high profile investigations, ironically, Hoover was 
in a position to dominate politicians who politically had control over him. Furthermore, 
through control of the information he collected, he had the power to protect his career 
path and maintain his position and authority as FBI director. Consequently, Hoover had 
the power to destroy political careers of many people and politicians who were unable to 
compete with Hoover’s impressive relationship with the print media to prevent the press 
from releasing sensitive information that Hoover collected through the auspices of 
COINTELPRO.
27 Patrick Jung, “The Responsibilities Program of the FBI, 1951-1955,” Historian 59:2 (1997): 
pp. 356-357.
28 Douglas M. Charles, “Franklin D. Roosevelt, J. Edgar Hoover, and FBI Political Surveillance,” 
USA Today Magazine 128:2652 (1999): p. 74.
29 Natalie Robins, “Inside the FBI: Attracting the Director’s Scrutiny Were Communists, 
Security Risks, and People Who Made Untoward Jokes,” National Review 44:9 (1992): p. 46.
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COINTELPRO’s inter-agency high profile investigations included a range of 
covert activities.30 James K. Davis, author of Spying on America, described 
COINTELPRO as “surreptitious entry... safecracking; mail interception; telephone 
surveillance; microphone plants; trash inspection; infiltration; disorganization and 
penetration of groups; falsely labeling group members as government informants; using 
informants to raise controversial issues within groups; encouraging the IRS to investigate 
target groups; encouraging street warfare between certain groups; using misinformation to 
disrupt target group activities; mailing anonymous letters to target group spouses in which 
allegations of infidelity are made; and mailing reprints of controversial newspaper articles 
to encourage group disruption.”31 COINTELPRO lawfully sanctioned the FBI and 
Hoover’s high profile investigative activities to collect information.32 Some targeted 
organizations included the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Black Panther Party, Nation of Islam, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, free community health clinics, cooperative 
community newspapers, and arts organizations.
In addition to organizations, COINTELPRO gave Hoover the prerogative to 
investigate individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, and any controversial 
leaders whom Hoover deemed suspicious. Hoover used Machiavellian means to bolster 
his power and escalate the course of his career toward the climax of its trajectory path 
under the pretext of COINTELPRO. With complete investigative power from the 
President and approval from the National Security Counsel, these organizations and 
individuals were “targeted, infiltrated and harassed.”33 Hoover had the authority to spy on 
American citizens while at the same time the liberty to use the information he collected 
from his high profile investigations to protect his position as FBI director. While Hoover 
utilized information to his career advantage that he legally collected during investigations
30 Karen Juanita Carrillo, “CBC’s COINTELPRO Braintrust Urges Compensation for 
Government Sabotage Victims,” New York Amsterdam News 91:38 (2000): p. 5.
31 Bernard A. Weisberger, “The FBI Unbound,” American Heritage 46:5 (1995): pp. 24-25.
32 Diane Gordon, “Old FBI Tricks,” The Nation 246:6 (1988): p. 185.
33 C. Stone Brown, “ Y2K,” Crisis 106:6(1999): p. 10.
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when wiretaps were used, SBI directors did not use legal wiretaps to collect information 
on politicians who controlled their career trajectories. Although the North Carolina 
Attorney General and superior court judges could authorize wiretapping in SBI 
investigations, SBI directors reluctantly used them as an investigative device. The SBI 
limited its practice of using wiretaps during this period but some wiretaps were authorized 
in high profile investigations involving union activity and labor strikes in North Carolina.34
Hoover and Marshall Target Communist Movement to Promote Careers
Francis Bacon, thel7th century English philosopher said, “Knowledge is power.”35 
No one in the 20th century was more familiar with this aphorism than J. Edgar Hoover. 
Hoover’s information base was synonymous with his power as he constructed a substantial 
information power base that he implemented without hesitation to promote and maintain 
himself in his career. Hoover exploited his power through his connections with the print 
media that played a major role in Hoover’s political and public success. The threat of 
releasing sensitive personal information to the print media collected during high profile 
investigations pertaining to individuals who threatened the success of Hoover’s career 
trajectory or were perceived by Hoover as threatening his career was a sufficient deterrent 
that prevented anyone from tampering with Hoover’s position as FBI director. For 
example, Presidents and politicians who distrusted Hoover did not challenge him because 
they knew he had enough critical information about them and that their careers would be 
destroyed rather than Hoover’s.36
Consequently, comments made by politicians or in newspaper editorials especially 
pertaining to Hoover and the agency always piqued Hoover’s interest. These editorials
34 Max Bryan, 4 December 1999. Bryan recalled instances when telephones were bugged in 
labor strike investigations in western North Carolina.
35 Justin Kaplan, gen. ed., Familiar Quotations: A Collection o f Passages, Phrases, and
Proverbs Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modem Literature 16th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1992) pp. 157-158.
36 Evan Thomas and Walter Pincus, “The Real Cover-Up,” Newsweek 122:21 (1993): pp. 66-72.
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and comments often involved high profile activities that were being investigated by the 
FBI. In some cases, specifically during the Civil Rights Movement, even comments or 
criticism made by seemingly minor officials were monitored and deemed significant if they 
had an audience with the citizens. For instance, in 1956, during one NAACP meeting at a 
Methodist Church in Maryland, Dr. T . R. M  Howard sharply criticized the FBI; however, 
the outcome contrary to Dr. Howard’s intent became an advantage to Hoover 
professionally and contributed toward Hoover’s career success as FBI director.
When the incident appeared in print, agents immediately sent Hoover a copy and 
Hoover responded to the criticism in writing. In defiance of Howard, Hoover did not 
write to the director of the NAACP, he wrote to Thurgood Marshall, the most renowned 
and significant Civil Rights attorneys of his generation.37 Marshall, the NAACP’s most 
prominent Civil Rights lawyer at the time, on past occasions had criticized the FBI for not 
protecting blacks in the South. “Given the sometimes barbed comments that passed 
between them, Hoover was pleased when Marshall wrote back to agree that Howard 
wrongly attacked the FBI with ‘misstatements of facts. ’ And in a real stunner, Marshall 
said he knew the FBI had done a ‘thorough and complete job’ in the three cases where 
blacks were murdered in Mississippi.”38
Marshall like Hoover loathed Communists, and like so many others he also knew 
how strongly Hoover opposed Communism. He also knew an alliance with Hoover would 
benefit his political career. Likewise, Hoover, knew if he gained an allegiance with 
Marshall, it would be to his career advantage. When the two men established a 
professional relationship with each other they strengthened their political positions that 
were publicly reinforced through public reports of the agreement between the two 
unprincipled alliances.39 Once again the print media carried stories reporting the 
cooperation between the two unlikely leaders. As a result, the extensive print media
37 Adam Cohen, “Thurgood Marshall: The Brain of the Civil Rights Movement,” Time 153:23 
(1999): p. 172.
38 Juan Williams, “The Strangest of Bedfellows,” Newsweek 132:37 (1998): p. 33.
39 David J. Garrow, “Marshall, Hoover and the NAACP,” Newsweek 128:25 (1996): pp. 37-38.
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coverage surrounding the two highly political figures reinforced Hoover’s public and 
political support in turn strengthening his career trajectory.
Hoover and Marshall needed each other to advance their causes and they needed 
the print media to continue publicizing their convictions and activities in order to increase 
public support and advance their personal ambitions toward their political goals. Both 
men had been prominently involved in high profile investigations of Civil Rights or 
Communist activities that they either adamantly supported or opposed. Each one stood to 
benefit from continued print media coverage to advance their positions on these issues and 
one needed the other in order to obtain their career objectives.
With the onset of this alliance between the two, without hesitation Marshall 
approached the FBI and asked for information to use in his speech at the 1956 NAACP 
convention on Communist groups who were purportedly using the Civil Rights movement 
as a front. He asked to personally meet with Hoover; however, Assistant Director Louis 
Nichols met with him instead. When Marshall met with Nichols, some FBI information 
was made available to him. Marshall assured Nichols that the source of his information 
would remain in confidence. “In his mind, Marshall did not consider Hoover’s decision to 
let him see FBI files to be evidence that Hoover was using him. Marshall viewed 
Hoover’s decision as an act of generosity—the sharing of information between like minds. 
He thought he had manipulated Hoover—Hoover had not manipulated him.”40 Illustrated 
by the exchange of information with Marshall, Hoover used any available resources to 
champion his cause whether it was using a Civil Rights activist who released information 
to the print media or whether Hoover released high profile investigative information 
directly to the print media.
Hoover sent Marshall a note to congratulate him on his nomination to serve on the 
United States Supreme Court. Political analysts attributed that Marshall “had caged a lion 
that could have derailed the civil-rights movement and destroyed his career.”41 Hoover 
gained an ally by sharing secret information with a high-ranking NAACP official. Through
40 Williams p. 33.
41 Williams p. 33.
130
his association with Marshall and strategic use of information collected during high profile 
mvestigations, Hoover continued to remain firmly in control of his career trajectory by 
using the high profile investigative information to defend his position against Communist 
supporters. Furthermore, the symbiotic relationship between Hoover and Marshall aided 
by Hoover’s high profile case investigative activities that were carried out by his agents 
and the print media coverage they each received benefited the career advancement of both 
leaders.42
FBI Investigates Civil Rights Cases
Eight years after Hoover and Marshall’s relationship developed, Hoover engaged 
in Machiavellian tactics again in order to achieve his career trajectory goals as FBI 
director in another case that became an exceptionally high profile investigation. Without 
hesitation, he employed the necessary measures to keep his career trajectory progressively 
moving upward and consistent with his ambition to remain successful in his position as 
FBI director. Specifically, in 1964 after all other traditional investigative methods failed in 
a Civil Rights case that involved brutal multiple murders, Hoover stepped over the line and 
used illegal methods to obtain a successful closure to the investigation. He secretly 
ordered his agents to use organized criminals to locate three missing Civil Rights workers.
Consequently, the FBI agents turned to a Mafia informant, Gregory Scarpa, Sr., to 
accomplish the task. Scarpa traveled to Mississippi and kidnapped Ku Klux Klansman to 
obtain the information on the whereabouts of the three missing Civil Rights workers. 
Allegedly, Scarpa threatened the Klansman by putting a pistol furnished by the FBI into 
the Klansman’s mouth and forcefully demanded that the Klansman divulge the Civil Rights 
workers’ location. The tactics employed in this high profile investigation concluded the 
search for the Civil Rights workers. Within a day of the meeting, FBI agents found the 
bodies buried seventeen feet deep under an earthen dam. Comprehensive print media 
coverage of the dreadful discovery appeared in newspapers throughout the nation.
42 Williams p. 33.
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Although Hoover engaged in illegal measures to solve the high profile murder case, print 
media accounts credited him and his agency in finding the slain individuals. Thus, he 
continued to prosper and his position with the FBI was even more secure as a result of the 
solved investigation although Hoover allowed unlawful interrogation methods to be 
employed in the investigation.
During this very volatile period of American history when high profile case 
investigations like the Civil Rights movement occurred, Hoover maintained a strong 
allegiance among his agents that protected his career.43 When outside political forces 
probed into the FBI’s investigative techniques in the missing Civil Rights workers, 
“Former FBI Inspector Joseph Sullivan, who spearheaded the FBI’s probe into the 
slayings, refused to say how the information was obtained.”44 Sullivan denied the use of 
organized crime figures or any illegal activities used in investigation of the case... 
“However, a high-level federal official who said he knew of the episode said: ‘It 
happened.’ Everyone’s going to say, ‘Nah, it never happened,’ but it did.”45 The high 
profile case murders of the three civil rights workers generated extensive print media 
attention. Contributing to the high profile recognition of the investigation following 
widespread print media coverage, the case was also the subject of four books and one 
movie, Mississippi Burning*6 This investigation among other high profile case 
investigations projected Hoover directly in the limelight and that was where he wanted to 
be. He used every print media opportunity to convey his version of the high profile 
investigation while he simultaneously appealed to the public, maintained support and 
successfully advanced his career trajectory toward a positive professional outcome.
During the early 1960s, newspapers reported civil unrest daily. Ku Klux Klan 
activities were reported in many states, including North Carolina. Director Anderson and
43 Susan Rosenfeld, “Doing Injustice to the FBI: The Negative Myths Perpetuated by Historians,” 
Chronicle o f Higher Education 46:7 (1999): p. B6.
44 Tom Robbins and Jerry Capeci, “FBI’s Hoover Hired the Mob to Help Find Bodies of Civil 
Rights Workers in 1964,” Knight-Ridder/Tribune Mews Service 21 June 1994.
45 Robbins, “FBI’s Hoover Hired,” 21 June 1994.
46 Robbins, “FBI’s Hoover Hired,” 21 June 1994.
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the SBI were investigating KKK activity simultaneously while Hoover and the FBI 
investigated similar civil rights violations.47 However, although the high profile KKK 
investigations in North Carolina generated print media attention none of the civil unrest 
coverage received as much print media attention as the bombing of a church in Alabama in 
which four Negro girls were killed.48 Yet again, Hoover and the FBI received national 
print media attention following a high profile case investigation.49
On September 15, 1963, the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in 
Birmingham, Alabama occurred and a high profile investigation ensued.50 Newspaper 
reports reverberated throughout the nation with an eyewitness’ account of the explosion 
and descriptions of the perpetrators. The print media released reports and stories as long 
as they could collect relevant information revealing detailed reports in their column. In the 
process the print media heightened public awareness and sensitivity to the Civil Rights 
movement and reinforced the high profile status of Hoover’s investigation of the case.
In the 1960s law enforcement officials in Birmingham were inundated with high 
profile racial violence and the Ku Klux Klan was responsible for some of it.51 Another 
problem facing law enforcement in general was the involvement of local police officials in 
the Klan. “One local Klansman, a former city employee named Robert E. Chambliss, was 
so active in racial terrorism that he was nicknamed Dynamite Bob.”52 Even though the
47 Stephen R. Jones, Personal Interview of Former FBI Latent Print Examiner, SBI Special 
Agent, and Supervisor of the SBI Latent Print Section, 30 September 1998. Jones investigated and 
gathered intelligence information on the Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina.
48 “At Long Last: Police Arrest Two Suspects in the ’63 Birmingham Bombing that Killed Four 
Little Girls,” People Weekly 53:22 (2000): pp. 133-134.
49 Acel Moore, “Bombing Case Is Closed, But Questions Remain,” Knight-Ridder/Tribune News 
Service 4 May 2001 Sec. K.
50 Rhonda Chriss Lokeman, “Justice Finally Comes After Nearly 40 Years,” Knight- 
Ridder/Tribune News Service 9 May 2001 Sec. K.
51 David J. Garrow, “Echoes of a Klan Killing: Four Young Girls Die in a Brutal Church 
Bombing and Almost 37 Years Later, Justice May Finally Be Near,” Newsweek (29 May 2000): p. 32.
52 Garrow, “Back to Birmingham,” Newsweek 130:3 (1997): p. 37.
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witness identified “Dynamite Bob” as one of the suspects involved in the Birmingham 
Church bombing he was not investigated until decades after the crime.
Camaraderie is a strong bond among police officers and Hoover realized the 
consequences of revealing his sources in this case. He refused to divulge any information 
that would identify police informants in Birmingham and at the same time jeopardize his 
confidential standing among law enforcement officials not to mention compromise his 
position as FBI director. At the time Hoover had the power to withhold information and 
did so without consequence to himself. Hoover’s powerful control in releasing 
information to the print media in high profile investigations like the Birmingham church 
bombing remained to be a factor in Hoover’s career security.
While the FBI’s involvement in the investigation brought a substantial amount of 
print media attention to Hoover, when he refused to divulge information, he protected his 
investigative resources as well as his position. It was a tragic case and Hoover’s decision 
to withhold information impeded the arrest of a guilty man.53 In 1964 the U.S. attorney 
said “the FBI knows who bought the dynamite, who made the bomb [and] who placed it 
there.” 54 Hoover was advised by his deputies in 1965 to pursue the case and arrest those 
involved; however, Hoover declined the advice of his deputies. Hoover was “reluctant to 
reveal his informants and questionable wiretapping in court.”55 At the expense of 
revealing some of Hoover’s illegal investigative tactics, Hoover would have compromised 
his positive career trajectory and the negative affect on his reputation as an effective 
director would have been irreversible. If Hoover admitted that he engaged in illegal 
investigative methods, as director his career trajectory would have been in jeopardy. 
Despite Hoover’s reluctance to divulge information, “Dynamite Bob” was finally brought 
to justice in 1977 and convicted of the bombing. “Dynamite Bob” died in prison; 
however, the other co-conspirators were never brought to justice.56 Through information
53 “Long Time Coming: A Cold, Sober Response to the Birmingham Church Bombing,”
Sarasota Herald Tribune 4 May 2001 p. A 12.
54 Garrow, “Back to Birmingham.”
55 Garrow, “Back to Birmingham.”
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control, Hoover fortified his position and reinforced his successful career trajectory. The 
Birmingham and Dynamite Bob cases publicized by the print media exemplified Hoover’s 
manipulation of high profile investigative case information to protect his professional 
standing among his political peers and superiors and benefited his career.
According to fifth century philosopher, Heraclitus, “There is nothing permanent 
except change.”57 Throughout Hoover’s career, criminal activities were definitely a 
constant although the nature of it changed decade after decade. In addition Hoover was a 
constant, as he became a seasoned lawman in his position as director, he was the constant 
in his changing world. Although constant in his egocentric career motivation, he adapted 
to the changes taking place around him and manipulated the print media in high profile 
cases to achieve his professional goals. From high profile cases involving gangsters to the 
Cold War and civil rights unrest to national tragedy, Hoover ingeniously and with 
expertise adapted to change and through the print media beguiled those who kept him in 
power.
Hoover and FBI’s Role During the Kennedy Assassination
The national tragedy that became one of the highest profile cases in the history of 
American law enforcement during the twentieth century occurred on November 22, 1963 
when Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated John F. Kennedy.58 Oswald fatally wounded 
President Kennedy from the sixth floor of the Schoolbook Depository Building in 
Houston, Texas as Kennedy rode past him in a motorcade of political leaders.59
This historic high profile case during Hoover’s tenure as FBI director had an 
extraordinary impact on Hoover’s career. Not only was it a high profile case because it 
involved the assassination of the President of the United States but three potential motives
56 Dahleen Glanton, “Former KKK Member Convicted of Planting Bomb,” Knight- 
Ridder/Tribune News Service 1 May 2001 Sec. K.
57 Bergen Evans, Dictionary o f Quotation (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968) p. 95.
58 Michael Beschloss, “The Day that Changed America,” Newsweek 122:21 (1993): pp. 60-61.
59 Melinda Beck and Melinda Liu, “The Mind of the Assassin,” Newsweek 122:21 (1993): p. 71.
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heightened the high profile status in the investigation. These motives included 
Communism, organized crime and civil unrest, all high profile activities that Hoover had 
investigated at some time during his tenure with the FBI.
As indicated, throughout Hoover’s career he was preoccupied with his 
professional advancement and job security; however, during the Kennedy administration 
he felt his job security was more threatened than it had ever been during his career. 
“Although he had been in power for four decades, Hoover was worried about his job.”60 
He didn’t like the Kennedys and heard from “reliable sources that President Kennedy was 
thinking of sacking him.”61
Hoover reputedly used Kennedy information in order to maintain his position as 
FBI director. During Hoover’s many investigations, he collected massive amounts of 
confidential information pertaining to Kennedy while Kennedy was a Presidential 
candidate. Kennedy knew Hoover had information regarding his personal life that could 
jeopardize his election. Consequently, President Kennedy naturally disliked and distrusted 
Hoover. Nevertheless, in 1960 prior to being elected President, Kennedy announced he 
would retain Hoover as FBI director.62
Although Hoover and Kennedy lacked respect for one another, when Kennedy was 
assassinated, Hoover was bound by duty to locate and convict the assassin. From the 
initial investigation of this high profile case, controversial differences surrounded the 
investigation of the President’s assassination and Hoover’s role in the investigation.63 
Regardless of these differences, the FBI seized control of the case and Hoover engaged his 
skillful tactics to elevate his status among his law enforcement colleagues and political 
superiors. Through the power of his position, Hoover suppressed print media information 
that he felt would reflect unfavorably on him. When Hoover publicly released information
60 Thomas p. 68.
61 Thomas p. 68.
62 Mark North, Act o f Treason: The Role o f  J. Edgar Hoover in the Assassination o f  President 
Kennedy (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, Inc., 1991): p 52.
63 Frank McLynn, “History Isn’t Always A Cock-Up,” New Statesman 128:4454 (1999): p. 27.
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regarding the assassination, it was never retracted nor his position altered regardless of 
additional developments in the assassination.64
However, in the process of gathering information as in other high profile 
investigations, the FBI judiciously pursued all investigative leads. When special agents 
collected laboratory evidence, it was rushed to the FBI crime laboratory for analysis. With 
the exception of fingerprint examination results, most of the evidence that was available 
had been examined. Since he did not want to antagonize the new President who wielded 
control over his career trajectory, as soon as a definitive determination was made on the 
evidence, Hoover briefed President Johnson. In the absence of conclusive fingerprint 
comparisons, he insinuated to President Johnson that Lee Harvey Oswald was the 
assassin. However, without fingerprint evidence, Hoover could not conclusively identify 
the assassin.65
High profile investigations often encounter dissension between federal and local 
agencies and this one was no different. Some of the initial conflict Hoover encountered 
included news releases made by the local authorities in Dallas. Discord between Dallas 
Police Chief Jesse Curry and Hoover soon erupted. Chief Curry made news releases and 
projected himself in the print media limelight much to Hoover’s disapproval. Predictably, 
Hoover was furious and resolved the situation by sending the FBI agent in charge of the 
Dallas office to talk with Curry about his press releases. Subsequently, Chief Curry 
retracted earlier statements made regarding the case. Curry, although a powerful Texas 
official, dared not defy the nation’s top law enforcement officer, Hoover. By late 
afternoon, the FBI released information to the print media indicating that traces of nitrates 
had been found on Oswald’s hands. Also his fingerprints and palm prints were discovered 
on the suspected murder weapon.66 Newspapers around the nation and world printed 
stories delivering the up-to-the-minute findings released by the FBI in the high profile 
investigation.
64 Thomas pp. 66-72.
65 Thomas pp. 66-72.
66 Thomas pp. 66-72.
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Hoover treated the Kennedy assassination case like any other high profile case. As 
deplorable as the case was, Hoover used it to protect his position as director and project 
his career trajectory along the path he desired. Since President Kennedy was no longer a 
threat to Hoover, he moved quickly to use his position as director of the FBI and this high 
profile investigation to fortify his status and continued to safeguard his career as director. 
By winning Johnson’s approval, Hoover regained a necessary political ally in the White
67House to ensure his position as FBI director.
In contrast to the lack of confidence in job security that Hoover experienced 
during the Kennedy administration, he felt reasonably confident about his professional 
relationship with President Lyndon B. Johnson. Hoover knew how to manipulate 
President Johnson to his advantage and cooperated with him unless the President made 
demands on the FBI that would damage Hoover’s career.68 When President Kennedy was 
assassinated, Hoover’s immediate career security worries were eliminated. He resumed 
exercising his powers to control information and the print media for the duration of the 
investigation in order to enhance his position and cultivate support from the President, 
Lyndon Johnson.
In addition, although Hoover’s relationship with Johnson was seemingly sound, he 
didn’t want to jeopardize his position. Since his relationship with the Kennedys had never 
been exceptionally solid, he used his position as FBI director to gain access to the 
Kennedy family. Through his position as director, he apprised the family of up-to-date 
investigation information.69 Calculatedly reinforcing his stronghold on his position as FBI 
director, he took advantage of opportunities to make inroads with the Kennedys and 
anyone who held persuasive powers over President Johnson that could lead to beneficial 
consequences for his career trajectory. He could not risk that others would persuade 
President Johnson to adopt the same sentiments toward him as President Kennedy. At any
67 Hugh Sidey, “Reach Out and Twist an Arm,” Time 142:25 (1993): pp. 43-44.
68 Kelly Orr, “The Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover,” U. S. News and World Report 95 (1983): p.
51.
69 Orr p. 71.
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rate, whether Hoover’s tactics made a difference, President Johnson became a fervent 
supporter of Hoover.
Evidence suggested that Hoover’s career trajectory was on a positive incline with 
the Johnson administration. Within days of the assassination, President Johnson appointed 
a panel to investigate the assassination. Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed to lead 
the panel referred to as the Warren Commission.70 In addition to other federal agencies 
that participated, to Hoover’s credit the FBI was the official agency assisting the 
commission in the high profile assassination investigation.71
The commission that investigated the case was comprised primarily of young 
attorneys from famous Ivy League law schools in the United States. The Warren 
Commission had a full-time staff of twenty-eight who actually assisted in the high profile 
investigation for the commission. Suspicions arose as a result of the many agencies 
involved in the investigation. Some of the commission members were especially 
suspicious of Hoover who had a reputation of achieving publicity while he promoted his 
career goals in gathering FBI information.72 Close Kennedy associates also knew when 
Kennedy was alive that he distrusted Hoover.
Regardless of suspicions from those who served on the commission and those who 
knew President Kennedy, in order to collect and compile information in this case, Hoover 
did not remove himself from the commission. He steadfastly directed the FBI’s 
involvement in the high profile investigation. His agents conducted twenty-five thousand 
interviews.73 As a result, the Warren Commission collected depositions from five hundred 
and fifty-two witnesses and ninety-four testified before the commission. Between 
Hoover’s assistance and members of the commission, in ten months a twenty-seven- 
volume report of approximately ten million words was produced. The report concluded
70 Janet Cawley, “John F. Kennedy,” Biography 2:11 (November 1998): p. 89.
71 Max Holland, “The Key to the Warren Report,” American Heritage 46:7 (1995): p. 51.
72 William Rubinstein, “Oswald Shoots JFK,” History Today 49:10 (1999): pp. 16-17.
73 Richard M. Mosk, “The Kennedy Assassination: Was the Warren Commission Report 
Credible?” American Bar Association 78 (1992): pp. 36-37.
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Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone to assassinate Kennedy, and there was no evidence of a 
conspiracy. Also, according to the investigation, Oswald never met Jack Ruby.74
Immediately when Oswald was associated with Kennedy’s assassination and 
arrested by the police, Hoover stood by his personal conviction that Oswald was the sole 
assassin responsible for Kennedy’s death. Hoover never believed there was a conspiracy 
although many challenged his belief.75 While Hoover directed his agents who collected 
information and explored investigative leads in the high profile investigation for the 
Warren Commission, Hoover accumulated increasingly beneficial information that he 
could use to elevate his career trajectory and control his appointment.
As long as Hoover maintained ultimate control of the investigative information and 
released it to the Commander and Chief, he reigned as FBI director. In addition, when 
Lyndon B. Johnson became President, Hoover gained another Presidential advocate, and
\ his career as FBI director remained unthreatened for the duration of the Johnson
i
| administration.
| Hoover took advantage of the print media to communicate information whether it
was to maintain power over politicians, the public or to control the news reports that
| appeared in the print media. The Kennedy assassination was no different. He was noti
! .[ remiss to reveal methodical details of the actual shooting that led to the death of the
I
j  President. Detailed in the Warren Commission Report based on information from Hoover
| and his agents, the evidence was described with precision. Typical of high profile cases,
i
| details of the shooting discovered during the investigation as reported by the Warren
| Commission were released by the print media in numerous newspapers.76 Hoover’s ability
to disclose precise details of the investigation gave the impression that the director was 
well informed and a competent leader. Consequently, through coverage of high profile 
investigations in the print media, he continued to advance his position and career as FBI
74 Rubinstein pp. 16-17.
75 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: the Man and the Secrets (Hew York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1991) pp. 548-547.
76 Gregory Curtis, “The Lone Gunman,” Texas Monthly 26:11 (1998): pp. 146-147.
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director by achieving support from the public, politicians and importantly President 
Lyndon B. Johnson.
Throughout the investigation Hoover’s investigative tactics and his egocentric 
desire to maintain control of his position as FBI director were never questioned. At the 
conclusion of the investigation and some years following the Warren Commission’s 
investigation, J. Edgar Hoover and Lyndon Johnson were suspected of participating in the 
conspiracy to assassinate John F. Kennedy.77 However, it was never proven and definitive 
answers to this high profile investigation were never successfully resolved.78
SBI, Professionalization and the Print Media
Although the SBI was not involved in investigations of assassinations and 
Communist activities, like the FBI, the SBI was investigating organized crime, civil unrest, 
and local high profile cases during this period. Like the FBI during this time, the SBI 
investigated high profile cases that received publicity by the Associated Press even though 
they were local cases. Hence, those investigations received national recognition. 
Consequently, national and local print media attention accentuated case investigations that 
either accelerated or decelerated directors’ career trajectories. Comparable to Hoover, 
SBI administrators were directly influenced by the publicity high profile investigations 
received in the print media. High profile case investigative activities in hyped print media 
played a role in promotional practices while developments in the professionalization of the 
SBI were perceived as the traditional impetus among promotional standards.
Among the developments that professional law organizations advocated and 
sponsored was training thereby promoting professionalization among local law 
enforcement agencies.79 In North Carolina during the reform era, the Police Executives of 
North Carolina, International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Institute of
77 Rubinstein pp. 16-17.
78 James Podgers, “Behind the JFK Records Project,” American Bar Association Journal 86
(2000): p. 102.
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Government at Chapel Hill and the FBI National Academy were among the specialized 
organizations and agencies that provided special training, seminars, and workshops that 
promoted professional conduct among law enforcement officers statewide.80
With professional support from these groups and the Institute of Government in 
North Carolina, the promotional process eventually included certification and standards 
among law enforcement agencies that increased over the course of several years. For 
example, the police training process through the reform era increased from eight weeks of 
training for the North Carolina Highway Patrol in the 1940s to twelve weeks in the 1950s. 
However, the Institute of Government was not adequately funded to train all law 
enforcement officers in the state of North Carolina. In addition to inadequate funding, 
lack of suitable facilities prevented the Institute from meeting the training demands of law 
enforcement officers for the entire state of North Carolina as well. In addition, the 
Institute of Government also conducted police instructor’s training for community college 
instructors in order to produce enough police trainers to bridge the training gap between 
trainers and trainees. However, while fundamental training standards were in a 
developmental stage, high profile case investigations in the print media continued to 
impact directors’ career trajectories. Directors who managed well-trained, professional 
agents combined with widespread print media coverage of high profile labor union strikes, 
civil unrest, and politically sensitive investigations championed thriving career trajectories.
While the training process underwent reformation, it also generated professional 
promotional changes in North Carolina law enforcement organizations. Additionally, 
Governor Moore requested that Albert Coates, a professor at the University of North 
Carolina Law School study the training needs of law enforcement in North Carolina. 
Subsequently, Professor Coates conducted the study and recommended that there should 
be a twelve-week certificate program for basic training, a two-year degree program and a 
four-year degree program. All of these were to be administered by the University System
79Linkinspp. 12-15.
80 William V. O’Daniel, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, 10 October 1998. 
0 ’Daniel recalled he was among several agents who attended training at SBI headquarters when he was 
hired in 1952. The training lasted approximately four weeks and one of the instructors was Special Agent 
James Bradshaw.
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of North Carolina. Following a comprehensive study and recommendations by Professor 
Coates of law enforcement training history in North Carolina, training practices changed 
extensively across the state.81 While the training process evolved, high profile case 
investigations carried by the print media continued to be a career trajectory factor when 
equally qualified candidates were considered for a position.82
In order to implement Professor Coates’ three-pronged law enforcement program 
recommendations, in 1966 state leaders requested funding from Law Enforcement 
Assistance (LEA) in Washington, D.C. Eventually the North Carolina Criminal Justice 
Training and Standards Council was founded to regulate police training.83 In addition to 
police training and investigative activities, local police agencies adopted civil service 
procedures for personnel selection and promotion. As a result, civil service rankings 
influenced police recruitment and officer appointments within law enforcement agencies 
were based on the applicants’ knowledge regardless of their political associations.84 
Contrary to professional changes in promotional advancement that were implemented by 
law enforcement agencies during this period, the Attorney General appointed SBI 
directors and Acting Directors. SBI agents who attained the top position were agents 
who were considered to be professional and participated in training but also who had 
investigated high profile cases that received print media exposure.85
81 Albert Coates, The Beginning o f  Schools fo r Law Enforcement Officers in North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The Professor Emeritus Fund, 1983) p. 118.
82 James R. Durham, Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Acting Director, 16 December
1997. When the Attorney General dismissed Walter Anderson, Durham was appointed to become Acting 
SBI Director. Early in Durham’s career with the SBI, he had experience as a field agent but was 
primarily a documents examiner. His educational and law enforcement training background equaled that 
of his fellow agents; however, his investigative experiences included high profile investigations that 
received print media coverage. He investigated high profile election law violations, embezzlements, as 
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83 Coates p. 118.
84 Robert H. Langworthy, and Lawrence F. Travis, III, Policing in America: A Balance o f Forces 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994) p. 81.
85 Haywood Starling, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Supervisor, Deputy 
Director and Director, 28 November 1997. Starling noted that James “Jimmy” Powell was the most
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D ir e c to r  P o w e l l ’s T en u re ,  th e  P r in t  M e d ia  and  P o lit ic s
Political transition persisted in the Attorneys General’s office and affected the 
promotional factors and career trajectories in North Carolina as the reform era continued 
to develop in the late 1950s. During this period, SBI Director Jimmy Powell’s 
administration abruptly ended on June 25, 1957 as a result of political disharmony 
between Director Powell and the State Attorney General George Patton.86 Unlike J. 
Edgar Hoover’s continued control over the FBI, there was no exact model in North 
Carolina to guarantee that SBI directors could prolong their tenure. Newly elected State 
Attorneys General determined whether SBI directors’ career trajectories ascended or 
descended based on their perceptions of the director. Their perceptions were influenced 
by high profile investigations reported by the print media.87 Political dynamics combined 
with the print media’s portrayal of the agency and the director in their coverage of high 
profile cases in newspaper reports influenced the director’s career trajectory.88 When the 
Attorneys General exercised their decision to make a leadership change in the SBI, it 
negatively affected the director’s career trajectory since the director’s position was one of 
the highest positions in law enforcement in the state. There were no comparable 
alternative law enforcement positions with the same power and prestige.89
professional, knowledgeable, and well trained of all the agents who came up through the ranks and 
directed the bureau.
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When Powell was asked to resign, he did not understand why Attorney General 
Patton dismissed him.90 Powell, who had been with the SBI for nineteen years, was one of 
the original four agents hired by Director Handy. Powell’s impeccable investigative role, 
his leadership skills and training background prepared him for the responsibilities as 
director. Prior to joining the bureau, Powell graduated from Virginia Military Institute 
(VMI) with a degree in chemical engineering. After graduating from VMI, Powell 
attended and studied forensic sciences at the Institute of Criminal Science in Washington, 
D.C. He had exceptional academic qualifications when he applied with the SBI and later 
proved to be an incomparable director as well.91
Powell, whose SBI career had excelled under other Attorneys General, was 
perplexed by the dismissal because the SBI’s performance while he was director was not 
consistent with Attorney General Patton’s justification to dismiss him.92 The 
accomplishments of Powell’s administration were reported by the print media and 
portrayed in a positive manner. During Powell’s administration, SBI agents and forensic 
scientists investigated and analyzed more than 6,000 cases. Also, during his tenure, the 
appropriations from the General Assembly increased by 68% to accommodate the SBI’s 
growth. Although, the legislature refused Powell’s request for four additional agents in 
fiscal year 1957-58, under Powell’s administration the SBI grew and employed a total of 
thirty-four agents, technicians, and staff There were nineteen special agents, two 
supervisory agents, five specialists, five clerical employees and one chief clerk. Powell 
also received credit for breaking up a high profile case in Columbus County involving the 
Ku Klux Klan. According to the print media, there were thirteen arrests and eleven 
convictions in the case.93
90 “Turmoil in the Ranks of the SBI Reveals Patton’s Still the Boss,” Raleigh Times 26 June
1957.
91 “J. W. Powell Was Former Resident,” Wilmington Star News 26 June 1957.
92 Tom Englis, “Powell Fired to Avert SBI Walkout’ -  Patton,” Wilmington Star News 26 June
1957.
93 Ted Ziegler, ed., “Powell’s Sacking Ends 19-Year-Old Career,” Raleigh Times 26 June 1957.
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Despite the successful high profile investigations and print media coverage, Powell 
said “he had been given no specific reason for his firing other than poor morale and public 
relations ”94 A newspaper editorial intimated that Powell’s administration was exemplary, 
“He appeared to be popular with the general public and the press; there was nothing to 
indicate that he had not been conducting his office in a proper manner, carrying the ball in 
the right direction.”95
The print media gave two speculative reasons for Powell’s termination, discontent 
among the SBI agents and political motivations centered in the Attorney General’s 
office.96 News releases by the print media contained information that supported both 
reasons. The Attorney General had ordered an investigation of the agency by one of 
Powell’s supervisors in the western part of the state due to complaints from agents.97 
Powell was a stickler for details and required his agents to perform with diligence and 
efficiency.98 However, Powell’s regulations and strict rules caused dissension among a 
few agents in the bureau. Powell was described as a “very, very efficient administrator 
who was molding the state organization after the FBI.”99 The print media reported that 
most agents were loyal to Powell; however, a few were extremely dissatisfied. To 
Powell’s detriment, the print media reported one source as saying he “was a man you had 
to know to like. Not many men really knew Powell.”100 Finally the Attorney General was 
reported as saying he terminated Powell because “the SBI chief had an unruly temper, 
abused his assistants, used profanity, and forced other agents to act as his chauffeur.”101
94 White, “Politics, Personality Issues Argued In Firing of Powell,” Raleigh Times 26 June
1957.
95 “Turmoil in the Ranks,” 26 June 1957.
96 “Questions Demand Answers in Firing of SBI Director,” Raleigh Times 27 June 1957.
97 “Refused to Resign, So Was Fired, Says Powell,” Wilmington Star News 26 June 1957.
98 Ziegler, “Powell Says Patton Exaggerated,” Raleigh Times 27 June 1957.
99 A. C. Snow, “Public Investigates Reasons for Discharge,” Raleigh Times 26 June 1957.
100 Snow, “Public Investigates Reasons,” 26 June 1957.
101 Bob Brooks, “Who’s Head Will Roll Next?” News and Observer 30 June 1957.
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In fact, former Assistant Director Ray Garland said, “George Patton, the one-armed judge 
from Franklin, North Carolina, was the one that let Powell go. Attorney General Patton 
objected to the point of John Boyd picking Powell up every morning, him [Powell] riding 
in the back seat of the car, and getting out in front of the Justice Building. He [Powell] 
tried to act like J. Edgar Hoover.”102
Consequently, the changes in SBI leadership were based on political decisions 
made by the Attorney General. 103 The director’s high profile investigative and leadership 
activities were reported in the print media and influenced the Attorney General’s opinion 
of the director.104 Unfortunately, Powell’s widespread print media coverage ultimately 
resulted in the decline of his career trajectory. Unlike Hoover, Powell did not have the 
political support to maintain his career trajectory when a new state attorney general took 
office. Initially, the print media supported Powell’s plight by pursuing the cause of action 
taken by the Attorney General for his termination. However, prior positive print media 
reports about Powell’s high profile investigations were insufficient in counteracting 
newspaper innuendos indicating that SBI agents’ were discontented with Powell. The 
negative print media reports contributed to the Attorney General’s contempt for Powell.105
Walter Anderson Returns as SBI Director
The Attorney General’s solution to the Powell situation was to bring former 
director, Walter Anderson, back as SBI director.106 Assistant Director James F. 
Bradshaw, Jr. voluntarily offered his resignation as a result of Powell’s dismissal but said
102 Ray Garland, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Deputy Director, 10 April
1998.
103 Ray Garland.
104 “Powell Dismissed As SBI C h i e f Morning Star 28 June 1957.
105 “Powell Declares He Acted Because of Bureau Morale,” News and Observer 26 June 1957.
106 “Anderson Takes Over; Bradshaw Resignation Accepted Expected,” Raleigh Times 27 June
1957 .
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he would like to stay on as a special agent under Anderson.107 However, Anderson’s first 
official act was to accept the resignation of Bradshaw with no conditions to keep him as 
an agent. Anderson eliminated the position of assistant director.108 Anderson’s 
management decision to eliminate this position is consistent with Hoover. Anderson like 
Hoover did not share the top position with others.
Bradshaw, who had an exemplary record with the SBI, had been involved with 
numerous high profile investigations and had advanced to the position of assistant 
director. However, with the removal of Powell, his career trajectory was adversely 
affected because of his association with the director.109 Powell said Bradshaw was “one of 
the finest gentlemen I have ever known. He is intelligent, capable, highly qualified and 
experienced in the field of criminal investigation.”110 Furthermore, Powell said “one of the 
most disturbing features of this affair is the grave injustice which has been done by ruining 
his career when he is guilty of no worse sin than being loyal to me.”111 Patton and 
Anderson limited their administrative authority to dismissing the director and his assistant 
director, Powell and Bradshaw. No other agents’ careers were affected by Patton’s 
reappointment of Walter Anderson to replace Powell.
As demonstrated by the Attorney General’s decision to dismiss Powell and 
reappoint Walter Anderson as SBI director, politics continued to influence state law 
enforcement leadership despite emerging trends toward professionalism. At the state 
level, since the State Attorney General continued to appoint the SBI director, strong 
political influence continuously affected SBI leadership and career advancement.112
107 “As Bradshaw Resigns Patton and Powell Trade Verbal Blows,” Wilmington Morning Star 28 
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108 Brooks, “Who’s Head Will,” 30 June 1957
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Although, professionalism significantly contributed to career advancement during this 
period, the impact of high profile investigations in the print media continued to influence 
career trajectories within the law enforcement profession.
In particular, the print media had a direct impact on Hoover and SBI directors’ 
career successes and failures. Hoover managed to maintain control of his career trajectory 
through high profile investigations of Communism, civil unrest and political crises while 
SBI directors only maintained intermittent control of their career trajectories. When 
negative newspaper reports were released, SBI directors’ career trajectories succumbed to 
the political scrutiny from the Attorney General’s office regardless of the extent of 
previous positive print media coverage of high profile investigations. Favorable 
representations of directors in the newspaper bolstered their image. Furthermore, the 
Attorneys General and other political leaders’ who determined the success as well as the 
failure of the directors’ career trajectories were influenced by high profile investigations in 
the print media.
Initially, during the first few years of Anderson’s second term, his charismatic 
personality that was much like Hoover’s served him well. The positive print media reports 
covering high profile case investigations continued to serve his purposes and characterized 
him favorably. Additionally, the publicity benefited politicians, especially the Attorney 
General since it reflected positively on a department head that the Attorney General 
managed.
Although, the print media’s positive coverage of high profile case investigations 
contributed toward escalating the director’s career trajectory, negative print media 
coverage of high profile investigative activities compromised the director’s career 
trajectory. Unlike positive print media coverage of high profile investigative activities 
potential to escalate the director’s career trajectory, negative print media coverage had the 
potential to impede the director’s career path. Anderson’s second term as director was 
detrimentally impacted when a high profile investigation involving an SBI agent’s 
connections in a sports bribery scandal received widespread print media coverage. The 
relationship between directors’ career trajectories and print media coverage of high profile
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case investigations were apparent during previous SBI directors’ tenures; yet, they were 
especially discernible during Anderson’s second tenure as director.
In addition to high profile cases, Anderson employed a nontraditional technique to 
elevate himself as SBI director and strengthened his control. At the national level while 
the FBI director engaged in a crusade against Communism and outwardly displayed 
control through his information gathering and dispersal techniques, at the local level the 
SBI director engaged in a personal religious crusade. Anderson was active in the 
Methodist Church throughout the state and region. Consequently, he engaged employees 
in religious activities at work. Routinely, he held prayer sessions at. the SBI Headquarters 
and had a following among the employees.113 Also, he spoke publicly to civic 
organizations promoting his religious and professional points of view. With his staffs 
support, his public following and the print media attention that he attracted, he continued 
to reinforce his position.114 Anderson’s actions like Hoover’s were self-serving to advance 
his career trajectory toward success in his position as director while utilizing the print 
media to promote himself.
Anderson was an assiduous public speaker who consistently attracted print media 
attention. His declamatory speeches about crime in public forums were convincing and 
were published in newspapers across the state. In view of his position on crime and 
criminal investigations, police leaders in organizations with political standing supported 
him as a police leader throughout his career. Also, he received political support 
demonstrated during his second term as director when two Attorneys General reappointed 
him as SBI director.
Print Media Coverage of High Profile Cases and Adverse Career Trajectories
Unlike beneficial career consequences from positive print media coverage of high 
profile cases, widespread disparaging newspaper articles resulted in a detrimental career
113 Margie Garland, Personal Interview with Retired SBI Administrative Support Staff, 10 April
1998.
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outcome in a case investigated by SBI Special Agent John Boyd.115 The controversial 
basketball case implicated Special Agent Boyd as behaving in a manner unbecoming to an 
SBI agent. He received a color television from an organized crime figure and the print 
media hounds reported the incident in the newspapers throughout the region. The critical 
publicity demonstrated when high profile cases were reported negatively that an 
investigative agent’s career trajectory experienced destructive consequences as well as the 
director. Although, no evidence indicated that Boyd engaged in criminal or unethical 
behavior, the case illustrated how adverse publicity by the print media with respect to an 
agent’s conduct was detrimental.
In addition, the print media’s portrayal of the immediate circumstances 
surrounding Boyd and his actions associated with the color television case created the 
perception of questionable unethical behavior. Not only was Boyd’s career trajectory 
adversely impacted, the career of Walter Anderson, SBI director whom Boyd served 
under, also experienced negative career consequences. One agent who worked with the 
SBI during this period theorized the high publicity that unfolded surrounding Boyd’s case 
precipitated Attorney General Bruton’s decision to terminate Anderson as SBI director in 
December of 1966.116
The Boyd color television case was one of the first high profile investigations 
involving an internal investigation of an SBI agent’s misconduct in a high profile case 
investigation conducted by the SBI. It was during this period that Hoover first admitted 
the existence of organized crime. The SBI not only recognized it, this case involved 
organized crime that Hoover had denied existed for years. The complicated high profile 
case of the color television began with the investigation of organized crime figures paying 
athletes to alter their plays that affected the final scores of sporting events in North 
Carolina. John Boyd, Max Bryan and Bill Hunt were assigned to investigate what would 
become a controversial high profile investigation involving a basketball scandal in 1960. 
The investigation lasted two years and led investigators to New York and other parts of
114 Ray Garland, 10 April 1998.
115 “John Boyd Quits SBI,” Raleigh Times 28 January 1967.
151
the country for interviews with basketball players, local gamblers, and others involved in 
organized crime.117
Like all case investigations, as the investigators probed for details, criminal 
activities became apparent and the print media promptly exposed as many specific details 
of the activities as they could to the public through newspaper accounts.118 The 
investigators discovered the players involved were not asked to throw a game but to 
control the number of points they were to win or lose by. The high profile investigation 
and trial made print media coverage throughout the state and region. In 1962 David 
Lewis Goldberg and Steve Lekemetros were convicted of bribing North Carolina State 
University basketball players for point shaving.
Four years later, Goldberg and Lekemetros were eligible for parole for their 
involvement in the high profile case and Special Agent Boyd took action that would send 
his career trajectory spiraling downward. He recommended that the State Paroles Board 
parole Goldberg and Lekemetros.119 Boyd failed to realize that his forthcoming plea to 
the State Board of Paroles would make headlines across the state almost every day for a 
month and that the consequences would negatively impact his career trajectory.120
Boyd went to Marvin Wooten, chairman of the State Board of Paroles, to 
recommend parole for Goldberg and Lekemetros because he learned members of the 
Raleigh Police Department intended to oppose the parole.121 Boyd, the special agent in
116 Durham, 16 December 1997.
117 Charles Craven, “Dixie Classic Game Fixed, Jury’s Indictments Charge: Wake Jury Charges 
10 in Scandals,” News and Observer 10 January 1962.
us “ggj Agent’s Disclosures Show Value of Telling Public News,” Raleigh Times 28 December
1966.
119 0f j y  figures In SBI Investigation,” Winston-Salem Journal 24 December 1966.
120 Snow, “Boyd Had Recommended Parole, Returned Set: Parolee Sent SBI Agent Color TV,” 
Raleigh Time 23 December 1966.
121 Shirley Hayes, “Only Raleigh Police Opposed Parole for 2,” Raleigh Times 28 December
1966.
152
charge of the basketball scandal investigation, supported their parole because the two 
completely cooperated with him during the high profile investigation.122
After the parole hearings were concluded, the Paroles Board voted to parole 
Goldberg and Lekemetros but the order was not written up until May 11, 1966. Three 
days later they were released, and approximately two weeks after they were released, 
Boyd received a crate addressed to his wife at their home from St. Louis. Boyd 
immediately contacted Anderson and told him about the crate and Anderson advised him 
to open it. The crate contained a color television set. Boyd assumed it was from 
Goldberg even though it did not have Goldberg’s name on the label since he did not know 
anyone else with a St. Louis address.
During the high profile internal investigation of the Boyd case, Boyd detailed to 
the SBI’s internal investigators specifically the events as they took place concerning the 
color television.123 As Boyd explained the details of the high profile case investigation, 
newspapers unrelentingly reported daily the details of the investigation. As soon as Boyd 
obtained a shipping crate, he returned the television. The newspapers across the state 
continued not only to report new information about the investigation but also to repeat 
previously reported information about the Boyd color television case.124
Although not illegal, Boyd’s conduct was scrutinized by the print media and 
negatively reported without censorship.125 When Boyd talked with Paroles Chairman
122 “Police at Raleigh Opposed Paroles,” Winston-Salem Journal 29 December 1966.
123 Laurie Holder, Jr., “Boyd’s File Shows Gift TV Returned,” News and Observer 28 December 
1966. The newspaper articles reported that Boyd explained that after opening the crate, he called 
Goldberg and learned that Mrs. Goldberg sent it as a gift. Boyd “asked Goldberg why he had sent the 
thing; because he [Goldberg] should have had sense enough to know it would put me in a very 
embarrassing situation.”
124 “Boyd Proves Bought Own Color TV Set,” Raleigh Times 28 December 1966. Newspapers 
reported that since Boyd destroyed the crate during the unpacking process, he needed a crate to return it 
and attempted to locate another shipping crate. Boyd was unable to locate an inexpensive shipping crate 
so he went to Stephen’s Appliance and ordered a Sylvania color television and used the crate to return 
Goldberg’s set. In Boyd’s defense, the print media reported that Boyd produced the serial number of the 
returned television that was also noted on the check for the shipping charge.
125 “Silence Would Only Compound the Troubles Within the SBI,” Raleigh Times 27 December
1966.
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Wooten, Boyd knew he would be in violation of the SBI policy to appear before the 
Paroles Board unless requested by the Board; however, he said he discussed it with 
Anderson before appearing. In rebuttal, Anderson denied having the discussion with 
Boyd. The print media had a field day with the high profile case ultimately at Boyd and 
Anderson’s career expenses.
Following the controversial and highly reported case, the SBI conducted an 
internal investigation pertaining to Boyd’s association with the high profile case.126 Three 
major North Carolina newspapers, the News and Observer, Raleigh Times, Winston- 
Salem Journal and other small local newspapers carried the Boyd television internal 
investigation story and featured detailed reports. Selected newspaper headlines included: 
Boyd Affair Gets New Twist, SBI Agent’s Disclosures Show Value o f  Telling Public News, 
SBI Checking on TV, and SBI Clears Boyd, Who Then Quits.
The negative print media coverage of John Boyd’s alleged connections with 
organized crime compromised Boyd’s career. The print media’s inauspicious portrayal of 
Boyd’s conduct threatened Boyd’s job security since the agency and politicians associated 
with the agency avoided negative publicity at any cost. Consequently, the adverse 
publicity had a direct detrimental bearing on Boyd’s career trajectory. On January 27, 
1967, Boyd was cleared of any wrongdoing. However, on the same day Boyd resigned 
his position as special agent with the SBI without any detailed explanation to the press.127 
Boyd’s dilemma set into motion irreversible negative career trajectory consequences for 
Anderson as well.
High Profile Cases Advance Investigators’ Careers
During this period in the history of the State Bureau of Investigation, the 
basketball scandal was considered one of the most complex and convoluted cases ever 
investigated by the agency. The News and Observer, the state’s newspaper with the
126 Hayes, “SBI Investigates Color TV Incident,” Raleigh Times 3 January 1967.
127 Hayes, “SBI Clears Boyd Who Then Quits,” Raleigh Times 27 January 1967.
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largest circulations, published twenty-nine articles over a nine-month period in 1962 that 
were related to the basketball scandal. In addition, during Anderson’s tenure as director, 
the SBI arrested Frank Larry Rosenthal in the basketball scandal investigation. The print 
media was a factor in the investigation becoming high profile. In the basketball scandal, 
newspaper articles glamorized the case and contributed to the motion picture industry’s 
interest in the investigation that escalated the high profile status of this case.128.
While the basketball scandal was being investigated in 1962, Director Anderson 
monitored another high profile investigation, the Brewer-Burch case.129 Governor Terry 
Sanford requested the SBI’s investigative involvement.130 Two factors contributed to the 
high profile status of this case. It involved political contacts associated with the 
governor’s administrative officials and the Governor’s direct involvement in enlisting an 
SBI investigation. Governor Sanford made a news release in early January 1962 that 
exposed the conflict of interest between a state government office and a private company 
contracted to produce highway signs.131 The investigation involved State Highway 
Department Engineer, Robert A. Burch.132 After the SBI investigation, Anderson 
presented the findings to the Attorney General.133
Politics and Controversial Print Media Lead to Anderson’s Dismissal
The Brewer-Burch case, although a successful high profile investigation conducted 
by the SBI, lacked enough positive weight with the Attorney General to counteract the
128 Hunt. Hunt said that Martin Scorsese directed a movie entitled Casino in 1995, based on the 
basketball scandal investigation and Rosenthal’s life in North Carolina when SBI agents arrested him.
129 Parker, “Governor Fires Engineer, Suspends Sign Firms: Connection Cited With Kidd 
Brewer,” Mews and Observer 8 January 1962.
130 Roy Parker, “SBI Unable to Contact Burch, Brewer In Probe: Sign Deals Investigated,” News 
and Observer 9 January 1962.
131 Parker, “Kidd Has Connections in Business, Politics,” News and Observer 10 January 1962.
132 “Statement Is Issued by Burch,” News and Observer 11 January 1962.
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unfortunate circumstances of the internal investigation of Special Agent Boyd and the 
director’s leadership responsibility during the investigation of the scandal. Like Boyd, 
Anderson’s position with the SBI was compromised. Anderson’s dismissal made 
headlines across the state much like Boyd’s investigation and became a high profile 
incident within the SBI and the Attorney General’s office.
Attorney General Bruton refused to speak with newspaper reporters about his 
investigation. As a result, rumors were mounting and reports in the print media predicted 
that Anderson was about to lose his job. One account indicated that at least three people 
went to Bruton to lodge complaints against Anderson.134 To the contrary, it was reported 
that out of approximately forty-five agents, twenty-four went to Bruton to express their 
support for Anderson despite reported accounts of internal dissatisfaction among SBI 
personnel. These twenty-four men reportedly turned in their resignations refusing to work 
with the two agents who lodged complaints against Anderson; however, Attorney General 
Bruton would not accept their resignations.135 One newspaper reported that Attorney 
General Bruton was investigating Anderson when the television case was discovered and 
fired Anderson as a result of it.136
Also, it was reported that a secretary who was fired by Anderson in his final weeks 
as director went to Mr. Bruton and appealed to him for a reversal of her dismissal. Bruton 
overturned Anderson’s decision to dismiss her and told her to go back to her job until his 
investigation of the agency was completed.137 On December 8, 1966, Bruton announced 
he had given Anderson two options effective January 1967, retire or resign, but Anderson 
refused to do either. When Anderson was asked to comment, he responded, “There’s not 
much comment I can make about it except to say I don’t know anything about it.”138 “I
133 Parker, “The Burch-Brewer Affair: A Rare State Scandal,” News and Observer 21 January
1962.
134 Hayes, “SBI Chief Anderson Reported Out,” Raleigh Times 7 December 1966.
135 Hayes, “Rumor Says SBI Men May Quit,” Raleigh Times 10 December 1966.
136 “SBI Agent Says He Sent TV Set Back to Parolee,” News and Observer 24 December 1966.
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guess you can just say this is my Pearl Harbor Day.”139 Anderson’s past positive 
experiences with the press had reinforced his position with the agency; nonetheless, his 
print media exposure at this juncture in his career proved insufficient to reverse the 
Attorney General’s decision.140
Anderson served approximately fifteen years as SBI director, first from 1946 until 
1951 and then again from 1957 until 1966. Anderson’s firing was a mystery to those on 
the outside. Some believed it was because he refused to disclose Ku Klux Klan 
information to the former Attorney General Malcolm Seawell, who served on Governor 
Moore’s Law and Order Committee.141 Seawell requested the information because he 
believed these files would have shown the Klan’s activities violated its certificate to 
conduct business in North Carolina.142 However, when newspaper reporters questioned 
Bruton about what prompted the decision, he denied that it resulted from Anderson’s 
refusal to divulge information about the KKK to Seawell.143
Newspaper reporters speculated that the SBI’s low unsolved rate in racial violence 
cases disturbed the Governor. During the summer of 1965 the Southern Regional Council 
published a list of thirteen accounts of racial violence in North Carolina. Only three 
convictions resulted from SBI investigations. There were no records of seven of the 
incidents in the SBI’s records. Three were still under investigation at the time of the 
publication. The SBI’s failure to solve numerous racial violence cases under the direction 
of Director Anderson reportedly displeased Governor Moore.144
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the salary in order to make the position more competitive and bring in the best candidate 
possible to fill the position. In addition, he asked for more agent positions and more 
equipment.149 Anderson’s dismissal received print media attention as the newspapers 
sought to report the details surrounding his removal from office. However, unlike Hoover 
who successfully used the print media to his advantage, the print media’s negative reports 
pertaining to Boyd’s high profile internal investigation and organized crime were to 
Anderson’s disadvantage.
Over the course of several days several newspaper reporters inquired about 
Anderson’s dismissal. On December 13, Attorney General Wade Bruton prepared to read 
a statement explaining the dismissal. As he proceeded to read the second paragraph of his 
release to the press at the North Carolina Department of Justice Building, a fuse was 
blown and all the lights went out. While Bruton withheld information from the print 
media and as a figure of speech attempted to keep them in the dark, everyone literally sat 
in the dark.Unfortunately, the press as well as many people continued to feel Bruton had 
not given an adequate explanation for the firing of Anderson. In the confusion, someone 
from Governor Moore’s office spoke up and sarcastically said, “Walter Anderson is a fine 
Christian gentleman, the trouble is, he doesn’t ever catch anybody.”150
In addition to Anderson’s perceived performance inadequacies as the chief 
executive officer of the SBI, his position was tarnished by reports of “personnel problems- 
-favoritism, promotion of the unqualified, and general unhappiness with administratioa”151 
Some felt Bruton’s decision to remove Anderson resulted from apathy among the agents 
as well as Anderson’s lack of leadership in directing high profile investigations. In other 
words, Anderson was incapable of managing the agents especially in high profile situations 
like the basketball scandal and Boyd’s unfortunate involvement with a parolee in the case.
148 “Fired By Bruton,” 8 December 1966.
149 Wallace Carroll, ed., “A Start on the SBI,” Winston-Salem Journal 9 December 1966.
150 “Blown Fuses in the Justice Department,” Raleigh Times 13 December 1966.
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Nevertheless, Bruton denied to reporters and politicians that Anderson’s firing had 
anything to do with racial violence cases being unsolved, and he also denied that internal 
personnel problems influenced the decision. Furthermore, Bruton responded vaguely to 
newspaper reporters, “I regret the necessity of this decision, but in my opinion this action 
is necessary for the best interests of the bureau so that it may continue as the most 
effective arm of law enforcement possible” and when “pressed by reporters, Bruton 
repeatedly declined to give his reasons for firing Anderson. ‘I couldn’t go into the 
details.’”145 As an elected official, the Attorney General was the chief appointing official 
over the SBI and could make this decision without consulting anyone, not even the 
Governor.146
Even though Bruton disliked Anderson, there were many local law enforcement 
officials who respected the SBI director. During Anderson’s tenure as director, he once 
remarked his most difficult task, as director was to overcome jealous local law 
enforcement officials who feared SBI agents would obtain recognition when crimes were 
solved. When Wayne County Sheriff Bill Adams, a local law enforcement official learned 
that Anderson’s job as SBI director was threatened, he promptly arranged to personally 
speak with Mr. Bruton on behalf of a number of sheriffs in support of Anderson, “He’s a 
capable Christian and runs a good department.”147 If any jealousy ever existed between 
these local officials and the director, at this critical time in his career, they demonstrated 
their support for Anderson.
Although the majority of the SBI agents and local law enforcement officials 
defended Anderson’s position to remain as SBI director, Bruton continued to make news 
releases pertaining to Anderson’s replacement. He emphasized he would seek to replace 
Anderson with a “an outstanding figure in law enforcement.”148 He also planned to raise
145 Cooper, “Anderson, SBI Chief, Fired,” 8 December 1966.
146 Pat Kelly, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, 18 January 1999. Kelly discussed 
SBI administration and history involving political relationships between the Attorney General and SBI 
director.
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Bruton’s decision to fire Anderson and the controversy that resulted placed Bruton in a 
position of scrutiny. Everyone watched him as he set about filling the position.152
The print media continued to contribute to the high profile status of the political 
events building around Anderson’s dismissal. Persistent newsmen would not relinquish in 
their efforts to uncover Bruton’s purpose for firing Anderson. Reporters learned there 
were two agents named as being difficult to work with when a group of twenty-four 
agents went to Bruton in a show of support for Anderson. According to newspaper 
accounts, the twenty-four agents accused John Boyd and Bill O’Daniel of frequently 
criticizing Anderson and other SBI agents. The group of agents reported to Bruton that 
Boyd and O’Daniel caused dissension among the agents.
During Bruton’s dismissal of Anderson, the internal high profile investigation of 
Boyd was also ongoing. In a press release the day before Bruton attempted to make the 
news release, Boyd said his superiors told him not to release all the facts surrounding a 
television he accepted as a gift. To the contrary, Bruton explained to reporters he was not 
the superior to whom Boyd referred.153 Bruton followed the print media coverage of the 
Boyd investigation as well as the newspaper reports that were being generated about 
Anderson.154
As reporters persisted in their inquiries into the Anderson firing, the press 
discovered more information about the basketball scandal and the color television 
investigation. Boyd, who was advised to speak freely to the press by Bruton, explained 
how he chose to go to the Paroles Board on his own accord to plea for Dave Goldberg 
and Steve Lekemetros. They, as mentioned above, had been convicted of fixing North 
Carolina State University basketball scores in point-shaving scandals in 1962. When he 
went to the Paroles chairman Martin Wooten, the first time, he said he did not talk with
152 Durham. Durham was appointed as Acting Director when the Bruton fired Anderson.
153 “Agents Complain, Bruton ‘Listens,’” Raleigh Times 28 December 1966.
154 Robert D. Emerson, Personal Interview of Former FBI Special Agent and Former SBI Special 
Agent, 24 January 1998. Emerson said he did not want to discuss the Boyd case on tape while being 
interviewed because he was the agent who conducted the investigation for the SBI. He noted there were 
numerous newspaper reports covering the Boyd investigation and subsequent dismissal of Director 
Anderson.
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Anderson; however, on his second visit, he talked with Anderson and got his consent. 
When questioned, Anderson said he did not remember giving his approval for Boyd to talk 
with anyone on the Paroles Board. When Boyd received a television set, apparently from 
Goldberg, he told Wooten about it. Wooten advised him to return the television and Boyd 
did return it.155 When Bruton discovered the facts of Boyd’s involvement in taking a gift 
from a convicted gambler and going before the Paroles Board, it only lessened Bruton’s 
opinion of Anderson’s ability to provide leadership to the agency. Bruton believed 
Anderson had knowledge of all that had transpired, but did nothing about it. As a result 
of Boyd’s candor with the reporters, Anderson’s position with the SBI and Bruton’s 
regard for him was compromised when the two agents complained to Bruton about 
Anderson.156
Bruton never disclosed a specific statement explaining why he fired Anderson. 
The closest explanation was that “Bruton would give no reason for the firing except to say 
that Anderson’s leaving would make for ‘more effective and harmonious administration’ in 
the SBI.”157 Repeatedly, reporters and SBI agents questioned the Attorney General, but 
he refused to release a reason for Anderson’s dismissal and like Bruton, Anderson never 
offered an explanation to the agents or the print media. Among other factors, Bruton’s 
decision to dismiss Anderson reflected the print media’s impact on Bruton’s opinion of the 
director and his professional ability to direct the agents he supervised.
Due to the public’s limited contact with the political process, the print media 
played an important role in determining public opinion. Often the print media was the only 
contact the public had with politics; therefore, it was an effective available method to gain 
political support. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Bruton’ s political decisions and 
Anderson’s career trajectory, forces such as the print media influenced public and political
155 Jack Childs, “Boyd Affair Gets New Twist,” News and Observer 29 December 1966.
156 Bryan. Bryan and a group of SBI Special Agents met with Attorney General Bruton to 
support Anderson and determine why Anderson was dismissed. Bryan said the Attorney General met 
with the agents, listened to their questions, and they never received a response from the Attorney General 
or any of his staff.
157 Holder, “Anderson Fired,” 8 December 1966.
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opinions. “Reporters rely on authoritative sources such as political and criminal justice 
officials to construct the event.”158 In the event of Anderson’s dismissal, the negative 
print media attention reinforced the lack of support and adversity that existed between the 
Attorney General and the SBI director that resulted with destructive consequences on the 
SBI director’s career trajectory.
Throughout the history of the SBI, the agency reflected the leadership 
demonstrated by the Attorney General. “An aggressive Attorney General had an 
aggressive SBI. A rock-along Attorney General would have a rock-along SBI.”159 
However, in comparison, Hoover, maintained a model of constant leadership despite the 
political changes that occurred in the Attorney General’s office. Even though Bruton 
hoped to achieve harmony and efficiency by firing Anderson, the outcome was just the 
opposite. Bruton was on a collision course with his own destruction as Attorney General. 
Anderson, who emulated Hoover’s control of information and publicity practices, was 
unable to persuade the Attorney General to retract his decision. On the other hand, when 
Hoover met with political dissention his career trajectory benefited from the print media in 
high profile investigations and his control of information.
There was public concern about the length of time it took to restore harmony and 
efficiency within the agency. Many politicians believed Bruton’s action kept the agency 
from doing its job since the agents were too busy with internal disharmony to pursue the 
real business of solving crimes.160 These politicians considered the prospect of removing 
the SBI from the Attorney General’s management and placing it directly under a 
commission with members from the North Carolina Association of Police Chiefs and the 
North Carolina Sheriffs Association.161
158 Steven Cherniak, “The Presentation of Drugs in the News Media: The News Sources 
Involved in the Construction of Social Problems,” Justice Quarterly: Academy o f  Criminal Justice 
Sciences 14:4 (1997): pp. 688.
159 “Attorney General Can’t Afford To Miss Any More SBI Boats,” Raleigh Times 31 December
1966.
160 “Spotlights SBI’s Problem,” Raleigh Times 15 January 1967.
161 “SBI Revamp Talked,” Raleigh Times 1 February 1967.
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In spite of the political fervor to remove the SBI from the Attorney General’s 
control, relocating control of the SBI never came to fruition. The main argument was that 
placing the SBI under the control of a commission would remove it from the control of 
the people. As long as the people controlled the office of the Attorney General by electing 
that official, they maintained control over the handling of the SBI. Since the SBI was 
created with a responsibility to secrecy, it was by law a secret agency and by law could not 
report to anybody except requests made by local officials. It was feared that placing the 
agency under a commission would compromise the agency’s direct responsiveness to the 
people it was created to serve.162
Despite the possibility that organizational changes for the SBI were entertained 
among political leaders, high profile cases and print media coverage, although negative, 
were a major impetus in determining the career trajectories of SBI administrators. As 
illustrated in Anderson’s career trajectory during this period, when the revolution of 
professionalization of law enforcement was a major consideration among politicians, high 
profile investigations in the print media significantly impacted his career trajectory. The 
print media divulged negative reports in the high profile investigation that compromised 
the directors’ integrity and resulted with uncontrollable political consequences that 
destroyed his career.
Conclusion
Professional law enforcement organizations and the FBI National Academy 
advocated training and professionalism for local law enforcement agencies and these 
organizations specifically encouraged development of standards for local agencies 
throughout the United States. The development and implementation of hiring and 
promotional standards promoted professionalism and improved the political era maladies 
that had existed in corrupt law enforcement practices. Nevertheless, the process was 
gradual due to the individual law enforcement jurisdictions.
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Although professional advances occurred among law enforcement agencies during 
this period in law enforcement history, print media coverage of high profile case 
investigations continued to contribute to the promotional process and impact 
administrators’ and investigative agents’ career trajectories both positively and negatively. 
For example, J. Edgar Hoover exploited the print media coverage of high profile 
investigations to promote not only his philosophical viewpoint on Communism and 
criminal activities, but he used it to advance his professional career trajectory goals as 
well. During Hoover’s tenure, high profile investigations of crime shifted from organized 
crime to the patriotic struggle against Communism. Throughout this time not only did he 
utilize high profile criminal investigations to reinforce his position as director of the FBI, 
in addition, he directed the operation of high profile investigations on the pretext of 
collecting top-secret information that he availed himself to in order to benefit his 
professional career trajectory ambitions. Hoover continuously elevated his status among 
politicians, other law enforcement colleagues, as well as the general citizemy while 
indulging the print media with high profile investigative news worthy information. 
Although the nature of the high profile investigations changed throughout Hoover’s 
career, the outcome was always consistent. Although Hoover sought to solve high profile 
investigations, he also strived in every high profile investigation to employ the various 
print media sources at his disposal to maintain his position as FBI director.
While Hoover took advantage of promoting himself through the print media’s 
coverage of high profile investigations similar activities continued to take place among the 
North Carolina’s SBI directors. However, during this period the publicity associated with 
high profile activities compromised the director’s position. While Hoover utilized the 
print media to promote his views on Communism and political issues, Walter Anderson 
successfully popularized his personal religious beliefs through print media news 
coverage.163 However, when the Attorney General perceived failure in Anderson’s 
management abilities, he was unable to prevent the negative career trajectory outcome that 
ensued. Due to Anderson’s perceived poor leadership and the indiscretion of a special
162 “People Can Best Control SBI Through the Attorney General,” Raleigh Times 2 February
1967.
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agent, John Boyd, the SBI became the leading high profile investigation covered by the 
print media. Consequently, the newspaper coverage of the high profile event was an 
embarrassment to the Attorney General. Dismissing Anderson gave the Attorney General 
an opportunity to initiate a campaign promise to appoint an SBI director with more 
professional law enforcement experience.164
Chapter four examines the career trajectories of the SBI’s first Acting Director 
followed by two SBI director appointments. One of the appointees was a former FBI 
Special Agent during Hoover’s administration, and the other was a popular journalist with 
political connections to the Governor’s office.
164 Warren W. Campbell, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Supervising 
Agent, 26 October 1997. Campbell obtained a copy of Bruton’s letter requesting Anderson’s resignation. 
The purpose stated in the letter for Anderson’s resignation was, “My recent investigation of the Bureau 
has reluctantly lead me to the conclusion that the effective and harmonious administration of the affairs of 
the Bureau require a change in the executive management of the Bureau at this time.”
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C h a p t e r  4
Community Problem Solving Era: Civil Unrest and Conflict 1967-1972
Community Policing Era
The third policing period, the community-policing era, developed in the 1960s. 
Furthermore, the concept emerged at a time when society was experiencing political, 
social and economic turmoil. Just as federal and state law enforcement directors took 
advantage of the media and high profile cases during the past periods in police history, 
these highly influential law enforcement leaders continued to exercise their authority to 
manipulate the media and high profile cases to benefit their career trajectories during the 
community policing era. During this period, however, instead of benefiting career 
trajectories, the media and high profile cases sometimes did irreparable damage to the 
directors’ career trajectories particularly at the state level.
Although directors risked unpopularity if an investigation was unsuccessful, law 
enforcement scholars, researchers, and the directors advocated community policing as the 
potential solution to the rift that had evolved between law enforcement and society. 
Consequently, law enforcement leaders and researchers embraced community policing as 
the answer to the rapidly changing society that had become isolated from the police. 
Furthermore, it permitted law enforcement to develop and utilize a link to the community 
using a medium that had always been available especially when successful high profile 
case investigations occurred, the print media.
The federal and state directors’ agencies investigated a plethora of high profile 
cases closely followed by reporters and publicized in the print media. Primarily, these 
investigations covered the insurgence of leftist groups who advocated extreme liberalism 
in attitudes and lifestyle, civil and racial unrest, involvement in the Vietnam War, the 
development and stock piling of nuclear weapons around the world as well as the 
proliferation of the illegal use of controlled substances. In addition to the extremist 
movements, political unrest, and experimental drugs during the 1960s and 70s, America 
was on the threshold of technological developments, and community policing provided
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law enforcement agencies with an opportunity to close the gap between law enforcement 
and the shift in the American society.
Ironically, by the 1960s one technological development that came about at the 
turn of the twentieth century, the invention of the automobile, contributed to the rift 
between the public and police. In law enforcement, technological advances like the 
automobile increased responses to crimes and allowed officers to patrol larger 
geographical areas. While the amount of geographical area patrolled increased, the 
amount of interaction time between the officer and the public decreased. Although the 
automobile was an innovative asset for apprehending criminals, the decreased amount of 
interaction adversely impacted the relationship between law enforcement officials and the 
public. The officers became increasingly detached from the people they served. On the 
other hand, the isolation caused by the automobile also motivated police to examine 
police programs to re-establish the personal contact with the public. As a result 
community policing developed in order to restore police and community relations. 
Consequently, through the community policing philosophy, law enforcement was 
gradually reunited with the community and efforts to reconstruct a closer relationship 
developed. Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux used the following metaphor to 
describe the birth of community policing. “Community Policing, therefore, rose up like a 
phoenix from the ashes of burned cities, embattled campuses, and crime riddled 
neighborhoods, a positive new response to the chaos of that turbulent era.”1 The new 
movement began under several different names such as foot patrol, neighborhood 
policing, neighborhood oriented policing, community based policing and community 
policing. The philosophy and organizational changes essential to provide the basis for 
community policing evolved over several decades 2
During the evolutionary period of this new policing philosophy, criminal justice 
scholars researched policing strategies and techniques used in police organizations 
throughout America. As a result of their research, the period in history came to be called
1 Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community Policing: A Contemporary
Perspective (Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company, 1990) p. 68.
2 P. J. Ortmeier, Policing the Community: A Guide fo r Patrol Operations (Upper Saddler River, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall 2002) p. 76-77.
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the community-policing era. One example of the application of police research in this 
new era is described in an article published by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson 
entitled “Broken Windows.” The article illustrates how Kelling and Wilson used the 
experiment of a renowned Stanford University psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, to explain 
how declining neighborhoods are susceptible to crime and fear among its residents.
Zimbardo put an abandoned vehicle on the street in a socio-economically 
deprived area of the Bronx, New York and also placed a vehicle in an exclusive wealthy 
neighborhood area of Palo Alto, California. The vehicle in the Bronx was immediately 
vandalized and any salvageable parts were taken. The vehicle in Palo Alto remained 
untouched until Zimbardo broke one of the windows and then vandals stripped the 
vehicle. The study illustrated that once a neighborhood begins to decline it attracts crime 
and places its citizens in fear regardless of the socio-economic makeup of the 
neighborhood.
Using Zimbardo’s sociological experiment with the vandalized vehicle, Kelling 
and Wilson, the two police researchers, compared the same principle to a declining 
neighborhood before and after police foot patrol. A visible presence of police on foot 
patrol reassured the citizens and presented a perception of safety. Therefore, Kelling and 
Wilson predicted the outcome of community policing would decrease neighborhood 
crime.3
The community-policing era not only fostered a cooperative relationship between 
the police and community but also promoted the continued professional development of 
police through training and education and the implementation of programs that would 
reduce crime and give the citizens a sense of safety.4 For example, in 1969 the New 
York City Police Department intensively trained some of their police officers for a 
special unit to handle domestic calls. All the officers in this unit received psychological 
training that prepared them to intervene in family crises before they developed into 
assaults or murder cases.5 Even though specific training programs like NYPD’s
3 Edward A. Thibault, Lawrence M. Lynch and R. Bruce McBride, Proactive Police Management 
(Upper Saddler River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998) p. 201.
4 Thomas F. Adams, Police Field Operations, 5th ed. (Upper Saddler River, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 2001) pp. 54-56.
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psychological training for officers are classified as community policing programs, 
community policing has also been described as “more of a philosophy than a set of tactics 
and is best defined as a collaborative effort between the police and the community to 
identify the problems of crime and disorder and develop solutions with the community.”6
While local police agencies adopted and practiced community policing during this 
period, state and federal law enforcement leaders, namely SBI directors as well as 
Hoover, also practiced the community-policing philosophy in an effort to overcome the 
problems of crime and disorder and re-establish their relationship with the community. 
Both favorable and unfavorable consequences occurred that impacted the directors’ 
career trajectories as high profile case investigations ensued involving community- 
policing strategies. As in the previous police periods, high profile investigations were 
closely monitored and reported by the print media, thereby, print media continued to play 
a prominent role in the career trajectories of directors of both state and federal law 
enforcement agencies.
The State Bureau of Investigation accepted the concept of community policing 
more readily than the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Moreover, community support 
was reinforced when positive outcomes emerged from community policing strategies, 
whereas, negative consequences resulted when the agencies failed in community policing 
tactics. Community policing at the state and federal levels involved programs that 
changed the public’s perception of SBI and FBI directors. For example, with the rise in 
the number of drug-related, high profile cases, the SBI implemented a drug identification 
and awareness program in which officers traveled to schools and civic organizations to 
lecture and present drug prevention programs.7 In addition to community outreach 
programs to educate the public concerning illegal drugs, SBI Director Charles Dunn 
intensified the fight against drugs. “Of all types of drugs... SBI figures showed 550 cases 
in 1968 and 190 in the first three months” of 1969 that would result in approximately 800
5 David Burnham, “Police Seek to Alter Image, Not Operation,” New York Times 29 September
1969.
6 James A. Inciardi, Criminal Justice, 6th ed. (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace College
Publishers, 1999) pp. 172-173.
7 “SBI Planning Mobile Unit in Drug Fight,” The News and Observer 4 December 1968.
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drug-related cases by the end of 1969.8 Consequently, during Director Dunn’s initial 
months as director, his use of community policing strategies and leadership of the SBI 
received positive print media coverage that also reinforced his career trajectory as the 
chief law enforcement officer of North Carolina.
Hoover, Community Policing, and the Most Wanted List
In the meantime, the FBI’s “Ten Most Wanted List” foreshadowed the 
community-policing concept adopted by local and state law enforcement agencies across 
the United States in the 1960s. The “Ten Most Wanted List” concept solicited support 
and input from the community and not only was it immediately successful when 
implemented in 1950, it continued to be a successful community-policing publication 
during the community policing era and has been a long-time successful strategy that 
elicits public interaction in solving crimes. At the onset of the community-policing era, 
the image of the FBI was at an all time high. Although Hoover and the FBI never 
practiced community policing to the extent that local and state agencies practiced it, 
nationally, researchers, political and law enforcement leaders recognized the impact it 
had on crime as well as the positive perception created by agencies that practiced 
community policing.
Unlike community policing, Hoover’s idea of policing utilized a model that 
incorporated the use of a scientific detection and apprehension of criminals. With the 
exception of the “Ten Most Wanted List,” the FBI never operated on a mutual exchange 
of ideas with the community for reducing crime. Consequently, the FBI during this 
period had a very limited role in community policing. However, Hoover did forge a 
bridge of public support and trust between the public and the FBI through his continued 
clever use of print media and high profile cases. Hoover was well known for his ability 
to manipulate the media, and frequently during this period politicians were quoted who 
described Hoover’s expertise in using the printed word to his advantage. For example, 
“The late Senator George Norris of Nebraska called Mr. Hoover ‘the greatest hound for
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publicity on the American continent.”’9 While publicizing wanted criminals in the print 
media who had been involved in high profile cases, Hoover simultaneously brought 
attention to himself.
In addition to the “Ten Most Wanted List,” Hoover also founded the National
Police Training Academy at Quantico, Virginia that was an outreach police-training
endeavor to train local law enforcement officers who in turn could transfer their newly
learned law enforcement skills to local agencies and communities across the nation.
Although the National FBI Academy was founded in 1934 and provided limited training
for local law enforcement officers, in 1965 “Congress appropriated funds to expand the
FBI training facility to render greater assistance to local and state law enforcement in the
training technical fields.”10 One police researcher, William J. Bopp, the author of O. W.
Wilson and the Search fo r a Police Profession said, “J. Edgar Hoover’s influence, despite
his contmuing attempt to achieve immortality as the patriarch of law enforcement, was
really quite narrow, and not particularly innovative except in the field of training.”11 As
Bopp also noted, Hoover was well known among political circles as well as the law
enforcement community for the emphasis he placed on maintaining high educational
standards and training rather than community policing. Like Bopp others recognized the
importance Hoover tried to achieve and the vehicle he used for this achievement more
often than not was associated with high profile case investigations, the press and public
recognition. “As some of the men closest to him volunteer, Mr. Hoover’s primary genius
12might well have been publicity.”
In 1970 publicity involving an exchange between Hoover and Senator Robert 
Kennedy concerning the differences that occurred between them many years before
8 Jack Childs, “Flow of Drugs Increasing In State, SBI Lab Reports,” News and Observer 5 April
1969.
9 Christopher Lyndon, “J. Edgar Hoover Made the FBI Formidable With Politics, Publicity, and 
Results,” New YorkTimes 3 May 1972.
10 Julie R. Linkins, “FBI Academy: 25 Years of Law Enforcement Leadership,” FBI law 
Enforcement Bulletin 66:5 (1997): p. 12-13.
11 William J. Bopp, O. W. Wilson and the Search fo ra  Police Profession (Port Washington, N.Y.: 
Kennikat Press, 1977) p. 132.
12 Lyndon, “ J. Edgar Hoover Made,” 3 May 1972.
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surfaced in newspapers across the nation. The rift between Hoover and Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy involved the minimum hiring standards for FBI agents. Hoover said, 
“The trouble was that Kennedy wanted to loosen our standards and qualifications to 
discard the requirement that agents hold degrees in law or accounting... he even wanted 
to discard the bachelor’s degree as a requirement.”13 In an attempt to revise Hoover’s 
hirmg requirements for the FBI, Kennedy and his brother, President John F Kennedy, 
who were sympathetic to the plight of minorities, endorsed the Civil Rights Movement 
and sought this as a way to increase minority recruitment in federal agencies.
Nevertheless, after spending decades building an agency like the FBI, Hoover 
knew diminishing standards would be intolerable not only to him but to the public as 
well. Moreover, when Hoover released his opinion to newspaper reporters on hiring 
standards, the printed stories cultivated increased support for him and his ideals and kept 
his career trajectory on a positive course with his public and political supporters. 
Through experience with the press throughout his tenure as FBI director, Hoover utilized 
this news medium to his advantage, capitalized on expressing his opinion and was always 
insightful of the potential positive impact on his political supporters and his public 
adherents. For example, in an article from the New York Times entitled “J. Edgar Hoover 
Made the FBI Formidable With Politics, Publicity, and Results,” the reporter wrote, “Mr. 
Hoover always understood the subtle currents of power among officials in Washington 
better than anyone.”14
It was well known around the capital as well as throughout the law enforcement 
community across the nation that Hoover’s principles were beyond reproach for himself 
and his organization. In fact, many perceived Hoover and the FBI as equals. “His 
[Hoover’s] story was the FBI story. Its growth mirrored his ow n.... Hoover had a law 
degree but not a college degree, a distinction not possible today.”15 Although Hoover did 
not have a college degree, he would not allow anyone, not the President’s brother or the 
President himself to devalue the FBI by lowering its standards. Any changes not
13 “Hoover Reported Describing Clark as ‘Jellyfish,’” New York Times 17 November 1970.
14 Lyndon, “J. Edgar Hoover Made,” 3 May 1972.”
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sanctioned by Hoover were perceived as a threat to his bureaucratic organization so he 
was defensive and unwilling to accept any recommendations from the outside yet readily 
willing to talk with reporters whom he liked who would support his position, thereby, 
bolstering his career trajectory accordingly with their news articles in newspapers 
nationwide.
Through the use of high profile cases and the print media for the duration of 
Hoover’s tenure, Hoover gained the confidence of the people and numerous 
Congressional members and reinforced his control of his position as an autocrat. As 
Hoover embarked on one of the highest profile investigations undertaken by the FBI of a 
prominent Civil Rights leader, the print media was his ally in maintaining public and 
political support.
The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.
One significant high profile investigation during this period involved the Civil 
Rights Movement. The Civil Rights Movement in America was a complex social 
movement resulting from the efforts and actions of several charismatic individuals, 
organizations and institutions that lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16
Reluctantly, Hoover engaged in one of the more prominent high profile cases of 
the 1960s involving the leader of the Civil Rights Movement. When President John F. 
Kennedy first approached Hoover and asked him to investigate Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Hoover refused. “He insisted that the FBI was strictly an investigative agency, and not a 
police force with peace-keeping responsibilities.”17 Later Hoover learned that one of 
King’s most trusted advisors and financial backers was Stanley Levison. Hoover knew 
Levison as a Communist sympathizer. With this information that pertained to the 
relationship between Levison and King, Hoover pursued King mercilessly for seven
15 Clarence M. Kelly and James Kirkpatrick, Kelly: The Story o f  an FBI Director (Kansas City, 
Missouri: Andrews, McMeel and Parker, 1987) p. 58.
16 Aldon D. Monis, The Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing 
for Change (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. 284-285.
17 Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life o f  J. Edgar Hoover (New York: The Free 
Press, 1987), pp. 367-370.
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years. After King’s death, Hoover sought to uncover a Communist connection between
Levison, King and the Civil Rights Movement. Hoover had agents watching and
following Levison almost continuously. The bureau unlawfully entered Levison’s home,
planted listening devices on his phone, in his home, and searched for any information that
would link Levison and King as Communists; thereby, hoping to uncover that the Civil
Rights Movement was connected to Communism. In addition to the numerous reports to
the President, Attorney General Kennedy, and Congress, Hoover made critical leaks to
18the media that led to newspaper headlines.
From the early 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement in America led to protest and 
insurrection throughout the nation. Some states and cities were impacted more than 
others during this tumultuous period but during this period the FBI collected intelligence 
on any group or individual that it classified as an internal threat to national security. 
Although Hoover was hesitant to initiate the investigation initially, the Civil Rights 
leader, Martin Luther King, Jr., became one of the FBI’s primary targets and Hoover 
authorized his agents to collect as much information as possible on King. “On October 
10, 1963, U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy committed what is widely viewed as 
one of the most ignominious acts in modem American history: he authorized the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to begin wiretapping the telephones of the Reverend Martin 
Luther King, Jr.... and his order remained secret until May of 1968.”19
As a result of the covert order sanctioned by the Attorney General, Hoover would 
ultimately be the one who received criticism. Author, Athan Theoharis wrote, “Hoover’s 
secretiveness and independence created a culture of lawlessness within the ranks of the 
FBI. FBI agents should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment 
when they illegally entered offices or homes to install bugs or to photocopy documents, 
and they were acting outside the law when they dismantled information under the Mass 
Media program or devised proposals to ‘harass, disrupt or discredit’ radical activist.”20
18 Powers pp. 367-370.
19 David J. Garrow, “The FBI and Martin Luther King: Martin Luther King Was Never a 
Communist—Far from It,” The Atlantic Monthly 290 (July-August 2002): p. 80.
20 Athan Theoharis, J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1995), pp.
158 - 159 .
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Consequently, when King was assassinated, Hoover and the FBI were investigated 
because accusations emerged contending that they were co-conspirators in the 
assassination.21
One of the principal individuals requested by the committee to testify was 
William Sullivan. At one time during Sullivan’s tenure, he was given top consideration 
to be Hoover’s successor; however, Sullivan made a fatal mistake that placed his job with 
the FBI in jeopardy and resulted in wrath from Hoover. “In October 1970... Sullivan told 
a group of newspaper editors and publishers in Virginia that the Communist party is not 
in any way causing or directing or controlling the unrest we suffer today in the racial field 
and in the academic community.”22 “Fear of secret, subversive conspiracies has always 
played a major role in such paranoid American thought, and the FBI’s long-standing 
obsession with domestic Communist was but one reflection of the widespread popular 
preoccupation with this same xenophobic fear.”23
Sullivan’s first mistake was speaking directly to the newspapers and secondly 
speaking to them about a subject that was totally adverse to Hoover’s position on 
Communism and the unrest the nation was experiencing. Hoover’s career trajectory was 
founded on the threat of Communism in America and his utilization of the press to 
maintain his control of his position. Sullivan’s remarks undermined the very premise that 
propelled Hoover’s career trajectory.
During the investigation when William Sullivan, former assistant director of the 
FBI’s intelligence division, testified before the United States Senate Committee regarding 
the intense FBI investigation of King’s activities, the Justice Department began an 
inquiry to determine if the FBI had any role in the assassination of King. There was 
speculation in the media as to whether James Earl Ray was acting alone, or whether other
21 “King Conspiracy Update,” Time 149:nl5 (1997): p. 29.
22 “FBI Aide Resigns in Policy Dispute: W. C. Sullivan Retires After Conflict With Hoover,” 
New York Times 3 October 1971.
23 David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From Solo to Memphis (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1981) p. 209.
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co-conspirators were involved in King’s assassination. Sullivan said that King “had been 
a target of an extensive FBI campaign designated to neutralize him.”24
Sullivan’s testimony revealed that the FBI’s campaign began in 1963 to collect 
any information on Martin Luther King and his activities until King died.25 Collecting 
information included details like wiretapping King at Hoover’s request for years. Prior to 
Sullivan’s testimony before the Senate Committee, with the exception of a few privileged 
individuals, Hoover’s investigative strategies were left to speculation for individuals 
outside the FBI; however, after Sullivan testified Hoover’s crime fighting tactics, some 
unsavory, were exposed. These included eavesdropping on King’s conversations for 
years; however, during the lengthy time he employed every tactic and device available to 
secretly collect information, he was unable to obtain evidence to prove that King was a 
Communist or Communist sympathizer. Furthermore, Hoover never conclusively linked 
Communism to the Civil Rights Movement.
Sullivan explained how he tried to arrange a meeting between Hoover and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.; however, it never materialized. Sullivan who was promoted to 
administer COINTELPRO suggested that Hoover should meet with King. He felt the 
Civil Rights leader “could be of great assistance to the bureau in the future.”26 Hoover 
agreed to the meeting with King as long as DeLoach, the former FBI COINTELPRO 
supervisor, was present. By this time DeLoach had advanced to the position of FBI 
liaison to the White House during the Johnson administration. When King was requested 
to meet with Hoover, he rejected the idea, thereby, infuriating Hoover. Also, when King 
declined the invitation Hoover perceived King as a Communist. However, although other 
bureau personnel would not dispute Hoover’s belief they “were reluctant to accept 
Hoover’s notion of Martin Luther King, Jr. as a red, but Hoover ran the store, and they
24 Gerald L. Posner, Killing the Dream: James Earl Ray and the Assassination o f Martin Luther 
King, Jr (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 259.
25 Posner p. 259.
26 James Earl Ray, Who Killed Martin Luther King? The True Story by the Alleged Assassin 
(Washington, D.C.: National Press Books, Inc., 1992) p. 244.
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27knew he could always hire more clerks.” “His [Hoover’s] compulsion to control was 
extreme.”28
Some years later Hoover and King talked by phone and subsequent to the 
conversation King remarked that Hoover “talks too much.” When Hoover was informed 
of King’s reference to their conversation “Hoover sicked DeLoach onto King’s case for 
the rest of the civil rights leader’s life and beyond.”29
Just as Hoover’s investigation failed to prove a connection between King and 
Communism, likewise after a fourteen-month Senate Committee review of the FBI’s 
investigation involving the FBI closely scrutinizing King, the committee concluded that 
the investigation of King revealed no evidence that implicated the FBI in the
30assassination. The consequences of this Senate inquiry were significant for Hoover’s 
career trajectory. Any involvement or incriminating actions on the part of the FBI would 
have been disastrous for Hoover, and his career, as director would have been destroyed. 
However, there was no “credible evidence probative of the possibility that Ray and any 
co-conspirator were together at the scene of the assassination. Ray’s assertions that 
someone else pulled the trigger are so patently self-serving and so varied as to be wholly 
unbelievable.”31 Although the Senate Committee’s investigation of Hoover and the FBI 
marked a changing trend in the popularity of Hoover, the committee’s inability to prove 
Hoover conspired in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination did not sway public 
confidence in Hoover. His career trajectory continued on a positive path despite political 
efforts to undermine his ability to continue his leadership as FBI director.
The FBI and Social Unrest in the 1960’s
27 Ray p. 244.
28 Kelly p. 58.
29 Ray p. 244. The term, “sicked” in this quote is an expression meaning to seek, harass, or to
pursue.
30 Ray p. 259.
31 Posner p. 259.
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Not only were Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination and the Civil Rights 
Movement significant high profile case events that marked a turning point in J. Edgar 
Hoover’s career trajectory, but other high profile cases involving social movements also 
captured headlines and influenced his career trajectory. For example, Hoover gained the 
public’s attention when the headline, “Rise In Terrorism Feared by Hoover,” ran June 1, 
1969 in the New York Times. Through the print media, Hoover not only conveyed his 
alarm but also at the same time earned public support for himself and his position against 
what he perceived to be an uprising New Left groups emerging on college campuses. He 
announced, “that the nation faced the prospect of increased terrorist tactics by the New 
Left aimed at the total destruction of the Government.”32
One of the New Left groups that the FBI investigated without revealing overt 
information was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In a newspaper account, 
Hoover reported that the FBI alerted the IRS regarding individuals who made large 
financial contributions to these groups such as the SDS. Although the information 
released publicly was limited while the investigation was taking place, Hoover used the 
press to publicize his position regarding members of the SDS and its supporters. 33 In 
one newspaper account, he described the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) as 
more of an anarchist group than one attempting to accomplish governmental reform 
through positive change. In the same article, he insisted the Communist Party had 
managed to gain access into student groups and promulgated dissension among young 
Americans.34
The SDS, a left-wing student organization promoted by Tom Hayden and Mark 
Rudd, became one of the most prominent high profile activities investigated by the FBI. 
To Hoover’s career advantage, it was not uncommon for newspapers across the nation to 
often quote his position against these groups. For example, Hoover was quoted as saying 
“ ...the mood of these organizations - as typified by Students for a Democratic Society, is 
a mood of disillusionment, pessimism and alienation. He continued: At the center of the
32 “Rise in Terrorism Feared by Hoover,” New York Times 1 June 1969.
33 “Big Gifts to SDS Cited,” New York Times 8 July 1969.
34 “Hoover Finds Peril In New Left Action,” New York Times 19 May 1968.
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movement is an almost passionate desire to destroy, to annihilate, to tear down... J. 
Edgar Hoover says that revolutionary stands taken by militant Black Nationalist groups 
and students of the New Left pose a threat to the nation’s security.”35
A splinter group of the SDS observed closely by Hoover was the Weatherman 
Underground. Mark Rudd created the group because internal disputes emerged between 
members in the SDS organization. Some of the members visited other countries like 
Cuba and Vietnam to participate in their revolution. They learned how to make Molotov 
cocktails and returned to America to practice what they learned. Rudd proclaimed 
himself a Marxist and declared anarchy on America. It is reported that the Weatherman 
participated in about 500 bombings in 1969. The Weatherman were “designed to shock 
the bourgeoisie and its morality by, for example, killing and eating an alley cat and 
expressing admiration for the murderous orgies of the Manson family.”36 On one 
occasion the Weatherman stole some biological warfare material and threatened to 
contaminate city water reservoirs but never carried out the threat.37
These anarchist groups were skeptical and critical of Hoover’s outspoken position 
because they recognized the power he possessed over the public. “...He is our nation’s 
highest law enforcement official,” and “...his views are reflected and disseminated
38throughout the nation—by publicity in the news media.” Hoover’s remarks to the 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence in September 1968 drew 
the attention of a group who was studying the police. The group was incensed by 
Hoover’s comments, “Communists are in the forefront of civil rights, antiwar and student 
demonstrations, many of which ultimately become disorderly and erupt into violence.”39 
The group challenged the police’s understanding of the their constitutional right to 
protest. However, Hoover refused to respond, “A spokesman for the FBI declined
35 “Hoover Finds Peril,” 19 May 1968.
36 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorist: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics rev. 
ed. (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982) p.60.
37 Dobson p. 60.
38 John Herbers, “Political Power of Police Decried: Violence Panel Study Says Militancy Seems 
Beyond ‘Reasonable Bounds,’” Mew York Times 11 June 1969.
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comment.”40 Furthermore, in a subsequent newspaper article, Hoover was reported as 
saying, “the greatest single challenge to an FBI agent was to uphold the reputation and 
traditions of a service which I am proud to say has been free from scandal, political 
influence and always devoted to the best interests of the nation.”41
These high profile investigations, Civil Rights and New Left groups, developed 
into investigations with FBI involvement; however, the degree of FBI involvement was 
not revealed until after Hoover’s death when Hoover’s role in the investigations was 
exposed. Although the discovery of these investigations was released after his death, the 
high profile investigations had a significant political impact on the director’s career 
trajectory while they were taking place. Numerous high profile investigations of social 
movements received media attention that extended beyond Hoover’s career as director.
Hoover was not alone in this position and his remarks persuaded a wide audience. 
Hoover influenced the public and politicians every time newspaper reporters published 
his remarks. Without any hesitation, utilizing the printed media he made his philosophy 
and views well known regarding the SDS and its activities. When he expressed his views 
about leftist groups to the press, he was not alone in his position and succeeded in gaining 
public support that contributed to political backing from leaders who controlled Hoover’s 
position as FBI director. Political leaders who opposed Hoover took a chance with their 
political careers and some learned first hand the potential consequences while Hoover 
took advantage of every opportunity to maintain his public image as the top law 
enforcement leader by using the press and high profile investigations to promote his 
image and his career trajectory.
Regardless of the political climate, Hoover, always managed to stay in control of 
his position while politicians feared losing support from their constituents if they opposed 
Hoover. In 1969, the United States Congressional Representative from Brooklyn, New 
York, John Rooney, chairman of the FBI’s appropriation subcommittee, talked with Tom 
Wicker, writer for the New York Times about Hoover’s political standing. Rooney said, 
“I have never cut his [Hoover’s] budget and I never expect to. The only man who ever
39 Herbers, “Political Power,” 11 June 1969.
40Herbers, “Political Power,” 11 June 1969.
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cut it was Karl Stefan, a Republican from Nebraska who had this job before me. When 
Stefan went home for election that year, they nearly beat him because he took away some 
of Hoover’s money. When he came back he told me John, don’t ever cut the F.B.I. 
budget. The people don’t want it cut.”42 Politicians like Stefan experienced the public’s 
wrath at the polls when he cut the popular FBI director’s budget, and politicians like 
Rooney did not risk their elected positions by offending Hoover or attempting to censor 
him when he released information pertaining to high profile investigations.
Without fear of retribution from Hoover, in 1970 when former U. S. Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark was no longer in office, he explicitly denounced Hoover in a book 
he had written. In Clark’s Crime in America, Clark sarcastically described Hoover’s 
“self-centered concern for his own reputation and charged that the FBI has so coveted 
personal credit that it will sacrifice even effective crime control before it will share the 
glory of its exploits.”43 Clark obviously disliked Hoover but waited until he was no 
longer in office to frankly disclose his opinion of Hoover. Clark spoke candidly about 
Hoover’s ego and emphasized that Hoover needed to gain personally from the 
investigations completed by the FBI. As expected, Hoover did not respond quietly to 
Clark’s remarks. He criticized not only Clark but Senator Bobby Kennedy as well. 
Again, no one censored Hoover. He exercised no restraint in expressing his lack of 
respect for both Clark and Kennedy without anyone stopping him.
In view of those like Clark who disliked Hoover and lacked any restraint in 
expressing their opinions of Hoover, an organization was formed to combat criticism of 
the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover. The group spokesman, Lee Edwards, a public relations 
advisor was hired. The organization was called Friends of the FBI. Efrem Zimbalist, Jr. 
was the honorary chairman who portrayed Inspector Lou Erskine on the FBI television 
program. Zimbalist said, “The FBI and J. Edgar Hoover are being subjected to the 
degradation of an attack by self-serving politicians, their supporting media, and certain
41 “Hoover Finds Crime Picture Bleak, Not Hopeless,” New York Times 28 December 1969.
42 Tom Wicker, “What Have They Done Since They Shot Dillinger?” New York Times 18 
December 1969.
43 “Hoover Reported Describing,” New York Times 17 November 1970.
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radical elements that ultimately seek the destruction of all law and order in the United 
States....”44
Hoover did not condone anyone from outside the bureau and especially his 
agents, to speak negatively about him or the bureau. An internal personnel issue 
developed into a high profile press story when reports appeared in the New York Times 
that began in October 1970 and made newspaper stories until June 1971. When a 
professor at John Jay College in New York criticized the bureau, Special Agent Jack 
Shaw responded with a letter that he asked the FBI steno pool to type for him. However, 
while the letter was in the steno pool, it was intercepted by a supervisor and was 
eventually sent to Hoover. When Hoover read the letter, he was furious and demanded 
that the author of the letter as well as fifteen other agents withdraw from the college. 
Unfortunately for Shaw, in the process of defending the FBI he mentioned some of the 
bureau’s weaknesses. The letter not only led to the agent’s withdrawal from college, but 
Hoover requested his resignation from the bureau. Shaw’s letter included many 
straightforward remarks, but unfortunately one remark surely incensed Hoover. “It 
certainly is no military secret, though I am sure, not widely published either, that 
adulation of the director in some form or other provides the main catalyst in the process 
of administrative advancement.”45 Even though this was a tactic that Hoover employed 
with political leaders and individuals in positions of power, Hoover discerned the sting of 
sarcasm when Shaw wrote that Hoover expected the same from his agents. Although 
Hoover’s political peers and superiors did not censor him, Hoover admonished agents, 
like Shaw, under his command who indiscreetly expressed himself in a letter to an 
outsider. Though Hoover exercised his power over Shaw, Shaw did not fear Hoover. 
Shaw filed a lawsuit against the Bureau and won. Newspapers reported that he filed a 
civil suit that charged, “He had been the victim of a capricious and vindictive act of 
personal retribution by Mr. Hoover.... Mr. Wulf [Shaw’s attorney] and Mr. Shaw said 
they knew of no other case in which the F.B.I. or Mr. Hoover had publicly reversed a
44 Robert M. Smith. “Friends of FBI in a Fund Appeal: Gets Excellent Response to Wide Mail 
Campaign,” New York Times 21 July 1971.
45 David Burnham, “Agent Who Quit F.B.I. Scores Bureau Investigations Discipline and 
Leadership,” New York Times 23 January 1971.
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previously established policy or position.”46 Although Shaw prevailed in the suit, 
Hoover, once again remained in control when Hoover placed John Jay College on the 
FBI’s blacklist that was also known as the “no-contact list.”47
The “no-contact list” received the same response from Hoover when reporters 
made inquiries about it as well as high profile investigations, “No Comment!” The list 
was most often in the form of memoranda or circulars. Included on the list were “usually 
persons who have spoken critically of the bureau and are in a position to spread public
48word of any direct contact with the bureau.” Political leaders, college professors and 
newspapers like The Washington Post were included among the contacts to be avoided. 
Agents were prohibited from contacting anyone on the list and sometimes this policy got 
in the way of investigations when special permission was needed to contact someone for 
an interview. Rather than obtaining special permission, agents often avoided the 
interview. “According to many sources this is a preoccupation of the Bureau’s 
leadership—the F.B.I. has set up these special procedures.”49 These special procedures 
were sanctioned by Hoover to be practiced by all the agents against anyone or any 
organizations that Hoover could not control.
Public and political support was critical to both Hoover and SBI directors and 
print media was a resource the directors utilized to promote and protect their agencies 
while simultaneously advancing their career trajectories. When negative internal 
investigations like the Jack Shaw investigation in the FBI and the John Boyd case in the 
SBI, that will be discussed later, erupted, the directors took essential measures and 
engaged in any necessary tactics to protect the reputation of the bureau and their career 
trajectories. Whenever Hoover’s career trajectory was threatened he benefited from his 
publicity tactics and managed to survive, whereas, regardless of the SBI director’s efforts 
to emulate Hoover’s publicity style, they were unable to redeem their publicity efforts
46 David Bumham, “Record Cleared for Ex-F.B.I. Man: Prejudicial Tag Removed from Critic of 
Hoover,” New York Times 18 June 1971.
47 “The F. B. I. Reconsiders,” New York Times 23 June 1971.
48 Robert M. Smith. “F.B.I. Reported to Have a List o f People Agents Should Avoid,” New York 
Times 14 January 1972.
49 Smith 14 January 1972.
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and maintain their position. In contrast to Hoover, they were unable to survive the 
political assaults on their career trajectories.
Decline and Death of J. Edgar Hoover: Legendary FBI Director
For the duration of Hoover’s career with the FBI, his professional relationship 
with news organizations, columnists and reporters heightened the success of his career 
trajectory. He used the power of the press to uphold his eminent position as FBI director; 
nevertheless, he never facetiously mocked the press in order to advance his professional 
law enforcement position. However, some members of the press like William F. 
Buckley, Jr., a columnist for the National Review, parodied an article on May 30, 1967 
irresponsibly reporting that J. Edgar Hoover had resigned as director of the FBI on 
morals charges. Hoover did not find Buckley’s parody humorous and declared that it was 
a new low in journalism. As a result of Buckley’s capricious act, he was removed from 
the FBI’s special correspondents list because he “attempted to be humorous at the 
expense of the Director.”50 A few years later Hoover was invited to be a guest on Firing 
Line that Buckley hosted; however, he declined. In the margin notes of the 
correspondence, Hoover wrote, “No. Buckley recently wrote a vicious column on the 
FBI.”51
Although some columnists like Buckley and politicians like Senator Joseph 
McCarthy alluded to Hoover’s retirement, Hoover remained steadfast in his position. 
When Hoover reached and exceeded the compulsory retirement age for federal 
employees, seventy, two presidents, Johnson and Nixon, waived the requirement for 
Hoover so he remained in his position as FBI director. However, as Hoover approached 
his 75th birthday, he had some political opposition to him remaining as director of the 
FBI. Hoover had “tangled publicly with civil rights leaders, and had a caustic exchange 
with the late Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.”52 Although Nixon defeated Senator
50 Natalie Robins, “Inside the FBI: Attracting the Director’s Scrutiny Were Communist, Security 
Risks, and People Who Made Untoward Jokes,” National Review 44:9 (1992): p. 42.
51 Robins p. 42.
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Eugene McCarthy in the Presidential campaign, Senator McCarthy’s dislike for Hoover 
was well known. “During the campaign, Senator McCarthy publicly called for his 
[Hoover’s] removal.”53
Others soon publicly recommended that it was time for Hoover to retire. Former 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark with whom Hoover had a long-standing acrimonious 
relationship turned to the print media to express discontent with Hoover’s continued 
leadership as director of the FBI. “I think, perhaps, the time has come when he should 
retire, both in the interests of his own career, which has been distinguished, and in the 
interest of the FBI which has been a great investigative agency. His [Clark’s] suggestion 
was the latest in a continuing controversy involving the wiretapping of the Reverend Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.”54 A controversial climate began to envelope Hoover and his 
investigative tactics of high profile cases like the Civil Rights Movement and its leader, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Moreover, with the passage of time more controversial articles 
appeared alluding not only to Hoover’s decline in his career trajectory, but a decline in 
the public’s opinion of the FBI itself. In August 1970, The New York Times reported 
“Poll Finds FBI Losing Support.”55 According to the article, while the FBI was 
recognized as the national leader in law enforcement, liberal groups were noted as 
criticizing the bureau.56 Hoover and the bureau were synonymous; one was not criticized 
without criticizing the other.
Less than two years before Hoover’s death when so many were suggesting that 
Hoover retire, Hoover was recognized as a man of power and control over his position 
while at the same time an attempt was made by a retired judge to persuade Hoover to 
give up his position. Retired First District Court Judge Lawrence G. Brooks of Eastern 
Middlesex, Massachusetts said in a newspaper article Hoover “is ‘sitting pretty’ to the
52 Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon Will Retain Hoover and Helms,” New York Times 17 December
1968.
53 Semple, “Nixon Will Retain,” 17 December 1968.
54 John Herbers. “Clark Suggests Hoover Step Out: Comments in Controversy on Dr. King 
Wiretapping,” New York Times 2 1 June 1969.
55 “Poll Finds FBI Losing Support: 71% in Gallup Study Give ‘Highly Favorable’ Rating,” New
York Times 9 August 1970.
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Rotunda, an honor that had only been given to twenty-one other distinguished persons. 
Eight of those were presidents or former presidents.
Fred P. Graham, writer for the New York Times, described Hoover as a “strong- 
willed and demanding bachelor [who] molded the bureau in his own image— efficient, 
incorruptible and rigid. He presided over it from the day—May 14, 1924—when he took 
over a small, politics-ridden bureau, through the eras of its most famous exploits, ... the 
Lindbergh kidnapping, the battles against gangsters like John Dillinger in the nineteen- 
thirties when ‘G-man’ became a byword, the capture of spies in World War II and the 
campaign against Communists in the postwar period.”61 While all of these high profile 
investigations played a major role in Hoover’s career trajectory throughout his tenure 
with the FBI, his accomplishment in his fight against crime continued to earn him praise 
and respect among the public, political leaders and the press who were pro-Hoover even 
after his death. Hoover’s proponents as well as his adversaries often acknowledged that 
he successfully manipulated newspaper reporters thereby influencing the print media and 
used high profile investigations to positively affect his career trajectory. However, with 
the death of Hoover, the FBI would undergo radical changes. Not everyone wanted the 
FBI to continue as it had under Hoover’s leadership. After Hoover died, “a major 
political debate about the proper purposes and functioning of the agency which had been 
accused by critics on the political left in recent years of devoting too much effort to
pursuing radicals and alleged subversives and too little to combating organized crime and
62white-collar offenders.”
Approximately five years before Hoover’s death, Columnist Buckley and Senator 
McCarthy attempted to embarrass and exert print media and political power over 
Hoover’s position as FBI director but they failed. To the contrary, at the beginning of 
that same year while the attempts to derail Hoover’s career trajectory failed, political and 
print media adversaries of Walter Anderson successfully derailed Anderson’s SBI career 
trajectory. Anderson was forced to step down and an acting director was appointed to fill 
the SBI director’s position.
61 Fred P. Graham, “J. Edgar Hoover, 77, Dies; Will Lie in State in Capitol,” New York Times 3 
May 1972.
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extent of being virtually sacrosanct. There is an impression that on occasion he cashes in 
on his situation.... In short, it would seem at the moment that if Mr. Hoover is to retire it
• • • , , 5 7will be only on his own initiative.”
Another writer critical of Hoover’s long tenure as FBI director and high profile 
image in the print media said, “By making himself a household word, Mr. Hoover, has 
served his own empire building proclivities.”58 Also, this same writer suggested what 
could be expected of the next FBI director based on Hoover’s performance as FBI 
director, “One mission of the next FBI director is to work himself out of an image and 
into a state of proper obscurity.”59
Regardless of those who wanted Hoover, to retire, he persisted in holding onto his 
position. A week before Hoover’s birthday on January 1, 1971 he remarked, “As for 
retirement, I have never considered stepping down from my position in the F.B.I. as long 
as I can be of service to my country and have the health, vigor and enthusiasm to perform 
my responsibilities in the manner my superiors and the public have a right to expect.”60
One year and four months after his expressed enthusiasm for his job, on May 2, 
1972 at the age of 77, John Edgar Hoover died in his sleep at his Rock Creek home in the 
northwest section of Washington, D.C. His housekeeper found him beside his bed at 
8:30 a.m. Dr. James L. Luke, a Washington medical examiner, listed the cause of death 
as hypertensive cardio-vascular disease. Since Hoover had a history of heart disease the 
medical examiner determined that he died of natural causes; therefore, no autopsy was 
ordered. The announcement of Hoover’s death was not released to the public until all 
FBI offices had been notified. When members of Congress learned that Hoover had died, 
they immediately voted and gave permission for his body to lie in state in the Capitol
56 “Poll Finds FBI,” 9 August 1970.
57 Lawrence G. Brooks, Judge, “J. Edgar Hoover -  Time to Retire,” New York Time 30 December
1970.
58 “The Future of the FBI,” New York Times 4 May 1969.
59 “The Future of the FBI,” 4 May 1969.
60 “Hoover, Almost 77, Declares He Never Thought of Resigning: Says His Health is Excellent-
Wili Not Relax ‘Stem Discipline’ of the F.B.I.,” New York Times 26 October 1971.
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James R. Durham, Acting SBI Director
In the last days of Anderson’s tenure before Bruton’s final assault on Anderson’s 
career as SBI director, Anderson re-established the assistant director position and 
appointed James Durham as Assistant Director. Durham, the documents examiner for the 
SBI, was involved in numerous high profile cases that resulted in identifications, arrests, 
and successful positive outcomes for the agency. At the time Anderson appointed 
Durham, he did not know he was appointing the man whom he had sworn as an agent in 
1948 would soon replace him as acting director.
Durham, whose educational background was in accounting and business 
administration, was initially a field agent but studied under former Director James Powell 
to become a documents examiner. In 1951 Durham became the SBI’s documents 
examiner and maintained the singular position of documents specialist for the agency 
until he retired in 1969. While Durham worked as a field agent and documents examiner, 
he investigated high profile cases. The documents in the high profile investigations 
included forged, counterfeited, disputed, and questioned documents.
Two of the high profile cases that Durham investigated involved election 
violations. Both were high profile investigations in that they resulted in print media 
coverage across the state and heightened Durham’s reputation as an investigator. 
Another high profile case that Durham investigated involved an insurance fraud case. He 
received letters of commendation from the Governor of Delaware, one from a 
Representative for the State of Delaware, and the head of the Delaware State Police.63
While Durham’s high profile document investigations received print media 
coverage, his career trajectory advanced and enhanced his political standing with the 
attorney general and yet again advanced his official status with the bureau. From field
62 Graham, “J. Edgar Hoover, 77, Dies,” 3 May 1972.
63 James R. Durham, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent, Documents Examiner, 
Supervisor, Assistant Director, and SBI Acting Director, 16 December 1997. Durham said he investigated 
numerous documents cases, however, some became high profile investigations They included: an election 
violation case with falsified names in the registration book, illegally marked election ballots, insurance 
fraud, embezzlement of funds from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, and falsified 
national teachers’ exam document.
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agent to documents examiner specialist, crime lab supervisor, assistant director, and 
finally, to acting director, Durham progressed up the career ladder during his tenure with 
the SB I64
One of the more unfortunate high profile cases previously discussed in chapter 
three that Durham had to take action on as acting director involved reprimanding John 
Boyd and resolving the matter of Boyd accepting a gift from a convicted parolee.65 
Although Bruton and Anderson were the direct managers involved with Boyd when the 
internal investigation took place, Durham had to execute disciplinary measures in the 
Boyd investigation.66 Bruton trusted Durham’s judgement in handling SBI 
administrative matters, and he also confided to Durham that he was going to appoint 
Myron McBryde to replace Anderson with a man who had served directly under J. Edgar
67Hoover’s command.
Former FBI Special Agent Appointed as SBI Director
Although high profile investigations and activities within the SBI and
developments in professionalization among the ranks of the special agents continued to
influence agents’ career trajectories and promotions, quid pro quo practices continued in
the politically charged SBI director’s position. Attorney General Bruton announced
Walter Anderson’s replacement was Myron H. McBryde who would become the next
68SBI director on January 30, 1967. McBryde’s experience and education made his 
background unique compared to the previous directors. Namely, Anderson’s background 
was exclusively in law enforcement. Powell’s background included military experience 
with a scientific education. Creekmore and Handy both had legal educations and
64 Walter F. Anderson, “Promotions Announcement,” SBI Weekly Bulletin (26 July 1962): p. 3.
65 “SBI Checking Color TV,” Raleigh Times 12 January 1967.
66 Hayes, Shirley, “SBI Clears Boyd,” Raleigh Times 27 January 1967.
67 James R. Durham, 16 December 1997. Durham met with Attorney General Bruton prior to the 
appointment of Acting Director and discussed SBI leadership.
68 Chuck Mooney, “New SBI Chief Takes Oath,” Raleigh Times 13 February 1967.
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involvement in state politics but no law enforcement investigative experience. In contrast 
to the previous directors, McBryde, a former FBI agent, was the first director to have 
both practical law enforcement experience as well as a degree in law.69
When asked by the print media how he would manage and operate the SBI, 
McBryde said he would not run the SBI like the FBI, although he would make the 
organization the best it could be.70 McBryde had high expectations of the agents. He 
expected SBI agents to always be mindful of their position. “If an agent worked with the 
SBI, he must be the SBI where ever he was. We hired him and made him an SBI 
agent.”71
McBryde’s initial hometown swearing in ceremony commenced with optimistic
72news releases and print media coverage. He was filled with confidence about his tenure 
as director; however, his tenure would last less than two years. During the same year as 
the internal investigation into Boyd’s involvement with organized crime figures, 
McBryde attempted to emulate Hoover’s print media utilization of high profile case 
investigations. McBryde, familiar with Hoover’s tactics of publicizing high profile 
investigations in the print media like the “Top Ten List” that resulted in career trajectory 
success, used the same approach with local high profile investigations. McBryde 
launched a print media campaign to focus public attention on a number of unsolved high 
profile murder cases. Although McBryde hoped the unsolved homicide press release 
would improve his career trajectory and reputation with the public and politicians, the
• • • 73publicity was ineffective in facilitating a positive career trajectory.
In an effort to publicize the unsolved high profile investigations further, McBryde 
responded with an additional news release concerning two of the murder cases in 
question. He reported that breaking news regarding the murder case of the 1965
69 “SBI Director To Be Sworn In Rockingham,” News and Observer 13 February 1967.
70 “SBI To Be ‘Best We Can Make It,”’ Raleigh Times 13 January 1967.
71 Myron McBryde, Personal Interview of Former FBI Special Agent, Attorney, and Former SBI 
Director, 19 December 1997.
72 Dick Brown, “SBI Director Takes Oath,” News and Observer 14 February 1967.
190
University of North Carolina female student, Suellen Evans, would soon be released. 
McBryde also indicated there were two suspects in the high profile case investigation of 
Brenda Joyce Holland that the bureau was currently investigating. Holland disappeared 
on July 1, 1967 while working on the outdoor drama of the “Lost Colony” at the North 
Carolina Outer Banks. Holland’s body was discovered five days later floating in the 
Albemarle Sound.74 The high profile investigations had been ongoing for months, and 
McBryde, like Hoover, attempted to use print media tactics to publicize selected local 
high profile investigations from the eleven that were included among the unsolved cases 
reported by the print media. However, although McBryde modelled his publicity tactics 
after Hoover, he did not achieve the same career trajectory outcome.75
In addition to the news releases on unsolved high profile cases, in an effort to use 
the print media to advance his career trajectory, during the final weeks of McBryde’s 
administration, he announced the SBI’s plans to secure a versatile mobile drug unit that 
could be taken into communities across the state, especially rural areas where facilities
76were limited or nonexistent. Also, McBryde released public announcements detailing 
his vision and funding requests advocating the creation of a narcotics division in the 
SBI.77 By promoting drug education to the general citizenry and ending illegal use of 
narcotics, he hoped to gain public support for the bureau as well as political support for 
his position as director.78 Like the directors who preceded McBryde, he was unable to 
accomplish maintaining his position although he emulated Hoover in his print media 
techniques associated with high profile investigations. Although McBryde attempted to
73 Franc Brock, “SBI Director Sees Hope of Breaking Murder Cases,” Goldsboro News Argus 1 
September 1968.
74 Brock, “SBI Director Sees,” 1 September 1968.
75 Dan Gilbert, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Supervisor, 18 January 1998. 
Gilbert said the SBI had a suspect in the Holland case but they never had enough evidence to make an 
arrest. The suspect later committed suicide.
76 “SBI Planning Mobile,” 4 December 1968.
77 “SBI Seeks Narcotics Squad,” News and Observer 27 September 1968.
78 Robert W. Pope, Personal Interview of Former FBI and SBI Special Agent, 28 February 1998. 
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promote his image and enhance his career trajectory through positive print media and 
high profile investigative techniques, the political arena surrounding the top position in 
the SBI necessitated a change. McBryde, like his predecessors, was not able to achieve 
public support to maintain his career trajectory as SBI director nor was he able to exert 
political pressure over politicians who had power to reappoint him when a new Attorney 
General was elected to office.
New Attorney General Morgan Supports SBI Reorganization
Robert B. Morgan defeated Attorney General Wade Bruton; subsequently, 
increased professionalization within the SBI was forthcoming. Morgan admitted he did 
not know what the trouble was, but felt there were two significant reasons that a new 
director and reorganization was needed. SBI Director McBryde was more involved in 
politics than Morgan believed he should have been.79 Secondly, there were a number of 
unsolved cases that resulted in the public’s loss of confidence in the agency. “In any 
case, Morgan wanted the SBI strengthened and its public image and prestige polished and 
brightened-as quickly as possible.”80
During Attorney General Morgan’s tenure, the SBI was more actively involved in 
professionalization. Organizational changes and the expansion of SBI services developed 
more rapidly during his administration than in past administrations. Many speculated 
incumbent Attorney General Morgan would make more changes in the bureau than just 
choosing a new director.81 However, the first change to make the headlines was in fact 
the SBI Director MyBryde’s resignation.82
79 Robert B. Morgan, Personal Interview of Attorney, Former Clerk of Superior Court, North 
Carolina Senator, N.C. Attorney General, U. S. Senator, and SBI Director, 14 January 1998. Morgan 
believed that McBryde was using FBI tactics to gather personal defamatory information for campaign 
purposes Morgan who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee while in Congress was familiar with 
the way FBI agents operated Morgan said, “The FBI under Hoover and even down to this day felt like the 
ends always justified the means.” McBryde felt justified in attempting to collect information for the 
Attorney General he was serving under.
80 Shires, “Morgan Seeking Administrator,” 16 December 1968.
81 “Morgan Concerned about Politics and SBI Agency,” News and Observer 15 May 1968.
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Although McBryde’s tactics were not publicly announced, his Hoover-like
83investigative measures may have been to his detriment. Morgan and McBryde met on
November 22, 1968. Without delay McBryde submitted his resignation the same day
they met. He told Morgan he would step down as director the same day Bruton’s term
ended.84 His tenure with the bureau lasted approximately 18 months.85 When asked if
their meeting involved a discussion of political activity, Morgan responded, “I think what
we were discussing involved a little more than what you would normally consider
political activity.”86 Though he was asked to explain what he meant, he would not
discuss it any further at that time.87 Unlike Hoover who successfully collected
information on the politicians with authority over him, McBryde was unable to employ
88those successful tactics against his new boss, Attorney General Robert Morgan.
When Morgan became the Attorney General, the SBI entered a new era when he 
appointed Charles Dunn as the next SBI director. Dunn’s reorganization of the SBI 
modernized the state investigative agency that was modelled after Hoover’s FBI.89 Dunn 
was instrumental in implementing Morgan’s envisioned professional changes in the 
bureau. Morgan advocated an expansion of the narcotics investigative services that 
resulted in the addition of a narcotics division. He [Morgan] referred to narcotics as, “the 
most critical crime problem in the state... .’,90 At first he believed a two or three-man 
division would be sufficient, but after more consideration, he strongly believed an eight
82 Jim Lewis, “McBryde Resigns as SBI Director,” News and Observer 23 November 1968.
83 Morgan. After winning the election, Morgan asked for McBryde’s resignation as SBI Director.
84 “Morgan Expected to Make Other Changes in SBI,” News and Observer 3 December 1968.
85 Lewis, “McBryde Resigns as SBI Director,” 23 November 1968.
86 Jack Childs, “Morgan Sees ‘No Wholesale Changes in SBI,’” News and Observer 6 December
1968.
87 Childs, “Morgan Sees ‘No,’” 6 December 1968.
88 Myron McBryde. McBryde knew as soon as the election was over that his position, as SBI 
director would end “He [Morgan] asked me to resign He [Morgan] knew that Wade Bruton was a family 
friend, a good friend.”
89 William S. Hunt, Jr., Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Training and 
Research Supervisor, 31 May 1999.
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or twelve-man division was needed in order to tackle the narcotics problems in the 
state.91 Dunn’s reorganization of the SBI modernized the state investigative agency that
92was modelled after Hoover’s FBI.
Charles Dunn Appointed as SBI Director
In 1968 at the national law enforcement level, Hoover continued to concentrate 
his law enforcement efforts on what he perceived as threats to national security by 
political activist groups. While at the state level of law enforcement in North Carolina a 
new Attorney General was elected, Robert Morgan. Morgan was faced not only with the 
problems posed by political activist groups in the state, but also with alleviating internal 
problems in the state’s highest law enforcement agency, the SBI.
Furthermore, when Morgan was elected Attorney General in 1968, politicians and 
reporters alike recognized and acknowledged internal problems among the ranks of the 
SBI. William Shires, a reporter for the Raleigh Times, reported that there had been a 
history of “problems of internal dissension and low morale within the super secret SBI.”93 
Solving internal political conflict within the SBI was an objective that the past elected 
Attorneys General and previously appointed SBI Directors had shared since the tenures 
of Attorney General Patton and SBI Director Jimmy Powell. When Morgan appointed 
the SBI director he hoped to bring about a solution to the long-standing conflict of 
internal dissention and low morale. Like his predecessors, Attorney General-elect Robert 
Morgan aimed to resolve problems with a new type of leadership for the top law 
enforcement agency in the state. Attorney General elect, Robert Morgan, said, the 
agency needs “leadership, harmony and an elimination of what he called internal politics 
in the SBI.”94
90 Childs, “Morgan Sees ‘No,’” 6 December 1968.
91 Childs, “Morgan Sees ‘No,’” 6 December 1968.
92 Hunt.
93 William A. Shires, “Morgan Seeking Administrator to Head SBI,” Raleigh Times 16 December
1968.
94 Jack Childs, “Morgan Sees ‘N o’” News and Observer 6 December 1968.
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Through news releases to the newspapers, Morgan conditioned the politicians, the 
ranks of the SBI as well as the media to accept the director he would appoint to the 
position. Headlines were indicators of the new leader who would take charge of the State 
Bureau of Investigation and the newspaper stories prepared everyone to accept the 
change. On December 16, 1968, a News and Observer headline announced, “Morgan 
Seeking Administrator To Head SBI.” One day later, December 17, 1968, the newspaper 
headline read, “Morgan Isn’t Sure SBI Needs Lawman.” Moreover, newly elected 
Attorney General Morgan further stated in the article that he was not sure that being the 
director of the State Bureau of Investigation “requires a lot of experience carrying a pistol 
or swinging a club.”95 Morgan announced that he was going to appoint the next SBI 
director as early as the following week. This press release indicated that Morgan, a 
skilled politician himself, was not only revealing the type of leadership traits that he 
preferred the next SBI director to possess but he was also supplying information to the 
media in order to obtain input from his constituents before appointing a director.96
By mid December the news of a new SBI director had been leaked to the press. 
Speculations projected that Charles Dunn would be the next SBI director. In a newspaper 
article that appeared in the News and Observer December 17, 1968, Morgan released to 
newspaper reporters a conversation he had with Charles Dunn about becoming the next 
SBI director. Dunn, former administrative assistant to outgoing Governor Moore, had 
experience as the governor’s chief advisor during civil unrest cases that required him to 
be present at the scene as a representative from the governor’s office, and he was a 
former newspaperman as well. Morgan said, “Years of law enforcement training would 
be of help to the director... but the job is one that requires many talents to be found 
outside of law enforcement work. A man for example, must be an administrator.”97 
Morgan, again an intelligent politician, used the print media to control information 
released to the public thus allowing him an opportunity to evaluate public reaction.
95 “Morgan Isn’t Sure SBI Needs Lawman,” News and Observer 17 December 1968.
96 Shires, “Morgan Seeking Administrator,” 16 December 1968.
97 “Morgan Isn’t Sure,” 17 December 1968.
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As stated earlier by the reporter, William Shires, many newspapers and
98individuals referred to the SBI as a “super secret” agency. The print media labeled the 
SBI “super secret” because since the early years of the SBI all investigative information 
about cases were closed by North Carolina general statutes and the internal decisions 
about the agency were confidential. Despite the secretive nature of the agency, the news 
media developed limited internal sources for information about the SBI. Undoubtedly, 
the print media had expectations of enjoying a relationship with the new director like 
none they had engaged in prior to his appointment. In addition to building camaraderie 
with the SBI’s investigators, representatives from the print media no doubt also expected 
to develop a rapport with the new director.
Headlines in major newspapers around the state of North Carolina, proudly 
announced one of their own who garnered the leading position in the state’s top law 
enforcement agency. The headline in the local newspaper in Wilmington, North Carolina 
read, “Former Newsman Heads NC SBI.”99 Another newspaper headline read, “Dunn to 
Head SBI for Morgan: He May Please Tar Heels.”100 The Goldsboro News Argus 
headline read, “Governor Moore’s Top Assistant: Morgan Names Dunn New Director of 
SBI.”101 In the history of SBI directors, Charles Dunn’s background as the seventh SBI 
director was unique. Three of the previous directors’ backgrounds were in jurisprudence, 
one was in science, and one was in local law enforcement. The SBI director who had 
experience in law enforcement was appointed twice as director.
Unlike his predecessors, Dunn’s educational background was markedly different 
from the other directors. Dunn graduated from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill in 1956 with a degree in political science. After graduating he worked as a 
reporter for the Hertford County Herald, the Chapel Hill Weekly, and the Durham 
Morning Herald.
98 Shires, “Morgan Seeking Administrator,” 16 December 1968.
99 “Former Newsman Heads NC SBI,” Wilmington Star News 24 December 1968.
100 Ann McAdams, “Dunn Head SBI for Morgan: He May ‘Please’ Tar Heels,” Raleigh Times 23 
December 1968.
101 “Governor Moore’s Top Assistant: Morgan Names Dunn New Director of SBI,” Goldsboro 
News Argus 16 December 1968.
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Dunn then left the newspaper business to become a legislative assistant to 
Congressman Horace Kornegay. In 1964, Dunn at the age of 34, became the youngest 
political appointee in Governor Daniel K. Moore’s administration. Dunn was one of 
Moore’s administrative assistants. As administrative assistant to Moore, Dunn worked 
with David S. Coltrane, Chairman of the Good Neighbor Counsel, and as a spokesperson 
for the Governor, Dunn became the Governor’s chief advisor during the period of racial 
unrest in the state of North Carolina during the 1960s.102 Having a political science 
degree, experience in journalism and being an administrative assistant to the Governor, 
provided Dunn with a profile of unique experience never possessed by any former SBI 
director. Not only did Dunn hold a number of distinctive positions but he also gained 
respect and admiration among politicians, reporters as well as the citizens in a state 
plagued by racial turmoil and civil unrest through published newspaper articles in which 
he articulated his views on human relations and the civil unrest the state has been 
experiencing. A few weeks prior to Dunn’s appointment as SBI director, he expressed 
his concerns as a human relations advocate that would extend into community policing 
strategies in the SBI. Dunn said, “Government, on any level, to be effective in the area of 
human relations, needs to involve more people.... He saw government as a bridge 
between the past and the future... and called for all citizens to help strengthen programs to 
help promote a better way of life and to devise new programs to provide greater 
opportunities.”103
In the press release, Attorney General Robert Morgan said this appointment 
“pleases me and I think it will please the people of North Carolina.” Dunn as the SBI 
director “could write a new chapter in the history of the bureau.” The SBI cannot 
“continue to be a stepchild of state government.”104 Although Dunn was recognized as a 
journalist who had worked for several newspapers, “It was politics, not ink, that really
102 “Former Newsman Heads NC SBI,” 24 December 1968.
103 “Dunn: Agencies See Responsibilities,” Raleigh Times 6 December 1968.
104 McAdams, “Dunn Head SBI,” 23 December 1968.
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flowed through Dunn’s veins and it was in the political world that he would make his 
greatest contribution.”105
Dunn’s political background as well as his background in journalism proved to be an 
asset to the SBI when he became director. In Dunn’s acceptance speech as SBI director, 
he alluded to his relationship with law enforcement and the agency’s needs.
It is precarious for newly elected politicians and appointees to request budgetary 
assistance from the General Assembly early in their administration; however, Dunn was 
not inhibited by his recent appointment to the position of SBI director nor was he press 
shy. Within the first month following his appointment, newspaper headlines announced, 
“Dunn Says SBI Needs More Men, Equipment” and in the article Dunn said, “I’ve got to 
figure out how to convince the General Assembly of what we need.”106 Through 
newspaper articles, Dunn was effectively working toward achieving the outcome he 
desired from the General Assembly. Dunn’s journalistic and political background 
equipped him with the political tactics that assisted him in attaining the resources the SBI 
required and benefited him in is role as director. Another headline read, “Manpower 
Increase Sought for SBI by Director Dunn.”107 Dunn reiterated, “This job is a challenge 
and a chance to contribute something. The challenge is to make this an efficient and 
effective assistance agency for local police.”108 At the outset of his tenure as SBI 
director, Dunn’s career trajectory was proceeding along a successful path as he continued 
to receive positive press coverage that enhanced his political and public support.
Unlike previous SBI directors, Dunn was well known among state capital 
politicians as a result of his experiences in politics as well as journalism. When Attorney 
General Morgan and SBI Director Dunn met with Governor Bob Scott in a budget 
drafting conference they discussed the needed improvements in the SBI, and Governor 
Scott endorsed their request. Governor Scott said he would request appropriations from
105 “Charles Dunn: Achievement and Service,” The Herald-Sun 1 November 1996.
106 “Dunn Says SBI Needs More Men, Equipment,” Goldsboro New Argus 27 January 1969.
107 “Manpower Increase Sought For SBI by Director Dunn,” News and Observer 19 February
1969.
108 “Dunn Says SBI,” 27 January 1969.
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the General Assembly to assist the SBI in three areas. Those areas included increasing 
the number of agents, improving laboratory facilities, and the addition of a narcotics 
division. At that time, the SBI had seventy-one employees including the director. There 
were forty-one special agents, eight crime lab technicians, nineteen stenographers, two 
administrators and the director.109 With the assistance of reporters and their positive 
coverage in statewide newspapers, Dunn’s first term was prosperous as SBI director, and 
his career trajectory thrived.
Dunn understood the minutiae of lobbying politicians and maximizing the 
benefits of the print media to accomplish his objectives. Consequently, the 1969 General 
Assembly approved forty-four employee positions; twenty-eight of those were positions 
for SBI agents.110 Also, funds were appropriated for four mobile crime laboratories. The 
funding enabled Dunn to expand SBI services. He was able to create three new positions 
and two new field offices. The three new SBI positions included two supervisory 
positions for the newly created field offices and a position for an assistant director for the 
crime laboratory.111
As a result of the approved funding in 1969, Dunn also formed a narcotics 
division and the first canine unit with agents specializing in the investigation of illegal 
drug activities.112 With every headline, Dunn who was already popular garnered 
additional popularity among politicians, the public, and the press. His ideas captured 
newspaper headlines around the state and the articles portrayed the new young top law 
enforcement officer of the state as an innovative thinker.113
Dunn had original ideas and did not resist changing the status quo.114 When Dunn 
became SBI director, he made headlines with many “first” time programs and decisions
109 Jack Childs, “Scott is Expected to Bolster SBI,” News and Observer 10 February 1969.
110 “SBI Adds New Agents,” News and Observer 29 June 1969.
111 “Assistant SBI Chief Appointed,” News and Observer 15 August 1969.
112 “Expert Trained In Drug Sniffing,” News and Observer 10 June 1969.
113 “Training Problem Dogs SBI: SBI Agent P.H. Kelly Puts German Shepherd on the Scent of 
Narcotics,” News and Observer 19 August 1969.
114 “Dunn Makes Promotions in SBI,” News and Observer 12 January 1969.
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that pioneered the way for changes that were taking place at the time and with every 
headline and article, he reinforced his position as SBI director and made a positive impact 
on his career trajectory. He employed the first African American special agent in the 
SBI Dunn said early after his appointment that he would “actively seek to increase its 
ranks through recruiting regardless of race.”115 He also implemented the “SBI Think 
Tank” which consisted of agents discussing unsolved sensational murder cases in order to 
find new investigative leads to pursue in these high profile cases.116
Like Hoover, Dunn placed a high emphasis on hiring qualified agents and 
training. In order to train the twenty-eight agents chosen to fill the twenty-eight positions 
the General Assembly approved funding for during the previous month, Dunn established 
the first formal SBI training academy. It was held on the campus of University of North 
Carolina at Asheville and began in July 1969. Seeking the most qualified person to 
supervise the training, Dunn named, Claude Davis, a former SBI agent with the North 
Carolina Department of Community Colleges Law Enforcement Training Division to 
head the academy.117 Like the previously referenced “first” that Dunn was credited with, 
the first training academy also received print media attention that continued to strengthen 
Dunn’s career trajectory as a successful director. According to a Greensboro News and 
Record editorial, Charles Dunn’s “first six -year stint left the SBI with beefed-up 
facilities and more college graduates in its ranks. The SBI’s image added greater 
sophistication as well as a high profile -  all to his credit.118
To illustrate the significance of the agency’s image to the director there was one 
cardinal rule taught in the SBI academy that was recommended as a guideline for agents 
making decisions in official matters. Bill Hunt, the training director under Dunn taught 
the SBI’s “cardinal rule” and it was, “do not do anything that will embarrass the SBI. 
From now on when you make decisions in your private or official life that decision can
115 “SBI Hires 1st Negro Agent,” News and Observer 5 April 1969.
116 Lewis, “SBI Plans Think Tank,” 14 February 1969.
117 “Academy to Train SBI Agents,” News and Observer 29 June 1969.
118 “Welcome Words Now, Let’s Hope New SBI Director Carries Them Out,” Greensboro News 
and Record 5 November 1991.
2 0 0
affect the agency and your career with the agency.” This philosophy was consistent with 
Dunn’s philosophy during his administration, and foreshadowed the outcome of Dunn’s 
career trajectory based on the wrong decision in a tragic law enforcement crisis and 
ensuing news releases to newspaper reporters.119
As one of Dunn’s agents acknowledged, the SBI’s image improved directly as a 
result of Dunn’s ability to work well with the media. The new director’s rapport with 
reporters was an important quality that benefited the agency as well as the new director. 
The agent expressed, “Under Charles Dunn we got a lot of publicity. That was all very 
positive for us and every time we would have a case of any magnitude, Charles Dunn 
would be there on the scene. He would be interviewed and give news releases to the 
newspapers and that was good because it projected a very positive image of the 
Bureau.”120 Although Dunn kept the lines of communication open between the 
newspapers and his office, he was guarded and judicious in his comments in high profile 
investigations. Dunn emulated Hoover’s use of the print media in high profile 
investigations to maintain a positive career trajectory more successfully than any of the 
former SBI directors. According to W. S. Hunt, Dunn’s decisions and changes shaped 
and molded the SBI into a modem state investigative organization.
Conclusion
During the 1960s while the FBI experienced a positive public image at the onset 
of the community-policing era, the SBI experienced a decline in its image. Community 
policing practices were unable to reverse the negative affect of the print media publicity 
surrounding the SBI’s high profile internal investigation involving one of its own, Special 
Agent John Boyd. Acting Director Durham was faced with making critical decisions 
during the interim period between Anderson and McBryde. In addition to other 
administrative decisions, he was delegated the responsibility of handling the dismissal of
119 Hunt.
120 Gilbert.
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John Boyd. Attorney General Bruton chose to replace Durham with Myron McBryde, a 
former FBI Special Agent, after Durham’s limited tenure.
McBryde succeeded in advancing the SBI’s professional position among law 
enforcement agencies by implementing a narcotics division and successfully secured 
funds to initiate a mobile narcotics training and education vehicle. McBryde successfully 
directed several high profile investigations that were solved during his administration; 
however, his effort to solve several unsolved high profile cases with the assistance of the 
print media near the end of his career did not benefit his career trajectory. The 
conclusion of McBryde’s administration occurred when constituents elected a new 
attorney general. Although the three SBI directors who served during the reform era 
emulated Hoover’s style of print media coverage of high profile investigations, none of 
them successfully maintained their position to Hoover’s extent. Their publicity tactics 
were successful on a limited short-term basis. Attorney General Robert Morgan 
appointed Charles Dunn to succeed McBryde, and Dunn advocated policy reform and 
agency reorganization during his tenure as director. Charles Dunn, an experienced 
journalist, demonstrated a publicity style that was more like Hoover than any of the 
directors who preceded him. Dunn was credited with making organizational changes that 
had more long-term affects on the agency than any of the SBI directors before him.
Agents like Ray Garland, the 17th agent hired with the original SBI, witnessed the 
growth of the agency firsthand that resulted from Dunn’s leadership and his predecessors. 
He said, when he transferred to Raleigh, he worked under Dunn. Up until 1969, the 
bureau only had four districts but during Dunn’s first tenure as director an additional two 
districts were created. Garland remembered when the SBI had less than twenty 
employees.121 However, “during the time of Dunn’s administration the SBI had more 
than 300 agents and 200 support personnel.”122
Dunn created a powerful organization of professional agents and his name was 
tantamount with the SBI agency. Once he became director, Dunn’s name was to the SBI 
much like Hoover’s name was to the FBI. Dunn, although never an agent himself,
121 Ray Garland, Personal Interview of Former SBI Special Agent and Deputy Director, 10 April
1998.
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became a charismatic leader with the support of his agents, politicians, and positive print 
media. Dan Gilbert, an SBI district supervisor, described Dunn as, “not a good 
administrator, but an outstanding administrator. He had the knowledge, he had the 
energy, he had the interest and that was his key trait. He was interested in the 
organization, loyal and dedicated to staying and getting the bureau operating.”123 Dunn’s 
career trajectory was seemingly secure. He had the respect of his agents. He worked 
well with politicians and newspaper reporters. Both traits benefited the agency as well as 
fortified his position as director.
Dunn was credited with bringing recognition to the State Bureau of Investigation. 
Gilbert said, “The SBI was made readily known to the Legislators and everybody else, 
not only members of the Legislature, but to everybody in the state.... Most people didn’t 
know what the SBI was. They [the public] had never had any dealings with them [the 
SBI] and never saw anything in the newspaper about them [SBI], We got a lot of 
publicity and some criticism from that standpoint. But more importantly than the 
criticism was the positive benefit of putting us on the map and bringing us out of the 
closet and exposed to the citizens of this state. That was the far-reaching advantage.”124
Dunn demonstrated a history of using the media with positive results on his career 
trajectory. Nonetheless, in all the news releases he made, he never made capricious 
releases; they were always well orchestrated and delivered purposefully. Dunn 
masterfully used the media to benefit his career trajectory. Dunn’s wife, Martha, 
emphasized how Dunn always responded to important investigations, “The SBI was his 
life. He loved it; he would travel anywhere in the state where there was an important 
case, check on his agents and talk with the newspaper reporters when they were around. 
It didn’t make any difference what time of day or night it was either.” 125 Dunn frequently 
would fly to the scene of high profile investigations using the North Carolina Highway 
Patrol helicopter and make news releases. Not only would Dunn make releases but he
122 “Easley Removing Dunn as SBI Chief,” News and Observer 2 February 1993.
123 Gilbert.
124 Gilbert.
125 Martha Dunn, Personal Interview of Former SBI Director Charles Dunn’s Wife, 7 August
1999.
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would answer question as well. This was a characteristic that added to his success 
because other law enforcement agency officials would only make prewritten news 
releases, frequently not answer question from the press or make it their policy to make 
“no comment” at all to the media.
As a result of Dunn’s directness, Dunn established a rapport with the press that 
benefited his career trajectory. Charles Dunn was a man of integrity, dedicated to law 
enforcement and the SBI. Former Attorney General and SBI Director Robert Morgan 
described Dunn as having a different philosophy from his. Morgan said Dunn had to be 
at the scene when a major case took place.126 However, “Pete Batton, a probation-parole 
officer and friend... said Dunn was able to see the core of the problem. ‘Everyone who 
works in the criminal justice system understands it’s not a system, it’s fragmented. 
Charles always felt that if you were able to coordinate the efforts, you could get to kids 
before they commit the crime and prevent the mistakes.’”127 Dunn approached high 
profile investigations using the same strategy. He was dedicated to improving society 
and sought to be involved in investigations and participate in solving them from the core 
or from their beginning. Staff writer Ruth Sheehan of the News and Observer wrote, 
“Charles Dunn was known to many as Mr. SBI. Candid and no-nonsense in his 
approach, he served as director of the State Bureau of Investigation... and is credited with 
upgrading the agency.”128
While Hoover and SBI directors incorporated limited community-policing 
strategies into police practices, the major influencing factors on their career trajectories 
continued to include print media and high profile investigations. Hoover resolutely took 
advantage of the print media to persuade and maintain his following of supporters both 
public and political. At the state level, although an elected official, the state attorney 
general, was the primary source of authority over the SBI director’s position, SBI 
directors’ career trajectories during this period continued to be directly impacted by the 
newspaper’s published responses to high profile investigations. Positive commentary by
126 Morgan.
127 “Former SBI Director Charles Dunn Dies,” The Durham Herald Sun 6 November 1996.
128 Ruth Sheeham, “Dunn, Twice SBI Chief, Dies at 62,” News and Observer 6 November 1996.
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the print media was beneficial in reinforcing and promoting directors’ career trajectories; 
however, negative commentary was difficult to overcome and capable of destroying 
career trajectories.
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